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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF
STATE GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION

Getachew Melkie
Old Dominion University, 2013
Director: Dr. John R. Lombard

Since thel980s, privatization has gained increasing acceptance among state
governments. Yet, few empirical studies have investigated the factors influencing the
level o f state government privatization focusing on a multitude o f programs and
services aggregated across departments. Most prior state level empirical research has
emphasized single cases or programs but has not addressed the aggregate level o f
privatization undertakings across the states. The paucity o f empirical research that
investigated the amount of state privatization and the drivers thereof created an
important gap in the literature that this study attempted to fill. Drawing on historical
and contemporary privatization literature, this research examined the influences o f
variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors on the
level o f state government privatization.
This study employed ordinal logistic regression and tested fourteen hypotheses
and four state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and
ideological) and developed a fifth model o f best fit. The bivariate results show that all
but state pension spending and political culture variables were insignificant. The
multivariate results indicate that in the socioeconomic model only state pension
spending variable was significant in the expected direction and the hypothesis was

supported. In the economic model, state per-capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and
state deficits were significant in the opposite direction than expected and the
hypotheses were not supported. With the exception of the political culture, all the
variables in the political model were insignificant. The traditionalistic political culture
was significant at both the bivariate and multivariate level, but in the opposite
direction than expected and the hypothesis was not supported. The moralistic political
culture was significant in the expected direction, but its significance disappeared in the
model o f best fit. All the variables in the ideology model failed to achieve statistical
significance. In general, the analysis reveals that a large part of the variance in the
dependent variable remained unexplained.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that socioeconomic, political, and
ideological factors are less likely to influence state government privatization. On the
other hand, the findings do suggest that economic factors matter; although the
influences o f the significant variables in the economic model were in the opposite
direction than expected, the findings nonetheless appear to provide tentative support to
the argument in the literature that economic factors are more likely to influence the
level o f privatization by state governments.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After more than a century in which the worldwide trend has been toward the
growth o f government, a strong movement has emerged in the past decade to
reduce government.... This movement is best known as the privatization
movement.... Current political and economic trends will make privatization a
policy direction o f fundamental social significance for the future (Report o f the
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 229).
The study by the Council o f State Government (CSG) reveals the following.
The topic o f privatization.. .seems to have re-emerged recently as a
controversial management issue for state policymakers. Governors, agency
directors and legislatures in many states are asking for either further promotion
or curtailment o f such public-private partnership cooperation to deal with the
faltering economy and dwindling revenues in the past two to three years. There
appears to be no consensus as to the effectiveness o f privatization in part due
to the lack o f empirical data as well as the complexity of the issue” (Chi,
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.466).
The above quotations aptly describe the controversies surrounding
contemporary privatization and further underscore the importance o f continuing the
empirical investigation to understand not only the drivers o f privatization policy but
also how pervasive privatization has been in the United States since privatization
began in earnest in the early 1980s; these controversies set the background for this
research study, which seeks to analyze and synthesize the development and evolution
o f privatization policy in the historical and contemporary contexts as well as to
examine empirically the factors that are likely to influence the level o f state
government privatization.

2
Background of the Study

The concept o f privatization is multidimensional with important social,
economic, political, and ideological implications. Indeed, the stakes involved in the
contemporary or modem privatization movement involve, among other things,
reducing the size and role of government in society. (The terms contemporary and
modem are used interchangeably in the literature and are used likewise in this study).
The debates over the relative size and role o f government have been recurrent themes
in the federal structure o f the United States since the beginning o f the Republic, and
the debates over the current privatization policy are, in many ways, a reflection of
these competing but enduring American political and intellectual traditions (Kaplan
and Cuciti, 1986).
The contemporary privatization movement has nonetheless created a new
intellectual undercurrent that seeks to reorient government policies away from the
interventionist policies o f the Keynesian orientation to a new strategy that emphasized
the market approach (Boix, 1997; Box, 1999). But the current privatization movement
has further intensified the blurring lines between the public and private sectors (Chi,
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004; Leavitt and Morris, 2004) and has raised fundamental
questions regarding the proper relationships between government and the private
sector. As conceived by the eighteenth century classical economists, the private sector
refers to an environment where free and individual economic activities were regulated
by the market forces o f supply and demand free from government intervention
(Midgley and Livermore, 2009). In the classical period, the terms “free” and
“individual” were the defining characteristics o f privatization (Florio, 2004, p.5).
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Historical accounts, however, reveal that, in the context of the United States,
the role of the federal government changed in the last half of the nineteenth century
during the Progressive Era giving rise to active government intervention in the social
and economic affairs o f society (Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore,
2009; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). The Progressive Era changes and subsequent reforms
altered the scope and structure of governance by reorienting government policies to
address issues o f national scope. Over time the interventionist role o f the federal
government increased leading to the expansion and growth of the public sector.
Guided primarily by demand-side economic theory or Keynesian economic thought,
fiscal policy became an important policy tool to stimulate and stabilize the economy
especially during the periods that included the Great Depression, World War II, the
Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the Civil Right movement of the 1960s. The
resulting intervention, growth, and expansion of the public sector set the stage for the
emergence o f the contemporary privatization movement (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986;
Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
The Report o f the President’s Commission on Privatization (1988) asserted
that the emergence o f the contemporary privatization movement in the United States
was essentially “a reaction against the themes and results o f Progressive thought”
(p.230) that led to subsequent growth and expansion of the public sector. Ginsberg
(2009) contends that the contemporary privatization movement represents a
resurgence o f conservative ideology; the author further states that “conservatism”
refers to the belief in the laissez-faire political and economic ideology that includes
“the free-market economic system, the family, and the traditional religious and
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cultural beliefs” (p. 195). Nonetheless, modem privatization appears to have little
resemblance with the classical political and economic thoughts that only assign a
minimal role for government.
Contemporary privatization appears to be incompatible with conservative
ideology largely because the contemporary usage o f the term privatization is taken to
mean delegation o f services to the private sector that “involve a substantial role for
government” (Savas, 1987, p.278). The traditional meaning of privatization assigns
no role for government, but the modem definition assumes the existence o f some
degree o f government involvement in the privatized arrangement. This inherent
inconsistency o f the contemporary privatization theory has generated controversies
and debates about the proper relationships between government and the private sector.
The multiple and somewhat contradictory meanings and practices o f modem
privatization have spawned claims and counterclaims about the benefits and
detriments o f privatization and have complicated the efforts of scholars to delineate
the actual drivers o f privatization policy.
However, largely inspired by microeconomic-based theories, the use o f
privatization policy has been justified primarily on grounds of economic efficiency.
Economic drivers are widely cited in the literature as the primary determinants of
privatization, but the empirical evidence is somewhat ambiguous. Studies show that,
in addition to economic factors, privatization policy is also influenced by
socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors as well. While the debates over
privatization policy remain unsettled, privatization nonetheless continues unabated at
all levels o f government, and research has yet to unravel the breadth and scope of

privatization undertakings as well as the factors that drive the level o f state
government privatization across the country.
Drawing on historical and contemporary literature on privatization, this
research investigates the level o f state government privatization by examining the
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors. The rest o f this chapter
presents the statement o f the problem, the purpose of the study, the significance o f the
study, the contribution o f the study, and the research question. Also included in this
chapter are: definition o f key terms, methodology, data analysis, potential
determinants o f state government privatization, research hypotheses, assumptions,
limitations, and delimitations of this study. This chapter concludes with an outline of
the organization of the study.

Statement o f the Problem

There is little empirical research in the literature that investigated the factors
influencing the level o f state government privatization focusing on a multitude of
programs and services simultaneously. As indicated in the introductory quotations, in
1988 the President’s Commission on Privatization predicted that privatization would
be a new policy direction with “fundamental social significance” (Report o f the
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 229). While the prediction cannot
be confirmed or denied conclusively based on the available empirical evidence, state
officials have nonetheless expressed concerns about the recent direction and
effectiveness o f privatization (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004).
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Literature shows that, in the United States, the contemporary privatization
movement gained momentum after the election o f Ronald Reagan in 1980 where the
Reagan administration “pressed hard for increased use o f the private sector in
delivering public services at all levels o f government’’ (Allen et al., 1989, p.2).
Subsequently, state governments embraced privatization due largely to unfunded
federal mandates, new and increased services, and the Federal Government’s shift of
functions to the states (General Accounting Office (GAO), 1997; Featherstun,
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Faced with expanded budget deficits, many states adopted privatization policy
and began organizing and managing their previously ad hoc privatization efforts; state
legislatures enacted statutes to encourage privatization and civil service reform and to
make it easier to implement privatization initiatives (GAO, 1997; Featherstun,
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001). The GAO’s 1997 report indicated that governments
needed “to enact legislative and/or resource changes to encourage or facilitate the use
o f privatization. These changes .. .are necessary to signal to managers and employees
that the move to privatization is serious and not a passing fad” (p. 11). GAO’s report
also noted that in addition to enabling legislations, budget cuts and management
reductions prove to be effective in encouraging privatization.
Although prior to the 1980s the use of privatization existed on an ad hoc basis,
the idea of expanded privatization efforts was somewhat unacceptable in many state
governments (Auger, 1999). However, the emphasis on the economic dimension o f
privatization as an efficient means to provide public services eventually attracted the
attention o f state policymakers and privatization gained increasing acceptance among
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states and local governments as a means o f providing efficient and quality services to
the public at low cost to taxpayers (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989;
Pouder, 1996).
The GAO report also noted that, apart from the goals of cost savings and better
quality, lack o f the necessary skills and resources in the public sectors was a
motivating factor to introduce privatization. State governments also engaged in the
privatization scheme for a number of other reasons including the desire to reduce the
size and role o f government (GAO, 1997; Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti,
2001). Government was to be made smaller, less intrusive and less proactive in the
affairs o f both individuals and the private sector. The underlying force behind this
movement was a strong belief in the fundamental superiority of the private sector as
an agent for the provision, production, and delivery of many goods and services, both
public and private (Savas, 1987; President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988; Chi,
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004 ).
But privatization decisions take place in a political environment, and political
considerations serve to impede or expand privatization initiatives. For example,
studies show that Republican governors and legislatures favor more privatization than
their Democratic counterparts. Public employee unions resist privatization because of
fear o f losing their jobs. Studies also point to several instances where public employee
unions launch legal challenges to state efforts to privatize government services based
on state civil service laws. Employee unions also use collective bargaining
agreements to block privatization projects that impact public employees. In some
cases politicians take sides with the unions and favor in-house provision o f services to

8
gamer political support from public employees (GAO, 1997; Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Furthermore, critics o f privatization policy contend that the economic benefits
and the quality services from privatization are illusory because o f the existence o f
hidden costs. They point out that there is transaction costs associated with the
preparations and specifications of contracts as well as with monitoring performances.
According to the critics, at least in the context o f contracting out, these hidden costs
are not accurately estimated and considered in evaluating the cost savings from
privatization (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
Scholars also oppose privatization arguing that privatized arrangements may
create “pathologies” that “combine elements o f government and market failures”
(Morris, 2007, p. 319) as well as “loss of accountability” and recommend using the
“public authorities” as an alternative arrangement “that may take advantage o f privatesector efficiencies while maintaining public accountability” (Leavitt and Morris, 2004,
p. 154). Other researchers have also suggested using managed competition to induce
efficiency in the public sector by allowing both the public and private sectors to
compete in providing services (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
As the preceding discussion indicates, privatization has been widely embraced
by state governments, but its effectiveness has been questioned even by state officials.
In the early years o f the first decade of the 21st century, privatization again re-emerged
as a controversial management issue prompting state policymakers to look for more
empirical research whether to promote or curtail privatization initiatives (Chi, Arnold,
& Perkins, 2004). But the CSG study noted that, in spite o f the lack o f consensus
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about the effectiveness o f privatization, “state officials have continued to privatize due
to the perceived efficiency the private sector might have demonstrated” (Chi, Arnold,
& Perkins, 2004, p. 476).
While economic factors are widely recognized as important drivers of
privatization, the empirical evidence appears to provide weak support to the economic
argument; this raises questions as to whether there are other factors lurking behind the
economic argument that have the potential to influence privatization decisions. The
logical question to ask therefore is: Are there non-economic factors that are likely to
drive state privatization efforts as well? In view o f the opportunities and challenges
that privatization offers, it is certainly appropriate and logical to investigate the level
and drivers o f state government privatization; but little attention has been paid in this
regard. Apart from two studies - GAO’s (1997) study and the 2002 survey conducted
by CSG, a review o f the literature shows that there is no previous study that has
investigated the level or amount of state government privatization.
Similar to the proposed research, the GAO (1997) studied the extent of
privatization efforts in six governments (Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
York, Virginia, and the city o f Indianapolis, Indiana). But a six-state study focusing on
selected projects is not comprehensive enough to explain the drivers o f state
government privatization and the extent o f privatization efforts across the United Sates.
On the other hand, the CSG’s study of 2002 which was published in the Book o f the
States 2004 was relatively more extensive than the study conducted by the GAO. The
CSG’s study involved surveying the “most popular privatized programs and services”
by five departments (correction, education, health & human services, personnel,
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transportation) and covered all the 50 states. The CSG’s study is broad in scope and
comprehensive in approach and is much in tune with the proposed investigation in this
study. But the CSG study appeared to have a singular focus involving only the
economic dimension o f privatization and has not addressed other potential
determinants o f privatization policy such as socioeconomic, political, and ideological
factors in its 50-state survey.
Apart from the two studies mentioned above, most prior state level empirical
research that employed variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and
ideological factors has emphasized single cases or programs but has not addressed the
extent of the spread o f government privatization across the states that are accounted
for by the aforementioned factors. To properly gauge the amount or level o f state
government privatization, it is necessary to consider privatized services by a state
government in aggregate and examine the likely drivers; the paucity o f empirical
research in this regard creates an important gap in the literature that this study attempts
to fill.

The Purpose of the Study

The purpose o f this study is to examine the determinants of the level o f state
government privatization. As indicated in the preceding section, the controversies
surrounding privatization policy are many and varied, and claims and counterclaims
about the benefits and detriments o f privatization abound the literature; nonetheless,
states continue to privatize. Therefore, the proposed study draws on historical and
contemporary literature to understand the social, economic, political, and ideological
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root o f contemporary privatization; building on the literature, this study examines the
level o f state government privatization using socioeconomic, economic, political and
ideological factors.

The Significance o f the Study

This study attempts to examine the factors that influence the level of
privatization undertakings by state governments. This study is significant because the
information gained will provide new insights about the factors that are likely to
influence privatization decisions by state government policymakers. Privatization is
likely to have society wide consequences, both negative and positive, and the lessons
learned in this research can help researchers and policymakers alike to frame the
issues in the proper context. More often than not, the discussions of contemporary
privatization in the United States refer to the role of governments in the provision o f
goods and services in a privatized arrangement and the policy choices governments
make are likely to have significant implications, among other things, for accountability
and democratic governance.
Governments are representative o f the people and reflect the collective
identity o f the citizenry; as such they are expected to respond to diversity as well as to
promote social equity in privatization decisions (Box, 1999). Hefetz and Warner (2004)
emphasize the need for governments to promote democracy, community building, and
a more socially equitable system o f urban service provisions. Proponents of
representative democracy stress the importance o f having public workforce that
closely resembles the demographic characteristics of the citizenry it serves arguing
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that inclusiveness would provide legitimacy to government practices (Oldfield, 2003).
However, government policies are not free from controversies. For example,
advocates o f social equity express their concerns by arguing that government agencies
give less attention to the interests o f disadvantaged groups while they tend to provide
better services to citizens of higher social, economic, and political status (Oldfield,
2003).
Governments make important decisions about what services to privatize and
the circumstances under which privatization should occur (Featherstun, Thornton II,
and Correnti, 2001). Seemingly, many programs targeted for privatization are
perceived to affect the lives o f millions o f people, and the policy choices governments
make can undermine or promote social justice, equality, as well as trust in government.
In view o f the concerns about the impact o f privatization on society, investigating the
factors that drive the level of state government privatization is certainly warranted.

The Contribution of the Study

This research will fill the previously highlighted gaps in the literature and will
contribute to state comparative literature in general and the theory o f privatization in
particular. The research will contribute to our knowledge base in privatization theory
by empirically investigating the level o f state government privatization that is
accounted for by socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors. By
developing and using a composite privatization index for the level of state government
privatization, the dependent variable, this research will examine the relationships
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between the dependent variable and the independent variables related to
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors.
The use o f a privatization index that takes into account several types of services
that states privatize is a new approach o f investigation; if this empirical investigation
provides support to the hypothesis that privatization policy is significantly influenced
by non-economic factors, the information learned in this study may then stimulate new
questions or new hypotheses for subsequent studies. Over time, a body o f research
evidence would accumulate from which less ambiguous general conclusions about the
determinants o f privatization policy can be drawn. Furthermore, if the findings o f this
study show that non-economic factors have statistically significant associations with
the level o f government privatization at state level, then the findings would dispel the
notion that privatization is solely an economic phenomenon.

The Research Question

This study seeks to examine the factors driving the level state government
privatization. Recent trends in devolutionary government gave greater responsibility to
the states for policy creations and service provisions. As a result states have
concentrated their efforts in providing public services to their citizens using
privatization with varying degrees o f intensity (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti,
2001). Even though privatization has gained increasing acceptance among the states
(Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001), the level o f privatization initiatives by
state governments is expected to vary because of the unique characteristics o f each
state.
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Studies reveal that states possess unique characteristics that can be attributed to
their respective political cultures, social and economic systems, demographic makeup,
ideological beliefs, religious traditions, as well as institutional capacities (see Elazar,
1984; Bowman & Kearney, 1988; Berry & Berry, 1992; Erikson, Wright, & Mclver,
1993; Dresang & Gosling, 2008). Therefore, building on historical and contemporary
privatization theory, this research study examines the factors influencing the level of
privatization by state governments. The overarching research question that this study
attempts to answer is: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization?

Definition o f Key Terms and Constructs
K ey terms

States - refer to the forty-eight contiguous states and Alaska and Hawaii. District of
Columbia and other US territories are excluded.
Services - this term refers to both goods and services. Following Savas (1987; 2000)
usage, the terms goods and services or simply services are used interchangeably.
Provision of services - refers to provision, production, and delivery o f goods and
services unless otherwise indicated to mean something else, in which case the meaning
of the term should be understood in the context in which it is used.
Level of State Government Privatization - the level of privatization that a state
government has undertaken.
Constructs

The following four categories of constructs will be used in this study. The constructs
will be operationalized as supported by the literature as shown in Chapter II.
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Socioeconomic factor - this term is used as a generic reference to social class, social
equity, and socioeconomic status and related terms. Oldfield (2003) used some
variant of these terms to examine the role o f social class in understanding government
responses arguing that “Although, technically, the terms social class, socioeconomic
status, class, and similar terms have slightly different meanings, they all entail notions

o f comparative rank, usually based on income, education, and wealth” (p.441; italics
in original). This study employs social, social equity, and socioeconomic terms
interchangeably to examine the relationships between social factors and the level of
state government privatization. The socioeconomic concept will be operationalized
using three variables: state healthcare spending, state pension spending, and state per
capita personal income.

Economic factor - this term is used to refer to fiscal policy of taxing and spending as
well as to other economic indicators such as the unemployment rate. Economic and
fiscal factors are used interchangeably. The economic concept is operationalized using
four variables: labor costs, state per capita spending, fiscal capacity, and deficit.

Political factor - this is expressed in terms of the responses of politicians to different
pressure groups such as labor unions, environmental groups, think tanks and the like.
As such the political factor accounts for the political environment that is likely to
promote or constrain the level o f state government privatization. For example, the
Republican Party is perceived to favor more privatization than the Democratic Party;
strong public employee unions resist privatization than weak unions.

16
Political culture also plays a role in politics as, for example, Elazar (1984)
asserts: “Political culture is particularly important as the historical source of
differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the
various states” (p. 110). Elazar conceptualized and identified three political cultures:
individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic each of which will be detailed in a latter
section. Political factor is operationalized using four variables: union power (union
laws), the party of the governor controlling state government, the party controlling the
legislature, and political culture.
Ideology factor - is defined as the need to reduce the size and scope of government;
noninterference in the free market economy; belief in the superiority o f the private
sector relative to the public sector. Since the political and ideological concepts are
multidimensional, some of the measures of these two constructs appear to overlap.
Political culture is a case in point. Political cultures refer to “habits, perspectives, and
attitudes” (Elazar, 1984, p.l 10) which are acquired over a long period o f time and
assume meanings relevant to measure the ideology construct. For example, the belief
in the superiority o f the marketplace is believed to be an ideological concept, which is
also a “perspective” derived from the 18th century laissez-faire economic and
political philosophy which has come to be a habit, attitude, or a belief system over
time.
Likewise institutional capacity may well serve as a measure o f political
construct. One o f the reasons why governments privatize services is lack o f skilled
personnel in the public sector and is reflected in the decisions of governments to
privatize services; this is essentially an issue related to institutional capacity. However,
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in this study institutional capacity is used to measure the ideology construct because of
the fact that institution building is fundamentally based on and informed by the
underlying ideology o f a given society. The ideology factor is operationalized using
three variables: state policy liberalism, state ideology index, and state institutional
capacity. State policy liberalism is another name for government policy. On the other
hand, the term state ideology refers to the ideology of the citizens of the states.

Methodology

The objective o f this study is to examine the factors that are likely to influence
the level o f state government privatization. The overarching research question this
study attempts to answer is: What factors predict the level o f state government
privatization? To answer this question, secondary data from various sources are
collected. The variable o f interest, that is, the dependent variable is the level o f state
government privatization (LSGP) across the states and is measured at ordinal level.
LSGP is defined and operationalized based on the 2002 Council of State Governments
(CSG) survey responses for four classes o f services: corrections, education, health and
human services, and transportation. That is, the conceptual definition is
operationalized using the responses o f state agency heads to the CSG’s question:
“How many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The
answers to this question for the four classes of services are used to operationalize the
dependent variable.
The four services were selected out of the five classes of services that the CSG
identified in its 2002 survey as “the most popular privatized services” and published in

The Book o f the States (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.477). However, the fifth,

personnel programs and services, has over 30% missing data on the responses to the
aforementioned question and is not included in this study. Based on the values for the
four classes o f services, an index o f the level of state government privatization is
constructed using summated rating scales, which in turn are transformed into three
ordinal levels o f low, medium and high level of privatization. This study also uses 14
independent variables measured at interval/ratio, ordinal, and nominal scales.

Data Analyses

Ordinal regression is used to analyze and test the hypothesized relationships
between the level o f state government privatization (LSGP) and the explanatory
variables. Appropriate model fit indices will be used to evaluate each factor. Ordinal
regression is used because o f the ordered nature o f the constructed dependent variable.
States serve as the unit o f analysis.

Potential Determinants (IVs) o f the Level of State Government Privatization

Researchers have employed a number of variables related to socioeconomic,
economic, political, and ideological factors to empirically investigate privatization
programs in different contexts. Likewise, in this study, several economic and non
economic variables are utilized to investigate the level o f privatization undertakings at
state level. Fourteen variables are used as independent variables. The variables are:
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labor costs (compensation o f public employees), state per capita spending, state
deficit, state fiscal capacity; per capita personal income; state health care spending,
and state pension spending; state union laws, state political culture, party affiliation of
the governor controlling state government, the party controlling state legislature; state
policy liberalism, state ideology, and state institutional capacity; based on these
variables, fourteen hypotheses are developed and tested in this study. This study also
models how well four general factors o f socioeconomic, economic, political, and
ideology explain variation in the level state government privatization.

Research Hypotheses

HI: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with lower health care expenditures.
H2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
H3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have lower level
of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal income.
H4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level of state
government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
H5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
H6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level o f state
government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
H7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
H8: States with weak union laws are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with strong union laws.
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H9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic political
culture.
H10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level of state
government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
H l l : States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled
legislature.
H12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have higher level
of state government privatization than states with liberal government policy
H13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
H14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower level of
state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.

Assumptions

“Assumptions are statements that are taken to be true even though the direct

evidence o f the truth is either absent or not well documented” (Plichta and Garzon,
2009, p. 15; italics in original). For the variable o f interest, that is, the dependent
variable, this study uses pre-existing survey data collected by CSG between October
2002 and December 2002 (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). However, the survey is
silent about the specific procedures followed to apply/implement the survey
instrument in conducting the survey and does not provide information on the
collection, aggregation, and interpretation o f the data; if these issues are addressed by
the researchers, then the documentation is not made available for this study, and
several attempts to contact the researchers directly at the Council o f State Government
(CSG) by email and telephone ware not successful.
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Therefore, this study assumes that: 1) common terms and concepts associated
with privatization o f public goods and services are used correctly, 2) the selected
participants in the survey understood the concepts and responded accurately to the
survey questions, 3) the data collected in each state measure accurately the public
services provided in that state, 4) the interpretation of the data accurately reflect the
perceptions o f the respondents, 5) the data collection process is not unduly influenced
by politicians, bureaucrats, and other stakeholders, and 6) appropriate procedures are
used to check for response biases.

Limitations

“Limitations are weaknesses.. .that potentially limit the validity of the results”

(Plichta and Garzon, 2009, p. 15; italics in original) and “are not under the control o f
the researcher” (Irby & Lunenburg, 2008, p. 133). This study uses secondary data
from multiple sources, but the accuracy o f the data cannot be verified, raising
questions o f validity. Welch and Comer (1988) made an important observation
pertaining to the problem o f testing the validity o f measures in research studies
especially in the social sciences including policy research saying “that there are no
hard and fast rules for testing whether a measure is valid” (p.42). However, a number
o f steps can be taken to check the validity o f the measures, including using simple
common sense or intuition to check for face validly; to review the literature to find out
whether the measures have been used in other studies to measure the same concepts
that this study attempts to measure (Welch & Comer, 1988).
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Sample size may be an issue. The CSG survey covered all the 50 states, but
only the data for 34 states are usable. The remaining 16 states have incomplete,
missing, and outlier data and are excluded from the analysis; this is a threat to external
validity in that the results cannot be generalized to all the 50 states. However, the
characteristics o f the 16 excluded states are compared with the characteristics o f the
34 states included in this study using a t-test for sample bias. As Appendix D shows
there is only one variable that demonstrates a significant mean difference between the
two groups. Also history may affect external validity because the data collected for
both the dependent and independent variables are for 2002, and some of the measures
may have changed (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003). Moreover, confounding
variables may also impact the validity o f the conclusion o f this study; for example,
while the selfish actions of politicians and bureaucrats are assumed to exist, their
influences on the level o f state government privatization cannot be directly detected,
measured, and assessed. That is, the indirect influence o f the utility maximizing
behaviors o f the actors may have altered to a certain degree the relationships between
the independent variables and the dependent variables leading to a conclusion with
questionable validity. As Creswell (2009) suggests, this study addresses the limitations
and potential spurious results in the conclusion.

Delimitations

“Delimitations are boundaries in which the study was deliberately confined”

(Plichta and Garzon, 2009, p. 15; italics in original). This study is confined to an
investigation o f privatized services aggregated by four departments (correction,

23
transportation, education, and health & human services) and does not attempt to
examine specific services or programs that are likely to be privatized by each
department. Also for the dependent variable, the study is confined by data collected in
2002 and does not attempt to look beyond the prescribed one-year time frame.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter I provided an introduction and
background o f the study followed by the statement of the problem, the purpose o f the
study, the significance o f the study, the contribution of the study, and the research
question. Chapter I also included the definition o f key terms, the methodology, the
data analysis, the potential determinants o f state government privatization, the
research hypotheses, the assumptions, the limitations, and the delimitations of this
study. Chapter II presents the literature review followed by the discussion of the
methodology in Chapter III. Chapter IV provides the results, and Chapter V covers
the conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter reviews the privatization literature to provide the background
information and the rationale for conducting research on the factors that influence the
level o f state government privatization by state governments. Specifically, this study
examines the extent to which variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political,
and ideological factors drive the level o f state government privatization. While
evidence in the literature shows the existence o f wide variations in the level of state
government privatization (GAO, 1997; Chi, K., Arnold, K., & Perkins, H., 2004),
there is little empirical research that investigates the factors influencing the level or
amount o f privatization undertaken by state governments. Most prior state level
empirical studies that employed variables related to socioeconomic, economic,
political, and ideological factors have focused on single cases or programs, and have
not examined the aggregate level of state government privatization accounted for by
the aforementioned factors.
Indeed, after more than three decades o f experimentation in privatization, the
level o f state government privatization, the contributing factors thereof, and the
implications for society have yet to be understood and explained based on empirical
evidence. To properly gauge the level of state government privatization, to identify the
potential factors that are likely to drive the level of privatization by a state government,
and to draw evidence-based conclusion about the implications o f privatization policy
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for society, it is essential to conduct a comprehensive research that takes into account
several classes o f programs and services simultaneously. The lack o f empirical
research on the level o f state government privatization accounted for by variables
related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors creates an
important gap in the literature that this study attempts to fill.
This is a state comparative research, but the subject matter to be examined privatization - is global in scope. It is therefore essential to understand the roots and
philosophical background of contemporary privatization in order to grasp clearly the
meaning and the context in which it is applied by state governments. This study
therefore draws on historical and contemporary privatization literature to understand
and explain the origin o f the philosophical assumptions that inform the development
o f contemporary privatization theory in the global context in general and the United
States in particular. Underlying the rationale for reviewing the privatization literature
from a historical perspective is the belief that contemporary privatization is a
derivation o f the classical market model, the development of which was based on and
informed by the neoclassical economic theory (Sclar, 2000).
Reviewing the historical as well as the contemporary privatization literature
provides useful insights to identify the factors that are most likely to be associated
with level of state government privatization, and to answer the main research question
o f this study, namely, what factors predict the level of state government privatization?
This chapter therefore summarizes the literature, identifies the potential factors that
are expected to influence the level of state government privatization, and concludes
with the development o f research hypotheses.
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The chapter is organized into six major sections which includes several sub
sections. Section one provides an overview of the historical context for the
contemporary privatization movement and highlights the philosophical assumptions
underpinning privatization; this section includes discussions of laissez-faire economic
thought, the Welfare state as a precursor of contemporary privatization movement,
arguments against the interventionist policies with an emphasis on the United States of
America; also the ideological, political, and economic arguments including the
demand-side and supply-side perspectives are summarized in this section. Section two
reviews the background of contemporary privatization in the United States. Section
three covers the definition of privatization. Section four presents a detailed discussion
o f the theory o f privatization which includes the characteristics o f goods, the
arguments for and against privatization, and the reasons why governments privatize.
Section five presents an overview of selected empirical studies. The final section
discusses the factors influencing the level of state government privatization and
concludes with the development of fourteen research hypotheses.

The Historical Context and the Philosophical Basis of Privatization

Historical accounts link modem privatization theory to the laissez-faire
political and economic philosophy that dominated most o f the first hundred years o f
the Republic. But the dominant philosophy came under attack in the second half o f the
19th century as a result o f growing social and economic problems spawned by the
industrialization of the economy, the urbanizations of society, and the growth o f the
population (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis and Mileur, 2005). The economic and
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social changes o f the nineteenth century transformed the political landscape of the
United States giving rise to what is referred to in the literature as the Progressive
movement; the changes o f that period demanded a strong, centralized government that
could provide a “path to social peace, class equilibrium, and industrial democracy”
(Milkis and Mileur, 2005, p. 87).
The Progressive Era changes and subsequent reforms created the conditions for
government to play an active role in society. According to historical accounts, the role
o f government was broad in scope and involved the initiation and development o f
many programs that gradually led to the growth and expansion o f the public sector,
which, in turn, set the stage for the emergence o f contemporary privatization
movement (Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009; Kaplan and
Cuciti, 1986). These historical developments as they relate to the privatization
movement are reviewed in the pages that follow.

Historical Context: The Laissez-Faire Economic Thought

Sclar (2000) noted that “privatization as a method o f providing competitive
public service is derived from modification of the standard market model, the core
element in neoclassical economic theory” (p.6). To understand this linkage, it is
perhaps important to review the historical root of privatization and the philosophical
assumptions upon which it is built. The genesis o f the contemporary privatization
movement can be traced to the eighteenth century laissez-faire economic thought that
is commonly attributed to Adam Smith’s work The Wealth o f Nations (1776) ( Moe,
1987). Adam Smith “propounded the notion of laissez-faire economics and was an
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early advocate o f free enterprise.... Smith believed that an invisible hand governs
financial interactions and that free economic pursuits build economies and create
wealth” (Midgley and Livermore, 2009, p. 196).
Individuals, not groups, are the foundation o f the laissez-faire economic
thought, which asserts that “a large number of buyers and sellers engage in market
exchanges of goods and services with any individual actions having little or no
appreciable impact on the price, quantity, or quality of the product” (Sclar, 2000, p. 6).
The laissez-faire economic thought or more commonly known as the classical
economic theory further assumes that the private sector does not have “organizational
size larger than a single individual” (Sclar, 2000, p. 15), and that individuals enjoy free
and unimpeded entry to or exit from the market.
The eighteenth century economic philosophy suggests that the private sector is
essentially an environment with a self-correcting market system where individual
entrepreneurs pursue their economic activities to maximize their individual profits
without the interference or coercion o f the state. In an effort to maximize their
individual profits, the invisible hand o f the entrepreneurs also benefits the national
economy, leading generally to the creation and accumulation of national wealth. This
simple but elegant economic principle characterized the early period o f capitalist
ideology, which continues to inform the beliefs, customs, and practices o f many
Western societies.
For over two centuries, the values o f individual freedom, personal liberty, the
preeminence o f the private sector, the free market system, and limited government
have been the defining ethos of the Western liberal democracies and remain to be the
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case to this day. Certainly in the United States o f America, “Smith’s ideas remain
widely accepted and popular today. They are fundamental to American economic
activity and law, which attempt to guarantee competition, the pursuit of free economic
development, the avoidance o f monopolies, and relatively little government
interference” ((Midgley and Livermore, 2009, p. 196).
Indeed, laissez-faire capitalism created unprecedented levels o f wealth and
transformed the social, economic, and political landscapes of many Western societies,
but it also produced undesirable consequences such as monopolies, social dislocations,
and instabilities (Sclar, 2000). Beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
Europe and the United States began experiencing the impacts of the industrialization
o f the economy, the rise and influence of corporate power, the urbanization o f society,
and the growth of population and its concomitant social problems (Kettl, 2002; Sclar,

2000).
The self-correcting mechanism that the classical economists attributed to the
laissez-faire economic model either didn’t exist or faltered so much that a belief in the
power o f governments to serve as agents o f positive social changes became
widespread. For example, in the United States, “Citizens came to see the national
government as generally benign and competent - a force for constructive change and a
healthy offset to market failures” (Sclar, 2000, p.viii). Over time, as a reaction to the
social and economic malaise that engulfed societies on both sides o f the Atlantic,
many governments adopted interventionist policies, which gradually led to the
development o f what is now commonly referred to in the literature as the welfare state
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(Kuttner, 1987; McAllister and Studlar, 1989; Sclar, 2000; Boix, 1997; Milkis and
Mileur, 2005; Midgley and Livermore, 2009; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986).

The Welfare State: the Precursor o f Contemporary Privatization Movement

Governments began exerting considerable effort to overcome the economic
difficulties and social instabilities brought on largely by the market forces operating in
the private sector that was deeply enthroned with the capitalist ethos of individual
freedom, self-correcting market system, personal liberty, and minimal government
interference. Although the interventionist policies varied from country to country, in
general, however, many governments responded to the economic and social realities of
the first half o f the twentieth century by subjecting industries to strong regulations,
nationalizing key industries, and expanding social welfare (McAllister and Studlar,
1989; Boix, 1997; Kettl, 2002: Sclar, 2000; Kuttner, 1987). For example, from 194551, the Labor government in Britain nationalized many industries and expanded social
welfare. In 1951, the nationalized industries employed 28 percent o f the workforce,
which represented a significant government involvement in the economy (McAllister
and Studlar, 1989). McAllister and Studlar (1989) made an apt observation when they
said: “From being the primary exponent of laissez-faire economics in the nineteenth
century, Britain moved in the twentieth century to ever-increasing levels o f
government involvement in the economy” (p. 159).
In the United States, partly as a reaction to the Progressive movement, the
responses involved not nationalization o f industries but “strong government
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regulation” to curb the power of the corporate trusts as well as to promote efficiency
and accountability, which Woodrow Wilson argued could be accomplished by
separating politics from administration (Kettl, 2002, p.81). Over time the
interventionist role of the federal government expanded especially during the periods
that included the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War, the Vietnam War,
and the Civil Right movement o f the 1960s. During these periods, on the domestic
front, unprecedented demands were placed on government to play a more active role
in the socioeconomic sphere, and the federal government introduced massive
programs, especially the New Deal programs of the 1930s and the Great Society
programs o f the 1960s (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis and Mileur, 2005; Midgley
and Livermore, 2009).
The New Deal programs o f the 1930s and the Great Society programs of the
1960s represented the largest initiatives undertaken by the federal government since
the founding o f the Republic (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). The New Deal programs were
enacted essentially to cope with the economic disaster that was largely believed to
have been caused by the Great Depression. Although a host of programs were put in
place during the period that was largely associated with the Great Depression, none of
the programs involved nationalization o f private enterprises. Most o f the major
programs appeared to have been designed to provide purchasing (spending) power to
people in order to pull the economy from the depths of the Great Depression. While no
nationalization o f industries took place in the United States of America, government
intervention nonetheless became necessary to correct market failures. In due course of
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time, however, the public sector began experiencing significant growth and continued
expanding throughout the Great Society era.
The Great Society programs were far more expansive and focused primarily on
ending poverty and racial injustices by creating opportunities for the poor (Ylvisaker,
1986; Gifford, 1986). The creation o f opportunities involved providing resources and
skills for the poor as well as outlawing various types of discrimination (Kaplan and
Cuciti, 1986). In essence, the progress made in the early sixties reinforced the beliefs
o f prior generations going as far back as the Progressive Era in the problem-solving
abilities o f government and provided optimism about the positive role that government
can play in society. These beliefs enhanced government involvement and expanded
the type and scope o f the programs created during the Great Society era (Kaplan and
Cuciti, 1986; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
Indeed, the political and economic philosophy o f the Progressive Era that
sought to legitimize active government role in the social and economic lives of society
reached its peak during the Great Society era, culminating in what is today known as
the welfare state. However, the Progressive Era political and economic thoughts in
general and the legacy o f the Great Society in particular were challenged not only on
the basis o f fiscal and economic issues but also on political and ideological grounds as
well. The oppositions, in part, came by way of the privatization movement (Kaplan
and Cuciti, 1986; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
Literature reveals that the growth and expansions o f government that led to the
creation o f the welfare state were believed to be the underlying causes of the
economic problems o f the 1970s that included economic inefficiency, chronic fiscal
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imbalances (large budget deficits), and huge national debt (Donahue, 1989; Hodge,
2000; Kuttner, 1987; 1997; Savas, 1987; 2000). Research further shows that the
regimes o f the welfare state have been characterized by lack of public confidence and
trust in government. These developments in turn led many governments around the
world to abandon the interventionist policies in favor o f limiting the size and scope of
government and promoting privatization policy (Boix, 1997).
While much o f the contemporary research alludes to the public sector
inefficiencies and slow economic growth of the 1970s as reasons for the emergence of
the contemporary privatization movement (Boix, 1997), historical accounts offer
broader explanations, at least in the context of the United States, that appear to be
much more in tune with the long secular changes that had taken place since the
Progressive Era (Report o f the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988).
Viewed in the historical context, therefore, the contemporary privatization
movement is not only a strategy for cost savings or for correcting fiscal imbalances
governments faced, but it is also an attempt to resurrect an ideology that is based on
laissez-faire political and economic thoughts. In other words, the movement toward
privatization is essentially an attempt not only to reorient the fiscal side o f government
but also to alter the political and economic philosophy that gave rise to the
interventionist policies in the first place. In many cases, the ideological battle
manifests itself in the increasing calls by conservative politicians and economists for
limited government and for the transfer o f public services to the private sector. Thus,
the arguments against the interventionist policies and in favor of privatization must be
considered within the context of the long secular developments o f the last hundred
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years that have altered the political and economic orientations of governments around
the world. These themes are the subject o f discussions in the next few pages.

Arguments against the Interventionist Policies

For several decades after the turn o f the twentieth century until the late 1970s,
the interventionist policies became the national strategies for many advanced countries
including the United States of America to spur economic growth, to promote stable
economic policy, to redistribute wealth, to provide public goods and services, and to
improve the welfare o f workers and the least well-off sectors of society (Kuttner, 1987;
Sclar, 2000; Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986). However, research shows that most developed
countries began shifting their domestic economic policies from the interventionist
policies o f the Keynesian orientation to a new strategy that emphasized the market
approach (Boix, 1997; Box, 1999). Studies further reveal that privatization began to
gain salience both in the political debates and in governmental agendas because o f
renewed enthusiasm about the virtues o f the competitive markets and the belief in the
efficiency of the private sector (Boix, 1997; Mitchell, 1988).
The arguments against the interventionist policies were essentially a reaction
against the economic slowdown o f the 1970s, the fiscal imbalances and the related
revenue shortfalls, the growing budget deficits, and the stagflation crisis (Boix, 1997).
While the specific policy prescriptions vary from country to country, in general,
however, the economic malaise o f the 1970s “certainly put into question the politicaleconomic institutions o f the Keynesian post-war consensus and triggered, among state
elites, a search for new approaches to governing the economy” (Boix, 1997, p.477). But
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Boix (1997) also offered a contrasting view regarding the extent to which economic
difficulties and the failure o f “the expansionary policies o f the late 1970s to solve the
stagflation crisis” served as a catalyst for the emergence o f the privatization movement
around the world (Boix, 1997, p. 474).
In reviewing the experiences of some of the Organization for Economic Co
operation and Development (OECD) countries, Boix (1997) noted that “lower growth
rates and larger public deficits did not mechanically trigger the privatization o f public
businesses” (p.477-478). He argued that there was no evidence to show that
privatization strategies were implemented only among countries that experienced bad
economic performances and harsh stagflation crises. “W hile it is true that several
countries suffering long-term economic stagnation, such as New Zealand and the United
Kingdom, engineered vast privatization packages, nations like Japan or Portugal, with
growth rates well above OECD average, engaged in sizeable sales of state assets as
well” (Boix, 1997, p. 478). Moreover, budget deficits/public debt played very little role
in approving privatization packages in many nations. For example, countries such as
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, with huge levels o f public debt, sold hardly any public
corporations (Boix, 1997), which underscores the fact that, in some o f the advanced
economies, fiscal imperatives play at best a marginal role in the privatization decisions.
According to Boix (1997), privatization decisions in OECD countries are
political and institutional in nature, but the author emphasized that the responses o f
individual countries depend largely on the alignment of political forces and institutional
arrangements available at the domestic level. That is, “the privatization movement was
mainly driven by the political actors in power at the time, constrained by the institutional
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settings in which they operated - Conservative governments privatized and left-wing
cabinets did not” (Boix, 1997, p.476). For example, privatization has been the
“centerpiece o f Margaret Thatcher’s three Conservative governments, reflected in the
sale o f publicly-owned industries to the private sector and in the sale of council houses
to their tenants” (McAllister and Studlar, 1989, p. 157).
The argument that conservatives privatize more than left-wing politicians or
liberals suggests that political and ideological preferences figure prominently more than
fiscal concerns in the privatization decisions. In some cases, in an apparent attempt to
project a stance of ideological neutrality, proponents of privatization invoke arguments
saying that voters demand the privatization of public enterprises; but these claims also
become matters o f empirical investigations. For example, in Britain, McAllister and
Studlar (1989) conducted an empirical study to determine the extent to which voters
demand privatization o f public enterprises. They tested two models - the median voter
and the elite interests model - to examine voters’ choices about privatizing public
enterprises. The median voter model argues that privatization policy is a policy
demanded and initiated by voters. In contrast, the elite interests model argues that
privatization decision is government initiated and there is no popular demand for it. The
authors concluded: “The evidence confirms the elite interests model and shows that
public opinion has generally accepted the status quo on the public ownership of
industry” (McAllister and Studlar, 1989, p. 157).
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The Case o f the United States o f America

In the United States of America, the anti-interventionist policy was also triggered
by the economic conditions of the 1970s; much o f the recent literature describes the
contemporary privatization movement as a reaction to the fiscal crisis, growing budget
deficits, and overall macroeconomic problems associated primarily with the welfare
state that was spawned by the Great Society programs (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Milkis
and Mileur, 2005). It is true that the poor economic performance o f the 1970s had
considerable impact on government policies, but there is no unequivocal evidence to
suggest that it was the only factor that contributed to the development of anti
interventionist policies and in favor of privatization policy.
In fact, numerous scholars argue that in the United States, as in Europe, the
political and ideological factors account for much of the shift in public policies and for
the adoption o f privatization policy as a result of the conservative ascendancy to power
in the early 1980s (Savas, 1987; Donahue, 1989; Kuttner, 1997; Sclar, 2000). Thus, in
the United States o f America, explaining the anti-interventionist policies in general and
the movement toward privatization in particular entails, among other things,
understanding the ideological, political, and economic arguments in a historical context.
These arguments are addressed in the next section.

The Ideological Arguments

Studies show that the contemporary privatization movement in the U.S. is “a
reaction against the themes and results of Progressive thought” (Report o f the
President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988, p. 230), and represents a resurgence of
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conservative ideology; as noted elsewhere, conservatism is essentially a belief in the
laissez-faire political and economic ideology including the family, the neighborhood,
the small republic, as well as the cultural beliefs (Ginsberg, 2009). As indicated earlier,
the Progressive movement emerged in the 19th century as a reaction against this
conservative ideology that dominated the early period o f the Republic and sought the
development o f strong central government and the promotion of true national
community in the U.S. (Report o f the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988;
Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009). In many
ways, the Great Society programs represented a concrete expression o f the Progressive
thought (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009).
From the economic perspective, as noted elsewhere in this paper, the Great
Society programs spawned the welfare state setting the stage for the emergence o f the
contemporary privatization movement. With the election o f Ronald Reagan in 1980,
the New Federalism policy that subscribed to the laissez-faire political and economic
ideology began shaping the conservative direction of the nation (Schambra, 1986;
Sclar, 2000; Kuttner, 1987; Brinkley, 1995; Midgley and Livermore, 2009). The
resurgence of the conservative ideology and the desire to change the legacy o f the
Great Society and the Progressive vision eventually led to the emergence o f
contemporary privatization movement (Report o f the President’s Commission on
Privatization, 1988).
Thus, as the preceding discussion clearly illustrates, the privatization movement
was not solely an economic phenomenon or a cost-savings strategy, but it also had an
ideological dimension (Schambra, 1986). While the ideological reasoning against the
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Progressive thought emphasizes a smaller government and a return to the traditional,
small republican values (Ginsberg, 2009), the political argument, at its core, appears to
be developing strategies for attaining or maintaining party control o f the institutions of
government, that is, political power. This political perspective is reviewed below.

The Political Arguments

In discussing the political aspect o f the privatization movement, recent
literature focuses largely on the demands made on governments for actions in an
environment o f sever fiscal constraints; but this is only part of the argument, and it
plays a marginal role when viewed in the context of the broad reforms associated with
the Great Society era and prior decades. Historical accounts unravel the racial and
class or socioeconomic implications inherent in the privatization movement, which
largely became prominent in the 1980s following the decline of the political and
economic thoughts associated with the Progressive Era.
Studies that focused particularly on the Great Society era provide useful
insights that shade some light about the political dimension of privatization.
According to some studies, the Great Society programs were efforts, among other
things, to reduce poverty by providing services through private agencies (Piven and
Cloward, 2005; Reisch, 2009); using private agencies was believed to be important in
order to curtail the influences o f local bureaucracies (Piven and Cloward, 2005; Reisch,
2009). Also, the financial burdens of state and local governments were reduced
because “the traditional grant-in-aid practice of requiring states and localities to match
federal contributions was reduced, to as low as 10 percent in the case o f poverty
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programs, and eliminated altogether in the case o f programs funded under the
Manpower Development and Training Act” (Piven and Cloward, 2005, p. 258). The
Manpower Development and Training Act was designed “primarily for reasons o f cost
efficiency and out o f reluctance to expand public assistance benefits” (Reisch, 2009,
p. 159).
In view o f the strategy highlighted here, one would expect the Great Society
programs to gamer broad national support. In fact, it would be difficult to invoke the
privatization argument on grounds o f insufficient funding and increased demand for
services because of the fact that there was no supporting evidence for such claims. The
problem, however, was that most o f the Great Society programs were targeted to the big
cities, especially to the inner-city populations that were black and poor (Piven and
Cloward, 2005). According to Piven and Cloward (2005), the focus on race, ethnicity,
and class did not bode well for the political future o f the Democratic Party; yet, the
Democratic administration at the time sought to strengthen the allegiance o f urban
blacks because their electoral participation had become particularly important in terms
o f determining the outcome of presidential elections. The political strategy o f the
Democratic Party in the 1960s was to line up the interests o f the Democratic Party with
the policies that promoted antipoverty programs (Piven and Cloward, 2005).
Likewise, the Nixon and Reagan administrations were acting in their political
interest when they reversed the pattern o f the Great Society and began channeling
program authority and funds back to the states and encouraged greater business
participation (Reisch, 2009). For example, according to Donahue (1989), “One o f the
Reagan administration’s earliest, biggest and most-relished budget cuts was the
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elimination o f CETA’s [Comprehensive Employment and Training Act] public service
employment component. When the program came up for reauthorization in 1982, it was
restructured to enlarge the role of the private sector“(p.l81-182).
The preceding analysis suggests that the contemporary privatization argument
that is premised solely on cost effectiveness rationale appears to be less plausible. The
implication o f the political argument is that, even in the absence o f budgetary constraints,
fiscal issues become a rallying point for some conservative groups to oppose federal
programs to the extent that those programs target race, ethnicity or class perhaps because
these groups are perceived to be allies of the Democratic Party. The political dimension
further underscores the fact that political party interest plays a significant part in
defining intergovernmental relationships; that is, shifting program authority and funds to
states and/or localities are likely to occur to the extent that the change o f venues serves
the interests o f the governing political party. The implication here is that competing
party interests play a part in privatization decisions. As Boix (1997) argued in the
context o f European governments where conservatives privatized and their liberal
counterparts did not, in the United States, at least in theory, the Republican Party tends
to privatize and the Democratic Party seeks to restrict it (Sclar, 2000; Savas, 1987; 2000;
Donahue, 1989).
While the political argument discussed above highlights the intricacies inherent
in the privatization policy, the economic perspective offers an argument how the private
sector can expand the economic pie for all to get maximum benefit. However, it is
worth noting that, although political and economic arguments can be differentiated
theoretically, the degree to which political and economic considerations can be separated
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unambiguously, at least in the context o f privatization discussion, is very much an open
question. More often than not, economic arguments overlap with political and
ideological arguments, and this limitation is evident in this study. The next section
focuses on the economic argument.

The Economic Arguments

Recent privatization literature alludes to decreasing public resources and
citizens increasing demand for services as the underlying factors driving the
contemporary privatization movement; while this may be partly the case in the past
thirty years or so, the major cause that underpins the movement towards privatization
is deeply rooted in competing economic philosophies. Much of the debate over the
privatization policy from an economic perspective has reflected differences between
those who support government intervention and those who support theories of a
market economy.
Although the extreme case of government intervention involving
nationalization o f industries did not occur in the United States (Kolderie, 1986; Moe,
1987; Donahue, 1989), government nonetheless employed regulatory and managerial
strategies as well as fiscal tools as it assumed an active role in the economy (Brinkley,
1995). But, in the 1980s, the conservative regime sought to promote economic growth
through restrictive monetary policy, deregulation, tax cuts, private saving, and
investment. In essence, conservative regimes sought to alter the direction o f
government policies towards privatization. The difference was thus, in pure economic
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terms, between demand-side and supply-side macroeconomic doctrines (Midgley and
Livermore, 2009).

The Demand-Side Perspective

The demand-side economic theory, also called Keynesian economics, focuses
on increasing the demand for goods and services in order to stimulate economic
growth. The demand-side economic policy utilizes fiscal tools (spending and taxing)
to promote high employment with stable price level or inflation. The idea central to
demand-side or Keynesian economic thought is that government can stabilize the
economy by spending more and taxing less during recession; and taxing more and
spending less during period o f high employment and sustained price increases
(inflation); the graphical representation of this strategy is what is known in economic
literature as the “Philips curve,” and involves essentially a “trade-off between
unemployment and inflation” (Ackerman, 1982, p .l 1). The demand-side idea is
essentially an expression that reflects a belief in the ability of government to manage
the economy effectively, efficiently, and responsibly using the tool o f fiscal policy.
Indeed, fiscal policy became the major economic tool to stimulate economic
growth, to promote mass consumption, and to expand social programs for nearly three
decades after the end o f WWII (Ackerman, 1982). Summarizing America’s social and
economic experience in the aftermath of WWII, Ackerman (1982) noted the steady
expansion o f the welfare state that started in the 1930s with the New Deal program
(social security, for example). The author further claimed that, in the 1960s, the
welfare state expanded so much that public expenditures on programs such as

unemployment compensation, food stamps and welfare were growing steadily. Yet,
according to Ackerman (1982), in the face o f growing public expenditure, “inflation
was unknown, wages climbed at a fairly steady pace, and spells o f high unemployment
were b rie f’ (p.2). Indeed, some scholars assert that the United States enjoyed the most
dramatic period o f economic growth in its history in the first thirty years after World
War II, and liberal economic policies were believed to be instrumental in sustaining
and accelerating that growth (Brinkley, 1995).
However, Brinkley (1995) wrote: “The effort to create economic growth and
full employment through consumer-oriented fiscal policies floundered after 1973 in
the face o f global competition, environmental degradation, and deindustrialization”
(p.270). Moreover, Ackerman (1982) asserted that the “levels o f inflation, interest
rates and unemployment that would have been called catastrophic a few years ago are
now commonplace. In the 1970s, Republicans and Democratic administrations alike
seemed powerless to reverse [America’s] declining fortunes” (p. 2). Although, the
demand-side economic doctrine informed much o f the economic policies o f the
postwar period, “the postwar expansion nonetheless came to a close and was replaced
by an erratic and often stagnant economy, increasing inequality, and growing social
instability” (Brinkley, 1995, 271). It is against this social and economic background
that the “New Federalism” also called “Reaganomics” or “supply-side” economics
emerged (Ackerman, 1982; Lowe, 1984; Brinkley, 1995).

The Supply-Side Perspective

As noted above, in the aftermath o f WWII, the Keynesian strategy or otherwise
known as demand-side economic doctrine was widely embraced, and as a result, the
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1960s saw a more aggressive fiscal policy. Nevertheless, studies show that in the
1970s supply-side economic doctrine was growing in importance; in particular,
monetary policy was recognized as an important policy tool to combat inflation, and
even became more evident in the 1980s with the emergence of the New Federalism or
Reaganomics (Kaplan and Cuciti, 1986; Ackerman, 1982; Lowe, 1984). Scholars note
that the shift in the relative roles o f fiscal and monetary policies was essentially a
reflection o f the growing influence of the supply side economic theory (Kaplan and
Cuciti, 1986; Ackerman, 1982; Ulmer, 1984).
The supply side economic thought subscribes to the notion that private sector
production (supply) of goods and services is the primary engine o f growth. According
to supply-side perspective, economic policy should focus on fostering economic
growth through high private savings, investment, and production. Lower corporateincome taxes, liberal depreciation schedules, cutting capital gains taxes, and reducing
marginal tax rates on high personal income are central to the supply-side theory
(Kuttner, 1987). In the United States, the supply-side economic thought gained
acceptance and prominence with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. As Kuttner
(1987) noted, “With Ronald Reagan’s election, the capital-supply school o f economics
came fully of age” (p. 52). Ulmer (1984) also asserted that
[T]he ‘supply-siders’ moved to center stage with the Reagan administration.
The more extreme among them favor the market over government almost to
the point o f old-time laissez-faire. Substantial inequalities in income, allowing
incentives for effort and ambition, are in their eyes essential not only for
industrial progress but for individual freedom (p. 10).
In general, the supply-side policy prescription calls for restrictive money supply, lower
wages, budget cuts, less regulation, and lower taxes.
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Upon assuming power, the Reagan administration followed pro-business
economic policy and encouraged restrictive monetary policy, tax cuts, budget cuts,
and deregulation (Ackerman, 1982). However, the results were not encouraging. The
tax cuts did not achieve the intended goal. “The actual personal savings rate declined
from an average o f 7 percent in the 1970s to about 5.5 percent under Reagan, and
investment declined sharply between 1980 and 1983” (Kuttner, 1987, p.52). Overall,
tight monetary policy discouraged investment, and the tax cuts widened the deficit. In
the ensuing period, concern over the budget deficit led Congress to enact a series of
tax legislations, and the budget deficit “served the crusade against the public sector”
(Kuttner, 1987, p. 52).
Literature reveals that the federal government sought to reduce its load by
devolving programmatic authority and responsibility to the states without providing
resources, which in turn constrained states’ ability to meet citizens increasing demand
for public services (Posner, 1998). For example, Posner (1998) cited studies that
showed that “counties spent $4.8 billion in fiscal year 1993 for twelve unfunded
federal mandates, or over 12 percent o f locally raised revenues” (p.5). The financial
difficulties o f states and localities were further compounded by lack o f public support
for tax increases to fund the additional services demanded by citizens.
Some skeptics took unfunded mandates as the federal attempt to get rid of
some programs that were meant to serve the poor. The skeptics claim “that the
President’s [President Reagan] aim was to rid Washington of its most troublesome
domestic programs [by shifting the responsibilities to] the states in the expectation that

47
many would soon die there” (Nathan, 1984, p, 36). While this argument might have
some resonance in some circles, it was not widely believed to be the case.
Aside from the interests of the Republican political party, the Reagan
economic policy was far deeper than the superficial argument suggested by the
skeptics. The Reagan economic policy (and hence the supply-side theory that
informed it) was deeply rooted in laissez-faire political and economic ideology that
was discussed at length earlier. The essence o f the economic policy was to reduce the
role o f government and narrow the size and scope of the public sector in many areas
including social programs at all levels o f government so that the private sector would
be able to take over functions that were previously performed or provided in the public
sector. “The fundamental belief of the Reagan team is that private enterprise will
work wonders as soon as the government leaves it alone” (Ackerman, 1982, p.3). Thus,
in line with the supply-side theory, state governments sought to alleviate their
financial difficulties by privatizing some of their public services.
However, different state governments are likely to respond to federal policy
changes in different ways, depending on a number of factors such as the
socioeconomic condition, the economic situation, and the political culture o f the state
as well as the ideological orientation o f the citizens and state policymakers. The
challenge for researchers who want to understand the level of state government
privatization is to identify the relevant factors and explain the extent and variations of
their influences on the aggregate level of state government privatization efforts. In
reviewing the root of the privatization history o f the past hundred years, this research
has revealed the existence of a link between contemporary privatization theory and the
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conservative ideological, political, and economic thoughts of the 18th century.
Conservative ideological, political, and economic thoughts are assumed to exert
considerable influence on privatization decisions at all levels of government, but the
extent of their influence on the level o f state government privatization is a matter o f
empirical investigation that this study attempts to undertake.
To understand the level o f state government privatization, identifying the
factors that are likely to impact privatization policy is certainly a necessary condition
but not a sufficient condition. Understanding the meaning of contemporary
privatization and the perspectives that inform it are also essential in order to make a
meaningful assessment o f the influence of each o f the factors mentioned above. The
review of the literature from a historical perspective has clearly established the
conservative root o f privatization, but the historical narration nonetheless offers little
insight into the conceptualization and meaning o f contemporary privatization in the
context o f the United States in particular.
The rationale for providing an account o f the background o f contemporary
privatization in the United States in a separate section as opposed to privatization in
the global context is to tackle the theoretical and analytical challenges that are likely to
arise in discussing privatization policy in the United States. There is a difference in
the conceptualization o f the term privatization between the United States and other
developed economies. In the United States, privatization does not involve complete
severance o f government intervention in the privatized services, whereas in most
advanced economies, privatization means primarily selling assets completely
(Donahue, 1989).
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Moreover, as indicated in the review o f the historical literature, the United
States o f America has had a mixed economy for a long time, and did not nationalize
any industries even during the height of the Great Depression (Donahue, 1989). In
view o f these unique U.S. circumstances, the conceptualization o f privatization is
fundamentally different from other economically advanced countries, and its meaning
is certainly intriguing and warrants separate discussion. Thus, the background of
contemporary privatization in the United States is reviewed in the pages that follow.

Background o f Contemporary Privatization in the United States o f America

In the United States o f America, the use o f privatization as a means of
providing public goods and services gained ground after the California voters passed
in 1978 Proposition 13, a major fiscal containment act ( Allen et al., 1989). The
privatization movement gained further momentum after the election o f Ronald Reagan
in 1980 where the Reagan administration “pressed hard for increased use o f the private
sector in delivering public services at all levels o f government” (Allen et al., 1989,
p.2). All government initiatives that involved public-private collaborations and
coordination constituted privatization because o f government reliance in varying
degrees on the private sector to provide the services that the citizens needed (Report of
the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988). But prior to the 1980s,
privatization had existed on an ad hoc basis in a limited scope and had not been a
source o f major controversies that characterized the 1980s and beyond (Featherstun,
Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001).
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The privatization movement that emerged in the 1980s became controversial
because o f concerns in some circles that privatization has gone far beyond the issue of
simple economic efficiency and has become deeply ideological and political at its core
(Savas, 1987). For example, one of the staunch advocates of privatization, E.S. Savas
described the controversies surrounding the concept of privatization in the following
manner.
The very word o f privatization unfortunately summons forth images from a
deep reservoir and causes misunderstanding, premature polarization, and shrill
arguments.... Some read into the word a plot to restore a completely free
market, with overtones of dog eat dog, exploitation of weakest, and survival of
the fittest. Others interpret the word as an attack on government and the things
government has been doing; direct beneficiaries o f government programs,
including employees, may therefore defend their self-interest by attacking
privatization. Still others are provoked by the term because they see it as an
attack on the ideals they cherish. Public to them denotes brotherhood, sharing,
and community, and they mistakenly interpret private to mean the negation of
these important values (Savas, 1987, p.277; italics in original).
Also, the following quotations from a speech by James C. Miller III, former director of
the Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) under the Reagan administration,
provide a vivid illustration o f the problem associated with the concept o f privatization.
James C. Miller III wrote:
While I was at the OMB, I had the temerity to suggest that the Post Office be
privatized. Well, that triggered considerable resistance.... I immediately had
congressional inquiries down my neck, and one o f the labor unions produced
‘WANTED’ posters o f ‘Postal Enemy Number O ne’ which featured an
unflattering caricature of me.
He further observed:
Opposition to privatization is entrenched on Capitol Hill, and those that are
threatened by privatization lobby very hard to retain their privileged position.
The concept of privatization is generally hard to sell to the American people.
(We looked long and hard for an alternative word to ‘privatization,’ because it
sounds somewhat commercial and selfish, but we didn’t find anything) (Miller,
1992, p. 3-4).
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It was not only on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. that the term privatization
became provocative, but it also sparked vigorous rejection in state legislatures in the
early 1980s (Auger, 1999). In fact, privatization was so viewed as anathema to public
concerns that many leaders around the world sought to use a different term, as E.S.
Savas reported as follows.
Numerous public officials throughout the world have told me, in great
frustration that they wished another word could be found. Indeed, the
euphemism productivity enhancement was employed early in the Reagan
administration to minimize reflexive employee opposition, and alternative
service delivery is the term of art often used in municipal government circles in
the United States. In fact, I devised this term specifically for that audience as a
circumlocution to avoid using privatization (Savas, 1987, p.277; italics in
original).
The ambiguity o f the term privatization also raised questions of motivation in the
sense that some advocates of privatization wanted to eliminate “worthy goods”
arguing that they were private goods and should not be provided by collective
financing (Savas, 1987, p.277). Thus, as Savas (1987) candidly acknowledges,
privatization, in its contemporary usage, is controversial because of the fact that the
concept is subject to different interpretations. A detailed discussion o f the definition
o f privatization is in order.

Definition o f Privatization

Privatization has been defined in many different ways in the literature.
Historically, the concept o f privatization refers to human economic actions in the
pursuit o f their individual self-interests in the market place (Florio, 2004). Elaborating
the concept o f privatization further, Florio (2004) notes: “ The personal responsibility
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of the entrepreneur is in fact an essential ingredient of the line o f reasoning that, from
Adam Smith onward, sees free individual economic action as a requirement of social
order - free, but also individuaV (p.5; italics in original). As a concept, privatization
traces its origin to Adam Smith’s (1776) book the Wealth o f Nations, and “free” and
“individual” economic activities underpin privatization in the early period of
industrialization.
In view o f the definition offered by Florio (2004), public companies, that is,
stock companies that are owned by shareholders do not fit the definition of
privatization. Florio (2004) further writes: “Many ‘public’ companies were in fact
private companies in disguise. Private ownership in the larger firms no longer bore
any resemblance to that o f the individual entrepreneur” (p.5). In the historical context,
the terms “free” and “individual” were the defining characteristics o f privatization,
which is rarely applicable in the current global economic environment.
A more recent conceptualization o f privatization is somewhat broader.
According to Donahue (1989), “Two concepts share the same word - privatization.
The first concept involves removing certain responsibilities, activities, or assets from
the collective realm .... The second [concept involves] retaining collective financing
but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215; italics in original). The terms
“removing” or “retaining” are two critical elements that allow differentiation between
privatization as selling off government assets and privatization as the provision of
services that involves some sort o f arrangement between government and the private
sector.
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Donahue (1989) further explained that the first concept “is the chief meaning
o f privatization in countries retreating from postwar, postcolonial experiments with
socialism, as they separate factories, mine, airlines, and railroads from public control”
(p.215). This definition implies complete termination o f governmental functions or
public ownership o f assets in favor of private ownerships, which can take the form of
individual entrepreneur or private firms or public companies.
The concept o f privatization, in the sense o f selling off assets to the private
sector, has been widely used in most countries around the world but is less common in
the United States. In Britain, for example, under Prime Minister Thatcher, the
government sold several enterprises ranging from large scale industries such as
telecommunications, oil, and steel to public housing units. While the scale of
privatization was much greater in Britain, many other countries have also sold
government assets to the private sector. For example, France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and
other less developed economies such as Turkey, Malaysia, Argentina, Singapore,
Mexico, and Brazil have sold state owned enterprises (SOE) but at a much lower scale
than Britain (Donahue, 1989; Marsh, 1991; Savas, 1987; 2000).
In the United States, selling off assets to the private sector is uncommon with
the exception o f the sale o f the National Consumer Cooperative Bank in 1982 and the
sale of Conrail in 1987 (Report of the President’s Commission on Privatization, 1988;
Donahue, 1989); in these two cases, like the countries mentioned above, the assets
were completely transferred to the private sector and were consistent with the meaning
of privatization in which the relationship o f government and the private entities was
completely severed (see first definition o f Donahue, 1989 cited earlier; Dominy, 1999).
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Apart from the two examples mentioned above, selling o ff assets to the private sector
is not practiced in the United States.
In the United States, the meaning of privatization is much less precise, and is
somewhat consistent with Donahue’s (1989) “second meaning o f privatization:
retaining collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215).
This is so because, as Donahue (1989) pointed out: “America has never had all that
many government enterprises and assets.... America had kept private in the first
place.. ..Aside from a strictly limited number o f asset sales, it [privatization] meant
(and continues to mean) enlisting private energies to improve the performance o f tasks
that would remain in some sense public” (p.7). Similarly, Moe (1987) argued: “From
the outset o f the Republic, the government has relied on the private sector to provide
commercial services and to own utilities.. ..Thus, today, compared to most other
nations, developed and less developed, relatively few candidates are available for full
divestiture by the United States government” (p.454).
With the few exceptions noted above, large scale sale of assets that parallels
other industrialized countries is practically unknown in the United States; this
prompted some critics to question the meaning o f privatization arguing that if assets
cannot be sold off to the private sector, then it would be a misapplication or misuse of
the term privatization to refer to public-private sector arrangements as privatization.
Dominy (1999), for example, argued that “the asset sale is the single defining act o f a
true privatization” (p.347). However, scholars point out that in the 1980s,
privatization appeared to be less contentious at the federal level, but the idea o f
privatization especially in the form o f service shedding or asset selling to the private
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sector was politically unpalatable proposition in many state governments (Auger,
1999).
Nonetheless, other scholars offered definitions o f privatization that take into
account the relationships between government and the private sector. Kuttner (1987)
referred to privatization as “the idea that public services will be provided more
efficiently if they are contracted out to private-sector providers.. ..Subsidizing services
by means of tax incentives or vouchers” (p.258). This definition is more in line with
Donahue’s (1989) second concept of privatization as “retaining collective financing
but delegating delivery to the private sector” (p.215). Also Kolderie (1986) defined
privatization as “government turning more to private producers for services for which
government remains responsible and which government continues to finance. It has
become simply a new name for contracting” (p.287).
Savas (1987) offered an ambiguous definition by referring to privatization as
“Relying more on the private institutions of society and less on government to satisfy
the needs of the people.. ..The act o f reducing the role o f government, or increasing
the role o f the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets” (p.3). This
definition is somewhat imprecise and can lead to different and often competing or
conflicting interpretations. Kettl (2002) also referred to privatization, in an ambiguous
manner, as a condition where “Government has come to rely heavily on for-profit and
nonprofit organizations for delivering goods and services ranging from antimissile
systems to welfare reform” (p. 120). Unless Kettl is talking about the degree of
“reliance,” government has always depended, in varying degrees, on the private sector

56
for delivery o f goods and services. Kettl’s observation sheds little light in terms o f
clarifying the concept o f privatization.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (1997) provides an all-encompassing
definition by referring to privatization “as any process aimed at shifting functions and
responsibilities, in whole or in part, from the government to the private sector” (p. 1).
Similarly, the Council o f State Governments (CSG) offers a range of definitions that
include:
• The transfer o f government functions or assets to the private sector.
• The shifting o f government management and service delivery to private providers.
• A shift from publicly-to privately-produced goods and services.
• Government reliance on the private sector to satisfy the needs o f society.
• A movement from collective action to private control (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins,
2004, p.2).
The definitions o f privatization described in the preceding section are certainly
overlapping, but imperfectly matching. Some of the definitions are too ambiguous to
be useful in clarifying the meaning of privatization and have contributed to the
confusions and controversies surrounding the debate over privatization. Yet
restructuring the relationships between the public and the private sectors appears to be
central to all o f them. Another important and comprehensive definition of
privatization that can perhaps capture and reconcile the discrete ideas that
characterized most privatization definitions is offered by Morris (1999). He argued
that “the term privatization refers to a range of potential service arrangement available
to public decision makers” (Morris, 1999, p. 153; italics in original). This definition is
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consistent with the usage o f the term in much of the recent literature of privatization,
and is broad enough to include various public-private arrangements.
Recent developments in privatization have certainly expanded the range and
scope o f involvement o f private firms in the public sector, requiring a definition or re
definition o f privatization broad enough to include a variety of new activities and new
methods of privatization. McNamara and Morris (2008) further offered a useful
definition o f privatization that allows considering different forms o f service
arrangements between the public and the private sectors. The authors thus wrote: “In
a broad sense, privatization refers to a variety of service arrangements linking the
public, private, and nonprofit sectors in different ways” (p. 569). Again, this
definition is consistent with the evidence in the literature as, for example, Auger
(1999) noted: “Privatization techniques in use today span a broad area ranging from
contracting of services to use of vouchers, from volunteerism to use o f asset sale or
sale/leaseback arrangements involving governmental property or enterprises” (p. 436437).
As controversial as it is, privatization has been gaining acceptance as a public
policy tool at all levels o f government in the United States, especially since the 1980s.
Prior to the 1980s, the term privatization was largely unknown in the United States,
though Peter Drucker has been cited as having used the term “reprivatization” as far
back as 1968 (Savas, 1987; Donahue, 1989). As far as its current usage is concerned,
according to Donahue (1989), privatization has a foreign origin. Donahue (1989)
provides the following account.
Privatization, as today’s fiscally ambitious, ideologically charged phenomenon,
began as a British import. English academics and Conservative party officials
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prepared a sweeping privatization agenda as Margaret Thatcher took office in
1979, and the British government shed major assets and responsibilities
throughout the 1980s. Conservative intellectuals in the United States set out to
emulate the British example (p.4).
The British experience might have been influential on ideological grounds, but
the method o f privatization employed in Great Britain has little resemblance with the
privatization scheme followed in the United States. Because of the absence of
nationalized enterprises, the American economic structure required a public-private
sector arrangement with government retaining some degree of involvement.
Nonetheless, the contemporary privatization movement has the same intellectual
origin regardless o f the mode of privatization used in different countries.

The Theory o f Privatization

Characteristics o f Goods

In advanced economies, drawing a line between the government and the
market system in supplying goods and services is somewhat difficult because o f the
differing nature o f goods and services that are available for human use. According to
E. S. Savas, “the nature o f good determines the conditions needed to supply it” (Savas,
2000, p.45). E.S. Savas classified goods and services based on exclusion and
consumption characteristics. These characteristics allow “[distinguishing] private
goods, public goods, and two intermediate kinds o f goods - toll goods and commonpool goods” (Mikesell, 2007, p.3) as shown in Figure 2.1 below. Based on these
intrinsic characteristics, it is possible to make privatization decisions and to choose the
appropriate method o f privatization.
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Private goods and services have several attributes: they are available for
individual use, the quantities diminish as they are used, once they are sold to one
individual, they cannot be made available to other individuals, payment must be made
to use the good or service, those who do not pay are excluded. Goods and services
with these properties are appropriate for market transactions. They can be supplied
according to market principles of voluntary exchange between buyers and sellers. In a
competitive market, ceteris paribus, the market forces o f demand and supply
determine the market clearing (equilibrium) price resulting in an efficient allocations
o f resources.

Consumption
Exhaustible
Exclusion

Feasible
Private
Example: cars, food, television set.

Not feasible

Intermediate (Common-Pool
R esources)
Example: fishing grounds, aquifers

Non-exhaustible
Intermediate (Toll
Goods)
Example: Turnpikes,
toll roads, motion
pictures
Public
Example: National
defense, justice system

Figure 2.1. Innate Characteristics of Goods and Services
Source: adapted with minor modification from Savas (2000); Mikesell (2007).

Examples of private goods and services include: cars, food, and hair cut (Savas, 1987;
2000; Mikesell, 2007).
Public goods and services, on the other hand, are the polar opposite o f private
goods; they can be used by many people concurrently at the same time without
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affecting the quantity and quality o f the goods or services. Furthermore, no one can be
excluded from using the goods or services once they are provided; these features o f
the public goods and services create incentives for free riders. Thus public goods and
services pose transaction difficulties in fully functioning markets. Essentially, when
non-payers cannot be excluded from using the good or service, a private business
cannot successfully charge a price. People not paying (free-riders) would use the good
or service as completely as those who paid leading to market failure. For this reason,
the public realm (government) appears to be the appropriate venue for the transaction
o f public goods and services. Examples o f public goods are: national defense,
mosquito abetment, pollution control (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007).
Toll goods and common-pool goods have one public-good characteristic but
not both. Toll goods combine feasibility of exclusion and joint consumption attributes.
Toll goods nonetheless are easier for market transactions. An individual can consume
the service without reducing the amount or quality of service available for someone
else, but nonpayers can certainly be excluded. Examples include drive-in movies and
toll roads (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007). Common-pool goods or services are
natural resources that can be consumed individually and are exhaustible; but exclusion
is not feasible. It is difficult to exercise exclusive ownership control over natural
resource, and when used, the resource becomes unavailable for others, and it may be
rapidly exhausted. Common-pool good or service requires government intervention
because there is an element o f market failure. Examples are: aquifers, oil and gas
deposits, and fisheries (Savas, 1987; 2000; Mikesell, 2007).
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The above classification scheme provides useful prototype to determine which
goods and services to privatize and how to privatize them. But also political factor
plays a role in the privatization decisions, in which case the innate characteristics o f
the good may have less significance than what is suggested by the classification
scheme. Savas (1987; 2000) pointed out that society might consider some goods or
services worthy and other goods or services not worthy.

Worthy Goods

According to Savas (1987;2000), worthy goods are certain private and toll
goods, such as food, education, and mass transit that society considers providing them
to the public regardless o f the ability to pay. The exclusion feature o f the private
goods and toll goods in this case doesn’t matter because government decides to
provide the good or service either through direct production or subsidies. An example
of a private good that is redefined or designated as a worthy good is food. Food is
distributed to the poor at collective expenses in order to avoid starvation o f people
who do not have the financial wherewithal to take care o f themselves.
Although the worthy good argument contravenes the innate characteristics
argument as the basis for privatization decisions, the classification scheme nonetheless
offers clarity about the types of goods that state governments are heavily involved in
providing them. E.S. Savas thus claims that “the big growth in government has taken
place in expenditures for individual and toll goods” that are designated as worthy
goods (Savas, 2000, p.62). Furthermore, identifying the nature of goods and services
allows a role for government as a provider or producer o f the good or service in

62
question. The issue o f production verses provision is an important theme in the debate
over privatization.

Production versus Provision

Practical and political reasons are offered to explain the inherent implications
o f privatizing production and privatizing provision based on the distinction made
between the two concepts: production and provision. Kolderie (1986) differentiated
the two concepts and the role government plays in the privatization decisions. He
argued that production decision is less complicated because it involves “operating,
delivering, running, doing, selling, administering” (p. 286), whereas provision
decision is more complicated and political in nature because it involves “policy
making, deciding, buying, requiring, regulating, franchising, financing, subsidizing” (p.
286). Kolderie contends that “While [privatizing production] has its ideological side,
most o f it is intensely practical. It is very much a clash between competing producers,
both o f which want the government’s business” (Kolderie, 1986, p.287).
Kolderie saw privatizing production from the perspective o f competition. But it
is also possible to conjecture other practical reasons; production is perhaps much
easier to write the contract because specification o f the good and its quantity and
quality is less complicated. Politically, it is less controversial and perhaps less value
laden because it involves no distributional decisions. On the other hand, privatizing
provision is tantamount to selling assets to the private sector, which is one o f the
definitions o f privatization, and allows no role for government. The scope for
privatization that severs the relationship between government and the private sector in
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the privatization arrangement is very limited and even less applicable in the U.S.
because o f the absence o f nationalized industries (Kolderie, 1986; Donahue, 1989).
Moreover, providing public goods and services or what E.S. Savas called “worthy
goods” has significant social and political implications, and for this reason, perhaps,
provision decision remains in the public realm.
Since financing or payment regardless o f preferences or consumption is a
unique feature o f government provision, decision regarding provision involves
distributional decisions that include what to provide, how much to provide, to whom
to provide, where and when to provide; these are certainly value decisions, and, in a
democratic society, only government has the legitimate authority to make such
distributional decisions. Therefore, provision o f some types of goods, especially
public goods and services, or worthy goods, cannot be left to the vagaries o f the
market without government intervention. Here the government certainly has a role
to play.
As Kolderie (1986) pointed out: “Here privatization has come to mean mainly
the government turning more to private producers for services for which government
remains responsible and which government continues to finance” (p. 287). The author
further underscores the fact that it is privatization of production not provision that
allows government to maintain “its role as buyer, regulator, standard setter, or decision
maker” (Kolderie, 1986, p.288). While this study does not emphasize the differences
between the two concepts - production and provision - understanding the distinction
between the two concepts is useful in order to have conceptual clarity, to avoid
unnecessary confusion and analytical difficulties, and to appreciate the theoretical
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arguments between supporters and opponents o f privatization. It appears from the
literature that the debate involves, by and large, privatization of production not
provision o f goods and services, and powerful arguments are offered by both
proponents and opponents of privatization.

The Arguments For and Against Privatization

The review o f the historical literature offers useful insights into the
conservative nature o f the privatization movement. The conservative ideological,
political, and economic root of privatization certainly underpins the debates over
privatization policy between supporters and opponents o f privatization. Nonetheless,
in this section, this study highlights the arguments of the recent past, particularly since
privatization became the prominent feature of the national policy agenda under the
Reagan administration.

Arguments fo r Privatization

Proponents of privatization invariably point to poor government performance
and public dissatisfaction with government activities as the major reasons underlying
the movement toward privatization. While acknowledging that public “complaints
about poor government performance are commonplace throughout the world,” E.S.
Savas asserts that “there is ample evidence that much o f the dissatisfaction is justified”
(Savas, 2000, p.l 11). The author listed several indicators o f poor performance ranging
from government inefficiency to theft and corruption.
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According to Savas (2000), poor performances reflect “the fact that many
government activities are performed by monopolies, which have little incentive to use
resources efficiently or to use labor-saving practices and suffer no penalty for poor
performance” (p.l 12). Advocates of privatization thus argue that government should
privatize most public services to overcome the problems listed above, to break
government monopoly, as well as to reduce the size and scope o f government. Savas
(1987) further argued that “privatization is the key to both limited and better
government.. .in that society’s need are satisfied more efficiently, effectively, and
equitably” (p.288).
The argument in favor o f the private sector is premised on the existence of
competition in the marketplace. Competition is central to supporters o f privatization;
they assert that “the issue” that divides supporters and opponents “was not public
versus private but monopoly versus competition [and] called for more competition in
the public services” (Savas, 2000, p. xiv). Supporters o f privatization often invoke the
efficiency and effectiveness attributes of the private sector to underscore the
advantages o f privatizing public services. According to proponents of privatization,
the major advantages o f private over public organizations include: “less red tape and
bureaucracy’’’ (another way o f saying less government), ‘’'’more competition, ” and

more quality services (Allen, et al., 1989, p.4; italics in original); all these translate
into lower costs to taxpayers, effectiveness in service delivery, responsiveness to the
needs of the citizenry, and, of course, efficient allocations and utilizations o f public
resources. Certainly proponents o f privatization make a powerful argument on
theoretical grounds. They even point to some empirical evidence to support their
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claims o f the benefits o f privatization. Likewise, opponents are equally persuasive in
their arguments.

Arguments against Privatization

Opponents o f privatization emphasize the frequent market failures that
necessitate government intervention to stabilize the market and the economy as a
whole. They point to many problems with privatization ranging from corruption to
private monopoly, from higher costs to poor services, from creating market
pathologies to diminishing accountability of government, from lower morale of
government employees to lower wages, reduced benefits, and fear o f losing their jobs
(AFSCME, n.d.; Morris, 2007; Kuttner, 1987; Sclar, 2000; Hodge, 2000).
According to critics of privatization, the major problems o f using the private
sector include: “potential fo r corruption, incentives to reduce service quality,
increased chance o f service interruptions, and possible reduced access to services fo r
the disadvantaged” (Allen, et. al, 1989, p.5-6; italics in original). Critics further

question the wisdom o f heavy reliance on the private sector (the marketplace) for the
provision of public goods and services that are traditionally the domain o f
governments, arguing that the limitations and difficulties that are associated with
government failures apply to the marketplace as well ( Sclar, 2000; Hodge, 2000).
In fact, studies show that there was opposition to privatization from many
circles including the public at large. One of the ardent advocates o f privatization, E.S.
Savas himself noted that supporters of privatization “encounter only four sources o f
opposition - to put it whimsically: workers, public officials, business interests, and the
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general public” (Sava, 2000, p.286). Nonetheless, with the ascendance o f the
conservative regime in the 1980s, the advocates o f privatization managed to have
considerable sway and their arguments and positions prevailed. The question however
is that, in the albescence o f consensus about the benefits and effectiveness or
privatization, why do governments want to privatize?
To frame the question slightly differently: what objectives do advocates o f
privatization want government to accomplish through privatization? Privatization is
global in scope, and the objectives that governments seek to accomplish through
privatization are likely to vary from country to country and from government to
government within a country, depending, in large part, on the ideology o f the party in
power (Boix, 1997). In general, however, privatization programs have several
objectives, and governments seek to accomplish one or more of these objectives.
Savas (2000) offered a long list of objectives of privatization programs that even
include a foreign policy component (see Appendix A). The objectives are many and
varied, but, at least in the context of the United States, a few of them stand out clearly
as the primary factors that motivate policymakers to privatize at all levels of
government. Some o f the reasons are discussed next.

Reasons Why Governments Privatize

Multiple reasons are offered why governments privatize. In the United States,
in large part, state and local governments adopt privatization policy for pragmatic
reasons, that is, to alleviate their fiscal crises (Donahue, 1989). For example, Allen et
al. (1989) noted that state and local governments “use the private sector [as] one
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potential way to contain costs and improve services” (p.2). Similarly, focusing on
prison privatization, Price and Riccucci (2005) sought to understand the reasons why
state governments privatize. They asked: “Why do state policy makers decide to
privatize their prisons?” (p. 231). The authors found out that “The conventional
response by political and appointed policy leaders has consistently and unequivocally
been to save costs” (p.231).
In general, studies show that state and local governments’ privatization
schemes focus primarily on few critical areas. Allen et al. (1989) provided six reasons:
1. to obtaining special skills or supplement sta ff for short periods, 2. to meet demands
beyond current government capacity, 3. to reduce costs, 4. to improve service quality,
5. to provide clients with more choice ofproviders and levels o f service, and 6.
ideology (p.4; italics in original). Survey information also shed some light regarding

the reasons why governments privatize. For example, in the context o f local
governments, the International City/County Managers Association (ICMA) conducts a
national survey every five years to find out why governments privatize. Table 2.1
below presents the results o f surveys for 1997, 2002, and 2007.
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Table 2.1 Reasons Why Local Governments Are Interested In Privatization*
Percent of local governments reporting
reasons for considering privatization for
the three different survey years
1997

2002

2007

44

50

50

Internal attempts to decrease costs o f service
delivery

87

88

87

State or federal mandates tied to
intergovernmental financing

11

10

10

Changes in political climate emphasizing a
decreased role for government

25

16

14

Active citizen group favoring privatization

7

6

4

Unsolicited proposals presented by potential
service providers

21

21

16

Concerns about government liability

12

13

10

Other

10

13

12

Reason
External fiscal pressures, including restrictions
placed on raising taxes, e.g., Proposition 13

♦The table information is compiled from aggregate survey results o f local government service delivery
choices for 1997, 2002, and 2007. Percentage is rounded to a whole number. A fraction less than .5 is
dropped, but a fraction o f .5 or more is rounded to the next whole number.
Source: Alternative Service Delivery in Local Government, Aggregate Survey Results, International
City/County Managers Association (ICMA). Retrieved June 12, 2011 from
http://icma.org/en/results/surveving/survev research/survey results

The results o f the surveys show that internal efforts to reduce costs are cited as
the main reasons why local governments privatize, accounting for 87% in 1997, 88%
in 2002, and 87% in 2007. External fiscal pressures are the second strongest reason
(about 50 %). On the other hand, federal mandates account for less than 11 %, and
active citizens favoring privatization declined from 7% in 1997 to 4% in 2007. As the
survey results suggest, overall, cost savings figures prominently as the principal reason
why governments privatize. Although ICMA’s survey does not address state level
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privatization, the survey results nonetheless provide useful information pertaining to
the primary reasons why governments privatize.
Also, at state level, many studies reveal that cost savings is the main reason
for privatization. For example, the Council of State Governments (CSG) conducted a
nationwide survey o f state government officials in 2002 and found cost savings to be
the principal reason why governments privatize. The results of the survey showed that
cost savings accounted for 68.4% followed by lack of state personnel or expertise,
which accounted for 53.9% of the responses from state budget and legislative staffs
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). Another study in 1997 by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) o f six governments showed cost reductions to be largely the primary
reason for government-wide privatization efforts. See Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2 Primary Reasons for Government-wide Privatization Efforts
G overnm ent

P rim ary reasons

Georgia

Limit growth o f government
Reduce scope o f government
Improve government efficiency

Massachusetts

Reduce state budget deficit
Reduce costs o f government services
Improve quality o f government services

Michigan

Reduce the state’s budget deficit
Shrink size and scope o f government

New York

Reduce size and scope o f government
Reduce cost and improve the quality of government services

Virginia

Improve services and productivity of government services
Reduce cost o f operations

Indianapolis (Indiana)

Reduce size and scope o f government
Increase the quality and decrease the cost o f services

Source: GAO (1997). PRIVATIZATIONS: Lessons Learned by State and Local Governments,
GAO/GGD-97-48, p. 26-32
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The survey results summarized above are consistent with the core argument in
the literature that, as Van Slyke (2003) notes, “States and municipalities have
privatized services in an effort to improve their cost-effectiveness and quality” (p.296)
These studies are just part of a plethora of research studies that provide support to the
claims that cost reduction is the main reason, if not the only reason, why governments
privatize.
The question is, how efficient and effective has privatization been in reducing costs?
To address this question, a summary o f selected empirical studies is presented below.

An Overview of Selected Empirical Studies

Many program-specific empirical studies that sought to estimate the gains from
privatization can be found in the literature. The types o f programs investigated in the
literature are too numerous to cover here, and mentioning only a few major studies
will suffice for the purpose of this study. With this caveat, this researcher looks at a
few major studies that have been cited repeatedly in many books and scholarly journal
articles dealing with the issue o f efficiency, effectiveness, as well as the cost
differentials between the public and the private sectors in the provision o f goods and
services.
Kettl (1993; 1988) has examined both the efficiency and effectiveness of
privatization at the federal level. For example, he cites the case o f the “Divad,” an
anti-aircraft weapon procured by the Pentagon in the early 1980s to protect armored
vehicles on the battlefield from enemy aircraft and helicopters (Kettl, 1988). Even
though the weapon failed to meet most o f the requirements issued by the Army, the
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contractor rigged the tests and falsified data to suggest the weapons system would
work better than it actually did. The Army invested $1.8 billion in the program and
bought some 65 o f the guns before cancelling the program. In another case, Kettl
(1988) describes the 1985 crash of a contracted airplane carrying 248 soldiers that
crashed in Gander, Newfoundland, killing all aboard. A subsequent investigation
showed that not only did the airplane’s operators ignore important safety regulations;
they also discovered that the aircraft had a history o f severe maintenance problems
that would have grounded a commercial passenger airliner.
In a third case, Kettl (1993) describes the illegal disposal o f nuclear waste by
Rockwell International at the Rocky Flats, Colorado weapons production facility. In
this case, the FBI raided the facility and seized records from both Rockwell and the
US Department of Energy, the responsible government agency. Rockwell later paid
huge fines to clean up the radioactive waste. While these examples do not speak
directly to efficiency and cost savings, they do reflect an important question of
value— did government get its money’s worth through these arrangements? Whether
there was any cost savings involved, the evidence suggests that the broader goals of
government were not well served. One may reasonably argue that the effectiveness of
the goods or services purchased was, at best, compromised. Weapons that cannot
meet their mission requirements, poorly maintained private aircraft that crash and kill
soldiers, and companies that pollute important groundwater sources with deadly
radiation are not examples o f effective service.
Heilman and Johnson (1992) also addressed the questions o f efficiency and
effectiveness in their study o f seven privatized wastewater treatment plants in the US.
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They reported mixed results; the construction costs for four of the seven plants were
above estimates. A closer examination o f their data reveals that a variety o f factors
work simultaneously to increase and reduce costs, making any specific determination
of cost savings problematic. In terms o f the effectiveness question, Heilman and
Johnson report that the most important factor in the operation o f the privatized
treatment plants was the specificity of the contract regime that governed the overall
satisfaction (a proxy for effectiveness) of the partners in the arrangement.
Savas (1987; 2000) provides summaries o f several empirical investigations
ranging from specific programs to a general survey of public officials. Two of these
studies reported by E.S.Savas are included herein. The first involves a summary o f
program-specific nine major empirical studies conducted over a period o f ten years,
most o f them prior to the 1980s. The studies covered “the United States, Canada,
Switzerland, and Japan, as well as regional studies in Connecticut, California, and the
Midwestern United Sates” (Savas, 1987, p. 124). Two researchers, Savas and Stevens,
conducted the study in the United States using a 1974 data for city sizes ranging from
2,500 to 720,000. The study investigated the relative efficiency between municipal
and private residential refuse collection and found that contract collection for cities
larger than 50,000 residents cost 29% to 37% less than municipal collection (Savas
and Stevens 1975; cited in Savas 1987, p. 126). Savas summarized the findings as
follows:
•

A municipal budget director has to allocate 35 percent more money for municipal
collection than for contract collection of equivalent quality.
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•

A resident has to pay 58 percent more for municipal collection than for contract
collection, after taking into consideration the tax rebate he receives indirectly from
the contractor.

•

It costs the municipal agency 88 percent more to perform the same work; that is,
the agency is much less productive. (Savas 1987, p. 124).
The next case involves a summary o f a 1987 nationwide survey o f public

officials of local governments. According to Savas (2000), three-quarters o f U.S.
local governments had saved money by contracting out services to the private sector
providers. Savas summarized the responses of 450 respondents and reported the
following figures: “ 11 percent reported savings o f 40 percent or more, 41 percent
reported savings o f 20 percent or more, and 80 percent reported savings o f at least 10
percent” (P. 148).
In 1984, a study sponsored by the Department o f Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) found that private contractors were 50 percent more efficient
than municipal agencies (Sclar, 2000; Savas, 1987; 2000; Donahue, 1989). The HUDsponsored 1984 study, led by economist Barbara J. Stevens, examined twenty cities of
comparable size within metropolitan Los Angeles. Ten o f these cities were served by
municipalities and the other ten were served by private contractors. Then the study
compared the efficiency o f these two categories o f cities on eight different services
ranging from building janitorial services to asphalt overlay construction. The results
revealed that private contractors provided services at a much lower cost than the direct
services provided by municipal agencies. The reported cost savings range from 96
percent for asphalt overlay construction to 37 percent for street tree maintenance.
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These savings represent about 5 percent o f the municipal budgets (Sclar, 2000). Some
scholars have questioned the validity and generalizability o f the findings o f this study
on methodological grounds (Sclar, 2000; Donahue, 1989).
The results o f the above studies do not appear to support unequivocally the
gains from privatization in terms of cost reductions. However, the 2002 nationwide
survey conducted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) provides a different
picture about the gains in cost savings. On cost savings, Chi, Arnold, & Perkins (2004)
reported the responses o f two groups o f officials-state budget and legislative staffs
and line agency heads from the 2002 CSG survey. According to this study, “Most
budget and legislative service agency directors reported on savings from privatization
to be 5 percent or less. But many o f them could not answer whether privatization
saved their state agency money or not, while 18 percent said it has resulted in no
savings.... [ Also] 29 percent o f agency heads reported cost savings to be more than
15 percent, and 33 percent of the agency heads reported no savings from privatization”
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, P. 14).
Cost savings also varies from program to program or from agency to agency.
For example, about 39 percent o f the transportation agency directors who responded to
the survey said their cost savings from privatization was less than one percent, while
36.5% percent said they did not know; 2.4 percent reported cost savings between 11
and 15 percent, and another 2.4 percent said their cost savings was over 15 percent.
The cost savings trend for all other agencies covered by the survey is similar to the
responses given by transportation agency directors, with only minor variations (see
Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 17-18). Also, in their empirical investigation of the
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determinants o f state prison privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005) found
that “the fiscal and economic variables are not determinants of prison privatization....
Rather, the factors that seem to better explain why states privatize their prisons relate
more to politics and ideology” (p. 229).
The empirical studies reviewed in the preceding sections provide conflicting
results. Some o f the findings provide compelling evidence about cost savings and
confirm the advantages o f the private contractors. The weight of the evidence in favor
of privatization is so overwhelming as to render the debate over privatization mute.
Taking the findings o f the studies at face value, one would conclude that state and
local governments have much to gain from privatization. Privatization can indeed be a
panacea to cure all their financial problems. However, other studies throw doubts
about the efficiency of the private contractors. Even the validity and generalizability of
the findings confirming cost savings have been questioned on methodological grounds.
The bottom line, however, is that the empirical studies are at variance with the
theoretical argument that advocates often employ to support privatization. Brudney et
al.(2005) point out that “empirical studies differ substantially in regard to the amount
of cost savings achieved and, in some instances, whether any savings (or even cost
increases) might be forthcoming” (p.395). In fact, in some situations, “direct public
service” can provide better services at low cost (Brudney et al., 2005). In light o f this
empirical ambiguity, it is perhaps reasonable to question the wisdom o f continuing
debating the efficiency gains from privatization. But advocates of privatization argue
that the “appropriate policy environment must be in place in order to achieve the
intended objectives.... The elements o f an ideal policy environment are the familiar
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ones o f a competitive market economy” (Savas, 2000, p. 124). Savas (2000) then
provided a long list o f the elements o f an ideal policy environment that would induce
efficient and effective privatization as shown in Table 2.3 below.

Table 2.3 Elements of an Ideal Policy Environment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Market prices without price controls or subsidies
The right to own property and to exercise property rights
No government barriers to entry by competitors and no protectionism
Equal application and enforcement o f laws, including the tax code and contract law,
within a fair, comprehensive, independent legal system
No favoritism by government in providing access to credit and foreign exchange
No favoritism by government in selling raw materials or purchasing products
Market-based interest rates, not preferential rates on government loans
Freedom for the newly privatized firm to hire and fire employees, subject to equal
application o f labor laws and the privatization agreement
Freedom for the private firm to restructure or change the business, subject to the
privatization agreement
Political stability
Currency stability and control inflation

Source: Savas, 2000, p.124-125.

These are elements that few countries can achieve. E.S. Savas was certainly
aware of the impossibility of achieving these elements o f an ideal policy environment
when he said: “Needless to say, nowhere is such an ideal policy fully in place” (Savas,
2000, p. 125). While some of the elements are less applicable in the context o f U.S.
privatization, the existence of market competition is nonetheless central to the
efficiency, effectiveness, and cost savings arguments. The belief in the existence o f
competition in the private sector underpins the push for privatizing public services.
The cost savings argument is based primarily on the premise that the private sector is
more efficient and effective than the public sector in allocating resources through the
market mechanism o f competition. The key assumption here is the existence of
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competition. As Van Slyke (2003) noted, “Each o f the arguments for privatization is
grounded in an assumption that competition exists” (p.297).
Competition is certainly the cornerstone o f private sector economy. In an ideal
competitive environment, prices are regulated in the marketplace through the supply
of and demand for goods and services leading to an efficient allocation of resources. In
a market where competition exists, a given output can be produced or attained at the
lowest possible cost (McNamara and Morris, 2008). Hence, governments engage in a
variety of privatization arrangements to take advantage of the competitive
environment in the private sector in order to achieve the public goals at the lowest
possible cost to taxpayers.
Yet critics point out that the existence of competition is questionable for a
number of reasons including: environmental constraints, actions by private
organization, network relationships, and government-enacted barriers (Van Slyke,
2003 ; Morris, 2007). Developing competition is further complicated because of the
fact that the public and private sectors appear to have conflicting values - divergent
goals, competing incentives, political and bureaucratic realities (McNamara and
Morris, 2008; Van Slyke, 2003); these issues undermine the abilities of agencies “ to
manage contract relationships and provide meaningful oversight that mitigates fraud,
waste, and abuse” (Van Slyke, 2003, p.307).
Furthermore, Morris (2007) argues that privatization may create pathologies
that “combine elements of government and market failures”. By adding new
“pathologies” to existing pathologies that characterize government and market failures,
privatization complicates the nature o f the principal-agent relationship, the manner
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outputs are measured, and the flexibility o f the private actor. In a case study involving
prison privatization in the state of Mississippi, the author identified three pathologies
(Morris, 2007). First, privatization added a new level o f complexity to the principalagent arrangement that forces the principal to assume the roles o f both principal and
agent simultaneously. Government serves as an agent to the people and as a principal
to the private contractor; this additional layer of principal-agent arrangement creates a
new pathology, complicating monitoring problems such as opportunistic and rentseeking behaviors normally associated with agents and principals respectively; it
further complicates problems related to accountability such as information asymmetry.
The second pathology that privatization creates refers to the problem of
measuring output. While some services such as clients served, potholes filled are
relatively easy to measure, other services such as quality and effectiveness do not lend
themselves to easy measurement that can readily be reduced to numerical indices.
The difficulty in valuing output is unlikely to be solved in the privatized arrangement.
The third pathology refers to government’s imposition o f strong accountability
mechanism (rules and regulation) on the privatized arrangement to prevent
opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent. The imposition of rules and
regulations can undermine the market efficiency that the government hopes to take
advantage o f through the privatized arrangement. These three pathologies reinforce
each other and blur the lines between government and market failures (see Morris,
2007, p.318-335). The implication of the study by Morris (2007) is that privatization
may not necessarily produce the desired results not only because o f the obvious
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existence o f government and market failures, but also because o f the addition of
“hybrid” pathologies that privatization arrangement creates.
In short, creating all the elements o f an ideal policy environment for
privatization to work, as suggested by Savas (2000), seems to be an impossible task.
As far as competition is concerned, scholars have argued that many factors including
environmental constraints, interest groups, and other related factors complicate the
development o f competitive market (Van Slyke, 2003; Morris, 2007; McNamara and
Morris, 2008). Privatization could not produce an unambiguous result in terms of cost
reductions because o f the fact that the appropriate environment, namely, competitive
marketplace did not exist.
The mixed results o f the empirical studies reviewed underscore the fact that the
perceived benefits and superiority o f the private sector/the marketplace could not be
confirmed consistently. This means in effect that the mixed empirical evidence cannot
be fully relied on as a guide for privatization decisions, which leads one to ask: In the
absence o f unequivocal empirical evidence to support the cost savings arguments, why
do state governments continue to privatize? The literature reviewed thus far provides
useful insights to identify the potential answer to the aforementioned question.
Indeed, the review o f the literature suggests that socioeconomic, economic,
political, and ideological factors may have been the likely drivers o f privatization
policy. Yet states show wide variations in their privatization efforts, and it is not clear
the extent to which these factors influence the levels o f state government privatization.
There is little empirical research that examined the influence of socioeconomic,
economic, political, and ideological factors on the level o f state privatization
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initiatives. As mentioned earlier, this study seeks to contribute to state comparative
research in general and to the contemporary privatization theory in particular by filling
this gap in the literature. The factors that have been identified in the literature as the
potential drivers o f privatization are summarized below; their expected relationships
with the level of state government privatization are also described and working
hypotheses are developed.

Factors Influencing the Level o f State Government Privatization

The major concepts employed in this study for predicting the levels of state
government privatization are derived from the review of the literature. Based on the
review o f the literature, 14 variables have been identified and classified under four
major categories o f factors: socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological
factors. Following the definitions in Chapter I, the concepts are further described and
operationalized using measures for each of the above factors, and the relationships
between these measures and the dependent variable are hypothesized. One dependent
variable and 14 independent variables are employed to develop several research
hypotheses to be tested by this study.

Research Hypotheses
Socioeconomic Model
Socioeconomic factors are operationalized using three variables: state health
care spending, state pension spending, and state per capita personal income.
According to Oldfield (2003), socioeconomic is a term used interchangeably with
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social class or class since these terms “entail notions o f comparative rank, usually
based on income, education, and wealth” (p.441). And discussions o f socioeconomic
factors often involve understanding and explaining the effects of socioeconomic status
(SES) on the wellbeing o f individuals in society. Oldfield (2003) cited several studies
in the literature showing the connection between socioeconomic status and various life
outcomes in many areas such as health care, education, income and wealth, and
highlighted numerous government programs to help the lower classes and “to assure
greater social equity” (p.451).
As the review o f the literature reveals, the U.S. government created many
entitlement programs to address the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged people
including the elderly during the New Deal years o f the 1930s (for example, Social
Security, Unemployment Compensation, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
[AFDC], Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled, now called Supplemental Security Income
or SSI) and the Great Society years o f the 1960s (for example, food stamps, Medicare,
Medicaid) (Dye, 1998). However, the proliferations o f entitlement programs led to the
growth and expansion o f the public sector that became a target of criticism and
spawned the contemporary privatization movement that sought to reduce the size and
scope of the public sector as well as to reduce costs of providing goods and services.
Over the past several years, privatization was embraced by state governments,
among other things, to reduce costs as well as to reduce the role o f government in the
provision o f goods and services; but the extent to which these goals are achieved
through privatization still remains an empirical question that needs to be investigated.
Thus, to determine the level o f state government privatization that are likely to be
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accounted for by socioeconomic factors, state health care spending, state pension
spending and state per capita personal income are employed to test the relationship
between socioeconomic factor and the levels o f state government privatization .

State Health Care Spending

As noted earlier, one of the legacies of the Great Society era was the
development o f health care system (Medicare and Medicaid) to alleviate the
socioeconomic hardships o f people o f lower socioeconomic status. Both Medicare
and Medicaid were enacted in 1965 as an amendment to the Social Security Act o f
1935 (Dye, 1998). While Medicare is designed for the aged (elderly) and is directly
under the purview o f the federal government, “Medicaid is a combined federal and
state program, [and] states exercise fairly broad administrative powers and carry about
half o f the financial burden” (Dye, 1998, p. 134); Medicaid is a welfare program
designed for needy people and the money is paid from the general tax revenues; states
establish the eligibility requirements as well as the level o f benefits to be paid to
recipients (Dye, 1998).
Over time, however, the growth of state health care expenditures raised
concerns about the rising costs of providing health care services. For example,
according to Levit et al. (2003), state Medicaid expenditures represented “an average
o f 20 percent o f spending” resulting in a significant “budgetary shortfalls in fiscal year
2001 for state governments” (P. 156). Also, U.S. Census, Statistical Abstract o f the
United States (2004-2005) reported that the combined state and local government
medical care expenditures rose from $24.9 billion in 1980 to $258.7 in 2002, which is
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an increase o f about 939 percent. Medicaid accounted for much o f the increase in
expenditures rising from $23.9 billion in 1980 to $250.0 billion in 2002 representing a
change o f 949 percent in 22 years (Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 2004 2005).
Health care became a target of reform to control the rising costs as well as to
expand access (Dye, 1998), and many states privatized some of their health care
services as a cost saving mechanism (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). But empirical
studies are scant regarding the influence o f health care expenditures on the levels of
state privatization efforts. This study therefore tests the extent to which heath care
expenditures predict the level of state government privatization.
Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with lower health care
expenditures.

State Pension Spending

State pension systems also began taking root during the Great Depression to
provide retirement security to elderly Americans (Almeida and Boivie, 2009).
According to Almeida and Boivie (2009), state and local public sector employees were
not included in the 1935 Social Security system, and states established their own
retirement system to provide a secure source of income for their retirees; “45 states
had retirement systems in place by 1961” (Almeida and Boivie, 2009, p. 154).
Today, state and local pension coverage is widespread, and many teachers,
public safety personnel, and other public employees count on state and local
government pension systems for a secure source o f income for retirement (Almeida
and Boivie, 2009; Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008). Public sector pensions are
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primarily defined benefit plans and cover a significant number o f workers. For
example, in 2006, almost 80 percent of the state and local workers age 25-64 were
covered by some type o f pensions o f which defined benefit plans accounted for a full
80 percent o f public sector participants (Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008).
Some studies show that in the last couple of decades, many state and local
governments have expanded generous retirement benefits to their workers (Edwards,
2010), which help retirees maintain a standard o f living similar or close to their pre
retirement level. From the perspective o f social equity advocates, state pension plans
provide additional safety net to prevent some retirees from falling into poverty.
Edward (2010), however, contends that since defined benefit pensions are essentially
differed payments, policymakers have been able to expand benefit packages over the
past several years with little short-term budgetary impact; but the expanded benefits
have been largely unfunded and “have built up large liabilities in employee pension
plans” (p. 92), eventually adding to the growth o f state budget shortfalls in the long
run.
Also, the Council o f State Governments (CSG) reported that the majority o f
public pension plans are underfunded or unfunded and have constrained states’ ability
to finance their public pensions and health care expenditures (CSG, 2007). Growing
pension liabilities and increasing health care expenditures have exasperated state
budget crises requiring major budget reforms and cuts. Although the state employee
pension system has been designed to alleviate the financial hardships o f retirees and
has been an integral part o f state programs since the Great Depression, it has
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nonetheless been found to contribute to the fiscal crises that government faced in the
last 20 or 30 years.
As a response to the growing fiscal crises, state officials have adopted many
strategies such as trimming employee pension benefits, moving employee benefits
away from defined benefit plans to defined contributions such as 401(k) plan,
delivering public services more efficiently, privatizing services when feasible, cutting
staffing levels, and terminating low-value programs (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010). Yet,
existing empirical studies have not tested the impact of pension spending on the level
o f state government privatization in the literature, which this study seeks to
accomplish.
Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.

State Per-Capita Personal Income

Writing as far back as 1974, David O. Porter and Teddie Wood Porter noted the
views o f the time that “by transferring more governmental services and goods to those
with lower incomes, [government can serve as] the vehicle for smoothing out gross
inequalities of opportunity” (Porter and Porter, 1974, p. 36). Aside from smoothing out
inequalities, politicians appear to respond to the demands o f voters if politicians perceive
that the outcomes o f their election or reelection efforts are likely to be swayed or
influenced by those voters who demand changes.
For example, as detailed in the literature review, during the Great Society years,
the Democratic administration sought to line up the interests of the Democratic Party
with the policies that promoted antipoverty programs for urban blacks at the time
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because the Democratic Party saw that urban blacks had become important in terms of
determining the outcome o f presidential elections (Piven and Cloward, 2005). As Porter
and Porter (1974) succinctly put it: “On the self-interest side, politicians have found it
profitable to respond to large or new blocks of voters demanding redistributions o f
resources” (p. 36). Recent studies have also supported the argument that politicians
respond to the needs o f low-income voters to gamer their votes in an election (see Soss
et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007).
The theoretical arguments suggest that per capita personal income can be used as
an indicator o f state policy decisions; and there is an extensive empirical research in the
literature that examined the association o f per capita personal income and state policy
outcomes. Many researchers in state comparative studies have conducted empirical
studies to test the relationships between per capita personal income and state policy
decisions in many areas o f public policy, such as tax policy, privatization policy, health
care policy, welfare policy, and education policy (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and
Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007). For example, Berry and Berry
(1992) tested four tax adoption models using probit maximum likelihood estimates. The
models included per capita personal income as one of the predictor variables and four
dependent variables for four different time periods (income-tax for 1919-37, gasoline tax
for 1919-29, any tax for 1919-39 and any tax for 1960-71).
The authors found a positive association between per capita personal income and
tax adoption for “any tax” variable for the 1960-71 time periods, supporting their
hypothesis that greater state per capita personal income results in a greater likelihood of
a tax adoption by state policymakers. For the three other variables and time periods, the
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statistical results show negative associations between per capita personal income and tax
adoptions, which suggest that “greater per capita personal income is associated with a
lower probability o f a tax adoption” (Berry and Berry, 1992, p.734).
Other studies have also examined the association between per capita personal
income and state policy decisions. For example, in their study o f the determinants of
state privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005) found per capita personal
income not to be a significant determinant o f prison privatization decision.
Nonetheless, both the theoretical arguments and the empirical results demonstrate the
validity o f per capita personal income as a measure of state policy outcomes.
Assuming everything else being equal, it can be argued that states with higher per
capita personal income are more likely to collect more money in taxes and have
greater capacity to provide more goods and services to its citizens without resorting to
privatization. On the other hand states with lower per capita personal income are less
likely to generate sufficient revenues to meet the needs o f its citizens and may resort to
privatization scheme. Thus, the association between per capita personal income and
the level o f state government privatization can be hypothesized as follows.
Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have
lower level o f state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal
income.

Economic Model

The economic factor is operationalized using state labor costs, state per capita
spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits variables.
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State Labor Cost

Public employees’ compensations have been partly blamed for growing budget
crises that states continue to face. According to the U.S. Census Bureau data, the
payrolls o f state employees increased from $4.29 billion in 1980 to $14.84 billion in
2002 representing an increase of 245.92 percent. For the same time period, the
payrolls for local governments increased from $10.45 billion in 1980 to $37.49 billion
in 2002, a change o f 258.76 percent. Over all, the combined state and local payrolls
increased by about 255 percent (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006). While
these figures appear to be large in absolute terms, it is not necessarily correct to
conclude that they are excessive if the growth of population and the adjustment for
inflation are factored in the calculation.
However, when employee benefits such as retirement benefits that include
defined pension plans discussed earlier are added to the payrolls, the contributions of
employee compensations to state budget shortfalls could be considerable. Furthermore,
some researchers contend that unions push the costs of the state and local workforce
because there are more unions in the public sector than the private sector (Edwards,
2010). In his study of the costs of unionizations for states, Edwards (2010) found that
“California’s 62 percent unionization rate translated into a statewide boost in public
sector compensation costs of more than 10 percent” (p. 109). Similarly, Kodrzycki
(1998) conducted an empirical study where she found that privatization in the form of
contracting out was more prevalent in cities and towns paying high wages to their own
employees. Sawicky (1998) also highlighted that “higher labor costs point more
explicitly to increased level o f public spending and taxes” (p. 107).
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The growing budgetary crises have constrained states’ ability to provide goods
and services to their citizens, and as indicated earlier, state policymakers have sought
to curtail the growth o f labor costs by adopting strategies that included, but not limited
to, changing labor laws that contain collective bargaining provisions, cutting staffs and
benefits, and privatizing services when possible (Edwards, 2010). Although
privatization o f services is invariably invoked as a means to tackle state financial
crises, there is no empirical study that examined the association between labor costs
and the level o f state government privatization. Given the argument that labor costs
(public employee compensations) contribute to budget shortfalls, the following
hypothesis can be tested.
Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.

State Per Capita Spending

In 2002, the aggregate direct general expenditures on state and local
government functions amounted to $6.01 billion on per capita basis, which is almost
twice the level spent in 1990 ($3.36 billion) (Statistical Abstract o f the United States,
2006). Compared to the level of 1990, the 2002 per capita spending represents nearly
79 percent increase in just 12 years. However, the aggregation conceals the existence
of wide variations in per capita spending among the states. For example, in fiscal year
2007, state per capita spending ranges from a low of $3,831 for Texas to a high of
$13,508 for Alaska (U.S. Census, Tax Foundation, 2007). The data show that per
capita spending has grown significantly over time and its effect on privatization
decisions has been investigated empirically. In her study o f the impact o f fiscal
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pressures on the privatization of local services, Kodrzycki (1998), for example, found
that “High and/or rising per capita expenditures on police and fire were associated
with a lower tendency to privatize service delivery, all else equal” (p.46; italics in
original). Since police and fire services are not targets o f privatization, the result does
not invalidate the basic hypothesis that higher per capita spending is likely to lead to
more privatization.
Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher
level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.

State Fiscal Capacity

Many studies have examined the impact o f fiscal capacity on privatization
decisions (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Kodrzycki, 1998). More
often the assumption is that higher fiscal capacity may mean greater state capacity to
provide goods and services without incurring budget deficits; a corollary to this is that
low fiscal capacity is likely to lead to additional costs that might require raising taxes
or cutting services. Because of the unpopularity o f tax increases, politicians are less
likely to adopt new taxes and may resort to privatization as an alternative to raising
taxes in order to control the costs associated with the provision of goods and services
to citizens.
There are many empirical studies that have examined the associations between
fiscal capacity and state policy decisions. Among these are two studies cited earlier;
one by Berry and Berry (1992) and the other by Price and Riccucci (2005). For
example, Berry and Berry (1992) found a negative association between fiscal capacity
and tax adoption supporting their “proposition that the poorer the fiscal health o f a
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state’s government, the more likely it is to adopt a new tax” (p.732). Intuitively, the
conclusion appears to be logical, but, as indicated earlier, for many politicians raising
taxes is in many cases politically unpalatable.
Also, Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the effect of fiscal capacity on state
prison privatization and found fiscal capacity to be insignificant. Although the authors
concluded that “fiscal conditions and economic factors do not explain why states may
choose to privatize” (p.229), their investigation is confined to prison privatization and
their conclusion cannot be safely generalized to other types of privatization including
corrections other than prisons. In fact, numerous studies have found both positive and
negative associations between fiscal/economic factors and state privatization decisions
(Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Pouder, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005). For
example, in a study that involved a two-stage process o f corrections privatization,
Nicholson-Crotty (2004) examined the impact o f different variables that included
various measures o f economic factors on state correction privatization decisions.
The first model tested the factors that influence the adoption o f enabling
legislations by state legislatures or governors, and the second model tested the factors
influencing administrators and managers to make decisions to privatize corrections;
the researcher found that in the first case “not a single economic factor has a
significant influence on the privatization decision.. .whereas in the second stage
[e]conomic factors play a significant role in the corrections privatization process” (p.
52).
Indeed, fiscal imperatives have been the most widely cited reasons for the rise
o f privatization; and governments have continued to justify their decisions to privatize

93
on the basis o f fiscal imperatives. Yet there is little research that examined the level of
state government privatization on a comprehensive manner that takes into account
several classes o f services simultaneously. This study will test the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity

State Deficits

Although subtle differences can be discerned between deficits and fiscal
capacity, the two concepts are intertwined or closely related, and variables used to
define and operationalize fiscal capacity can also be used to operationalize deficits. In
view o f this, the quantitative research and results cited for fiscal capacity variable
above are equally valid to the discussion of the impact o f deficits on privatization
decisions. With this caveat, some o f the theoretical arguments about deficits are
highlighted below.
Literature reveals that governments at all levels incur budget deficits for at
least three main reasons: 1) slow economic growth or recession, 2) increased demand
for services by the public, and 3) lack o f public support for tax increases; these factors
create fiscal imbalances often leading to large budget deficits; this is particularly the
case in state and local governments (Henton and Waldhom, 1984). The increasing
public demands for more services without additional costs coupled with the unfunded
mandates from the federal government intensify the budget shortfalls that
governments face. As a result, in some cases, governments resort to privatization as a
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means to reduce costs and to balance their budgets (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Chi,
1998; Kettl, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003).
Evidence exists in the literature in which researchers have investigated the
effects o f budget deficits on privatization decisions. Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny
(1997) conducted an empirical study on the factors driving privatization by county
governments using variables that included measures of budget constraints. The authors
found “that factors that increase the cost o f government spending, such as state laws
restricting government financing and measures o f the state’s financial trouble, make
privatization more likely” (Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1997, p.468).
Related studies have found a positive association between deficits and
privatization decisions in the context of local governments. For example, Kodrzycki
(1998) noted that “Rising deficits (or falling surplus) between 1987 and 1992 were
significant spurs to increasing a locality’s reliance on outside contractor” (p.46). While
these empirical studies do not focus directly on the deficits at state level, the studies
nonetheless support the validity o f using deficit as a variable to measure the impact of
economic factor on state privatization decisions. Therefore, the impact o f state deficits
on the level o f state government privatization is hypothesized as follows.
Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower deficits.

Political Model

Numerous studies have shown that political factors influence privatization
decisions (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004;
Pouder, 1996). The theoretical argument about the influence of political factors on
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privatization decision is extensive, but there is a paucity o f empirical research that
investigated the impact o f political factors on the general levels o f state government
privatization in a comprehensive manner, which this study attempts to accomplish. In
so doing, the following four variables are used to operationalize the political factor:
state union laws, state political culture, party affiliation o f the governor controlling
state government, the party controlling the state legislature.

State Union Laws

A plethora o f research is available in the literature that shows that political
opposition particularly from public employee unions impede privatization efforts;
unions resist privatization of services that they have traditionally performed (Hirsch
and Osborne, 2000; Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004; Sawicky, 1998; Pouder, 1996;
Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny,
1997). For example, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) noted that public employee opposition
can impede privatization efforts. Similarly, Sawicky (1998) and others highlight the
power o f relatively high levels of unionization to oppose privatization. Studies further
indicate that “state employees in several states filed lawsuits against their government
to oppose privatization” (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 476).
However, evidence exists in the literature that shows that the presence o f
unions and the level o f unionization in a state fail to predict state privatization
decisions. Nicholson-Crotty (2004) empirically investigated the extent of union
influence on state corrections privatization decisions and found that “the degree o f
unionization.. .within a state did not have a significant impact on the decisions to
privatize corrections management” (p.52). The author offered two explanations for the
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lack o f the empirical support for the presence of union influence on state privatization
decisions.
The first explanation has to do with what the author calls “construct
invalidity,” which suggests that “the percent of public employee unionization within a
state may not be a suitable proxy for the power o f employee unions” (p.53). The
second potential explanation refers to the fickleness of the theoretical argument that is
premised on the assumption of unions having the power to thwart state decisions to
privatize services; the author concluded that the “public employee unions simply do
not wield the power over the privatization process that researchers had previously
suspected” (p.53).
Other researchers use state’s labor law as an indicator of union power arguing
that the presence of unions or the degree o f unionization is not necessarily a valid
measure o f the power o f unions. For example, Price and Riccucci (2005) argued that
“Although the presence or absence of unions has typically been used as a measure of
union strength, it does not accurately reflect potential union power...state’s public
sector labor law would be a more accurate indicator” (p. 227). In their empirical study
on the determinants o f state prison privatization decisions, Price and Riccucci (2005)
used state’s labor laws as a measure of union power in their model. Their findings also
showed that unions were not significant predictors of state prison privatization
decisions.
However, other empirical studies have found results that support the theoretical
argument that powerful labor unions can deter privatization decisions. Indeed, some
researchers argue that strong unions are more likely to influence privatization
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decisions in their favor. For example, Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny (1997) conducted
an empirical study on the determinants o f local government privatization decisions and
found that “the fraction o f county employees represented by bargaining units
[collective bargaining] comes out highly significant and negative, indicating that
strong unions deter privatization” (p.457); in the statement cited here strong unions
can be taken to mean strong union laws. Also, Hirsch and Osborne (2000) contend
that “high levels o f unionization in municipal labor force continue to create
opportunities for municipal labor to effectively oppose privatization” (p.324).
While the first group o f researchers found results that fail to support the
theoretical argument that unions deter privatization, the results o f the second group of
researchers appear to be consistent with the proposition that strong unions deter
privatization. Nonetheless, the discussion above clearly shows that the variable state
union law is a valid indicator o f the strength or power (weak union power or strong
union power) o f public employee unions. Essentially, the concept weak union power is
used to refer to states that have the right to work laws in their books, and the concept
strong union power is used to refer to states that do not have the right to work laws
and the unions can be represented by collective bargaining units. As such, the
following hypothesis can tested.
Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with strong union power.

State Political Culture

Political culture has been used as a variable in state comparative studies to
investigate state policy outcomes. Elazar (1984) defined political culture as “the
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historical sources o f differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence
political life in the various states” (p.l 10). The author maintains that political culture
combined with what he calls “sectionalism ” and “frontier ” shape “the individuals
states’ political structures, electoral behavior, and modes o f organization for political
action” (Elazar, 1984, p. 109; italics in original).
Based on the conceptualization o f Elazar (1984), Dresand and Gosing (2008)
offer a more elaborate definition o f political culture as the “combined effects of
historical experiences, tradition, pattern o f immigration and migration, and religious
identities that shape political attitudes, views of the appropriate role o f government in
society, the relative priorities placed on public programs, and avenues for political
participation” (P.21); this definition is likely to capture the many dimensions that
political culture entails including the impacts o f immigration and migration Elazar
(1984) identified three political cultures which the author thought define the American
society. These are: individualism, moralistic, and traditionalistic.
Individualistic political culture focuses largely on the instrumentality of
government policies as a means to promote individual self-interest; if individuals view
the market place as the best means to allocate values that benefit them, then
government is to be restrained by keeping it out o f the way of the marketplace. At
other times, individuals support government policies, such as tax breaks, to extent that
those policies are believed to be beneficial to them. In either case, from the
perspective o f individualistic political culture, tangible benefits must be realized from
government inaction or action (Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008).
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Moralistic political culture appears to embrace liberal philosophy in that it
accords government a positive role in advancing the collective welfare over narrow
individual interest. According to the moralistic political culture, as a representative of
the people, government is expected to promote the interests of those who are
disadvantaged in the economic and political marketplace as well as to encourage broad
participation o f common folks in determining what is in the public interest. From the
perspective o f moralistic political culture, issues are more important than individual
interests or personalities (Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008).
Traditionalistic political culture seeks to advance elite interests and embraces
values that appear to have definite class overtones. According to Elazar (1984), the
traditionalistic political culture seeks “to confine real political power to a relatively
small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often inherit
their right to govern through family ties or social position” (p. 119). Dresand and
Gosing (2008) also assert that traditionalistic political culture “is oriented toward
protecting the interests o f traditional elites and that often entails preserving the status
quo” (p.22). The three political cultures are essentially “rooted in colonial America”
(Dresand and Gosing, 2008, p. 22) and are presumed to be stable over a long period of
time. Although the notion o f political culture being stable over time for all states is
challenged by some scholars (see Berry et al., 1998), it is still being used as a measure
of state ideology in state comparative studies in many areas of public policy such as
welfare, corrections and other related programs ( Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007;
Price and Riccucci, 2005; Breaux et al., 2002 ).

100
Specifically, however, political culture is used as a variable to operationalize
citizen ideology as distinct from state government ideology; Berry et al. (1998) argue
that citizen ideology and state government ideology are different and point to previous
studies that have used political culture as “a surrogate for citizen ideology” (p. 328).
In the context o f privatization policy, evidence exists in the literature in which
scholars have used political culture as a variable to state privatization decisions. For
example, Price and Riccucci (2005) included political culture in their empirical
investigation o f the determinants o f state prison privatization. The authors
operationalized political culture using measures developed by Erickson, Wright, and
Mclver (1993) and found a statistically significant association between conservative
political culture and state prison privatization. This study will test the influence of
political culture on the level of state government privatization as hypothesized below.
Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic
political culture.

The Party Affiliation o f the Governor Controlling State Government

The General Accounting Office ([GAO], 1997) states that “privatization can
best be introduced and sustained when a political leader champions it” (p.8). But
privatization decision, like similar other decisions, is made in a political environment
and the political ideology o f the legislators or governors may have the most influence
when enabling legislations for privatization are considered and privatization decisions
are made (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Breaux et al., 2002).
More often “ideological conservatism creates an environment that is more supportive
of privatization” (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004, p.46).
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As the review o f the literature shows, ideological conservatism is associated
with the Republican Party, and liberal ideology is associated with the Democratic
Party; this ideological distinction between the two parties is believed to be generally
true to this day. In view o f this distinction, it is safe to argue that a Republican
governor is more likely than his/her Democratic counterpart to promote privatization.
Some recent studies support this general theoretical proposition. For example, in their
study o f welfare reform related to the implementation of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in the state of Mississippi, Breaux et al.
(2002) found that the conservative Republican governor, Kirk Fordice, chose to
privatize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
Breaux et al.(2002) offered a detailed analysis that revealed that the
conservative Republican governor managed to have “direct control over the state’s
Department o f Human Services (DHS), the state agency charged with the
implementation o f welfare programs after the state legislature abolished a bipartisan
governing board that had served as a buffer between the governor and the DHS”
(Breaux., 2002, p.96). Having direct control of DHS, the governor was able to fill “all
top-level management positions with party faithful and those who shared his
ideological beliefs on the direction of the agency; soon after heavy use o f privatization
followed” (Breaux et al., 2002, p. 96).
Other studies offer a rather tenuous account of the ideological divide between
Republican and Democratic governors as a determinant o f a governor’s privatization
decision. For example, the 2002 Council o f State Government (CSG) study
summarized the views o f six state governors about the implementation o f privatization
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initiatives in their respective states. The governors were three Republicans and three
Democrats, and their rationales for undertaking privatization efforts were essentially
their beliefs in the efficiency and effectiveness o f the private sector. The opinions of
both the Republican and Democratic governors were not fundamentally dissimilar and
did not reflect the ideological divide when pushing for privatization (Chi, Arnold, &
Perkins, 2004).
Also an empirical study by Price and Riccucci (2005), cited earlier repeatedly,
examined the impact of the political ideology o f a governor on prison privatization
decision; they referred to evidence in the literature that showed “the importance o f the
governor’s political party in state-level decision making” (p.328). Their findings
however did not show the political ideology of the governor to be a significant
determinant o f state prison privatization decision (Price and Riccucci, 2005). The
conclusion to be drawn from the studies cited above is certainly contradictory, but this
mixed conclusion cannot invalidate the basic theoretical argument that privatization is
more in tune with conservative ideology than with liberal ideology. At best, the results
point to the need to conduct further research. The studies however show that the
political ideology o f the governor controlling state government is a valid measure to
operationalize the influence of political factors on privatization decisions.
Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level
o f state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.

The Party Controlling the State Legislature

Writing in 1957, political scientist David Easton described the functions of
politics in the following terms: “The study o f politics is concerned with understanding
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how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society” (Easton, 1957,
p.384). Since the appearance of Woodrow W ilson’s essay The Study o f
Administration (1887) and later Frank Goodnow’s book Politics and Administration

(1900), the politics-administration dichotomy model was believed to have served the
nation well until the middle of the twentieth century in terms of setting the boundaries
between policy making and policy execution; that is between the legislative and the
executive branches, although the claim is “rejected on empirical grounds” (Svara,
1998, p.51).
Central to the dichotomy model is the idea that the lines o f responsibilities o f
the legislatures and the chief executives must be demarcated clearly so that the
legislatures set policies and the chief executives execute policies. For example,
Goodnow (1900) “classified government actions in terms of two functions - the
expression o f popular will through legislation and the execution o f that will through
administration” (Svara, 1998, p.51). While the distinction Easton’s (1957) made
between “authoritative decisions” and “executions” appears to be an affirmation o f the
dichotomy model, literature shows that political ideology matters more than the
institutional separations in many policy areas (Svara, 1998; Freire, 2008; NicholsonCrotty, 2004).
Although the legislative and the executive branches are separate entities
institutionally and serve, along with the judiciary, to check and balance each other, the
notion o f separating the legislatures from the chief executives in terms o f developing
policy proposals appears to be tenuous when ideological motivations are considered;
in this connection, Freire (2008), writing in the context o f European political
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orientation, asserts that it is the “left-right political cleavage [that] functioned as a
device to classify ideologies.. .by which parties categorize political orientations and
policy proposals” (p.l 80).
Similarly, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) stressed the importance o f political
motivations when legislators and/or governors consider the adoption of enabling
legislations for privatization or other policy areas. Thus, it can safely be assumed that
political ideology determines the relationship between the legislative body and the
executive body in many policy areas not the institutional separation per se. It is
commonly assumed that the political party controlling or dominating the state
legislature is more likely to affect state policy decision than the minority counterpart.
Since the Republican and Democratic parties are the only two major parties
represented in state legislative branches (as well as in the U.S. Congress), the
competition between the two parties essentially reflects their respective ideological
persuasions.
The Republican Party is assumed to espouse conservative ideology and the
Democratic Party is assumed to subscribe to liberal ideology. As reiterated in the
review o f the literature, conservative ideology is largely associated with the
privatization movement, and by implication, the Republican Party is believed to be the
major promoter o f privatization. Whereas the Democratic Party is commonly
associated with liberal ideology and is assumed to exercise restraint when making
privatization decisions. In view o f these ideological distinctions, researchers have
examined the link between political ideology and legislative decisions in public policy
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(Berry and Berry, 1992; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al.,
2001; Breaux et al., 2007).
For example, the study of the welfare reform in the state o f Mississippi by
Breaux et al. (2007) provides useful insights regarding the influence o f ideology in
state politics. The authors’ analysis showed how abolishing the bipartisan governing
body by the state legislature allowed the conservative Republican governor to
privatize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) by exercising direct
control over the Department of Human Services (DHS), the state agency responsible
for the implementation o f the welfare programs (see Breaux et al., 2007). Although
the study does not speak directly to the party configuration in the state legislature, the
analysis nonetheless sheds some light on the influence o f ideology in state policy
making.
Another study by Price and Riccucci (2005) examined specifically the extent
of influence that Republican controlled state legislatures exert on prison privatization.
The authors summarized some previous theoretical studies that link privatization to
conservative ideology and the Republican Party. Based on the theoretical arguments
in the literature they tested a hypothesis to determine the effect o f Republicancontrolled legislatures on state prison privatization decisions; the results indicate that
the “political party of governor” was not a significant predictor o f prison privatization
decisions (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.231). The findings run contrary to the
theoretical argument that conservative ideology drives privatization. But this
conclusion may not hold for the level of state government privatization in general.
Therefore this study tests the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled
legislature.

Ideology Model

Literature shows that ideological factors influence many areas of state public
policy including privatization policy (Morris, 1999; Hodge, 2000). Whiles many
studies point to fiscal imperatives as the primary driver o f privatization initiatives at
state and local levels (Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989; Boyne, 1998),
some scholars contend that “The context o f privatization is inherently ideological”
(Hodge, 2000, p. 17). For example, Morris (1999) argues that “Privatization is and
ideological choice requiring one to determine the particular set o f values to be
maximized as well as to understand the inherent value tradeoffs” (p .l55). In fact some
scholars have devised measures related to ideology that have been used in state
comparative studies to assess the impact o f ideological factors on many areas o f public
policy (Wright, Erikson, and Mclver, 1985; Berry and Berry, 1992; Erikson, Wright,
and Mclver, 1993; Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson, 1998). In light of this
theoretical argument, this study examines the impact o f ideology on the level o f state
government privatization using three variables: state policy liberalism, state ideology,
and state institutional capacity.

State Policy Liberalism

As indicated above, many researchers have constructed indices to measure
variables related to ideology. One such variable is state policy liberalism, which is
another name for government ideology. For example, Erikson, Wright, and Mclver
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(1993) developed a government ideology index which they labeled “policy liberalism”
by summing the standardized scores of the responses of 47 states to eight policy items
which include: education (public educational spending per pupil), Medicaid (eligibility
for Medicaid beyond the minimum levels required by federal regulations), AFDC
(eligibility analogues to the Medicaid measure), consumer protection, criminal justice,
legalized gambling, Equal Rights Amendment, and tax progressivity (p. 75-76).
According to the authors, “the eight policy variables represent one single dimension of
policy liberalism.” They maintain that “The index should be an accurate reflection of
the liberal-conservative tendencies of states’ policies” (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver,
1993, p. 77).
Similarly, Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson (1998) used the scores from
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political
Education (COPE) from 1960 to 1993 to create a composite measure o f citizen and
government ideology for each of the 50 states; the composite measure is constructed
based on an average score of interest group ratings of members o f Congress,
supplemented by congressional election outcomes, the roll-call voting scores o f state
congressional delegations, the partisan division o f state legislatures, and the party of
affiliation of the governor (Berry et al., 1998). The composite measure “runs from
zero representing the most conservative government ideology to 100 representing the
most liberal government ideology” (Berry et al., 1998, p.334).
Some scholars have utilized the above government ideology measures to assess
state policy decisions (Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007; Price and Riccucci, 2005).
For example, Soss, Schram, Vartanian, and O ’Brien (2001) used the measures
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developed by Berry et al.(1998) to examine the impact o f government ideology on the
choices state officials make when implementing the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996, commonly known as the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Their findings reveal that states with more
conservative government ideology had stricter sanctions for welfare recipients. “The
states that acted quickly to impose tough welfare policies were those in which
conservative governments held sway” (Soss et al., 2001, p. 389).
Also, Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the influence of government
ideology on state prison privatization using the measure developed by Berry et
al.(1998). The results support their hypothesis that “states are more likely to privatize
their prisons when the government ideology is more conservative as compared with
more liberal” (p.228). While the theoretical arguments and the empirical studies
reviewed here suggest that governments with conservative ideology are more likely to
promote privatization, the extent to which conservative government ideology
influences the level o f state government privatization is not addressed. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is tested in this study.
Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with liberal government
policy.

State Ideology

Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993) and others maintain that government
ideology is different from state ideology in that state ideology reflects the policy
preferences o f the citizens of a state. State ideology or “state citizen ideology ” or
simply “citizen ideology” is “generally conceived as the mean position on a liberal-
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conservative continuum o f the ‘active electorate’ in a state” (Berry et al., 1998, p. 327328; italics in original). Erikson, Wright, and Mclver assert that states vary in their
policy choices even though they appear to exhibit similarities in the policies they enact;
the differences are largely reflected in the policy preferences of the citizens o f each
state (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver, 1993). Therefore, the authors made a distinction
between government ideology, which they call state policy liberalism and state
ideology, which represents the preferences o f the “state electorate’s ideological taste”
(p.74).
Based on the theoretical distinction reviewed above, Erikson, Wright, and
Mclver (1993) devised indicators to measure state ideology. The authors used the
CBS/New York Times national surveys o f more than 167, 000 respondents for the 48
states conducted between 1976 to 1988 and aggregated the responses to construct a
single measure o f state ideology based on the mean ideological identifications of the
respondents who classified themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative; however,
“ the correlation between state’s mean ideological identification and the composite
policy index are highly correlated (r = .82)” (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver, 1993, p.78).
This strong correlation suggests that both indicators explain 82% o f state policy
variations.
Berry et al. (1998) argued that the two concepts (state ideology and policy
liberalism or government ideology) as constructed by Erikson, Wright, and Mclver
(1993) are difficult to operationalize. They developed indicators that measure citizen
ideology and government ideology as described above. The authors claim that their
citizen ideology and government ideology measures are dynamic and capture the
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ideological changes of citizens and elites over time and represent an improvement
over the static measures o f current indicators of ideology such as the one developed by
Erikson, Wright, and Mclver (1993). While acknowledging the importance o f static
measures in cross-sectional studies, the authors nonetheless argue that over time “a
static measure o f ideology cannot account for changes in policy” (Berry et al., 1998, p.
328).
Numerous state comparative studies have utilized state/citizen ideology to
assess state policy outcomes under varying circumstances (Brudney et al., 2004;
Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al.,
2001; Breaux et al., 2007). For example, Brudney et al. (2004) conducted an
empirical investigation o f the determinants o f state contracting out and its impact on
the quality and costs o f service delivery using variables that included citizen ideology
in their model. The authors used the measure developed by Berry et al. (1998) to
operationalize the citizen ideology variable; the finding indicated that the “political
and ideological variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical
significance” (Brudney et al., 2004, p. 413).
Similarly, in a study that examined the factors that motivate state-level
privatization decisions in the area o f corrections, Nicholson-Crotty (2004) used Berry
and his colleagues’ (1998) measure of citizen ideology in order to capture the political
conservatism o f a state. The empirical results show that “state liberalism is significant
and negatively correlated with contracting” (p.51). The finding supported the author’s
expectation that “states that are ideologically conservative are more likely to adopt
legislation that facilitates corrections management contracting” (p.46). Another study
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by Price and Riccucci (2005) examined the extent to which state ideology predicts
state prison privatization using political culture as a surrogate for state ideology.
As mentioned earlier, Berry et al. (1998) noted the difficulty of
operationalizing the two concepts (government ideology/state policy liberalism and
state/citizens’ ideology) and point to some studies that used “political culture as a
surrogate for citizen ideology” (p.328). Likewise, Price and Riccucci (2005) included
political culture (read state ideology) in their model as one of the indictors o f prison
privatization; the finding indicated that state ideology is significant. The authors thus
concluded: “the factors that seem to better explain why states privatize their prisons
relate more to politics and ideology.. ..The two political and ideological variables that
are statistically significant include government ideology and the political culture o f the
state” (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.229). In this study, the influence o f state ideology
on the level o f state government privatization is tested as hypothesized below.
Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.

State Institutional Capacity

Although, as noted earlier, the conservative-liberal ideological divide plays a
part in the policy preferences of state governments, state institutional capacity
becomes pertinent in the decision and implementation process and has been
operationalized and tested as one o f the determinants o f state policy decisions in many
areas o f public policy (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). Essentially, the assumption
here is that state institutional capacity has the potential to constrain or enhance the
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ability o f a state government to adopt and implement the desired program; and
scholars have defined and devised indicators to measure state institutional capacity.
Bowman and Kearney (1988) cited previous studies that defined capacity in
relation to the ability o f citizens and their government to develop political and
administrative institutions that have the capacity to provide responsive, effective, and
efficient public services. The authors also note that the concept of institutional
capacity is “multidimensional [and] is composed o f variables long associated with
state institutional modernization” (Bowman and Keamey, 1988, p.347). Yet long
secular development o f political and administrative institutional arrangements are
most likely to be influenced by the ideological preferences of citizens; and the concept
of institutional capacity, broadly defined, can be assumed as having an ideological
construct. However, noting the difficulty o f reaching a consensus on the definition of
capability/capacity and realizing that the concept is too broad to be adequately
captured in a single factor,” Bowman and Keamey (1988) devised “measures that
operationalize the concept capacity or capability in the context o f state government
institutions” (Bowman and Keamey, 1988, p.343).
Bowman and Keamey (1988) developed an operational definition o f capacity
that takes into account “measures that are commonly associated with institutional
reform (adaptability, decision making, and conflict management)” (P.347). They also
included “accountability, centralization, representation, coordination, and staffing and
spending” (p.359) to account for the multidimensionality o f institutional capacity in
constructing their measures. Using these indicators the authors developed empirically
derived separate scores for four factors: staffing and spending, accountability and

113
information management, executive centralization and representation (see Bowman
and Keamey, 1988). The authors claim that the scores o f the four factors together
measure state institutional capacity.
Some studies have utilized the measures developed by Bowman and Keamey
(1988) to operationalize state institutional capacity in many state comparative studies.
For example, in a study that examined the factors that influence state leveraging
decisions in the implementation of federal environment policy related to Clean Water
State Revolving Loan Fund (CWSRF) program, Travis, Morris, and Morris (2004)
used Bowman and Kearney’s (1988) measures o f state institutional capacity. They
investigated empirically the leveraging decisions process, using three models that
included institutional capacity as one o f the variables in a two-stage decision process
(the decision to leverage and how much to leverage).. The authors aggregated the
interval-level scores for the four factors (staffing and spending; accountability and
information management; executive centralization; and representation) to arrive at a
single measure o f institutional capacity.
With the institutional capacity variable included in the model, the authors
tested their hypothesis that “states with stronger institutional capacity to be more
likely to leverage” (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004, p.471). The results indicated
that institutional capacity was found not to be significant in the first stage o f the
process, but it was significant in the second stage of the decision process leading to the
conclusion that “states with greater institutional capacity are more willing to pursue
larger leveraging programs” (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004, p.472). In this study,
it is assumed that greater institutional capacity (which implies having, among other
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things, adequate resources, skilled manpower, and expert staffs) is likely to enhance a
state’s ability to provide services to citizens without the need to resort to privatization.
As such, it can be hypothesized that higher institutional capacity is expected to lead to
lower level o f state government privatization.
Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower
level o f state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.

Summary

This study examines the factors that influence the level o f state government
privatization across the states by drawing on the historical and contemporary
privatization literature. While the historical account offers useful insights about the
philosophy that underpins the contemporary privatization movement, a review o f the
modem literature on privatization reveals the rationales for the emergence and rise of
contemporary privatization policy across the United States and around the world. The
review of the contemporary literature further reveals that the factors that drive
privatization are many and varied and are largely related to socioeconomic, economic,
political, and ideological factors. The variables identified and discussed above are
supported by theory and empirical studies and have received considerable attention in
the literature as the likely drivers o f contemporary privatization. Yet, the extent of
influence these various factors exert on the level o f state government privatization has
received little attention in the literature. This study attempts to fill this gap in the
literature. A summary of the four models is presented in Figure 2.2 below.
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S o c io e c o n o m ic M od el
•
•

S tate H ealth Care S pending (+)
S ta te P ension S pending (+)

•

S ta te P er C apita P ersonal Incom e (-)

Economic factor
•
•

S ta te Labor C osts (+)
S ta te P er C apita S pending (+)

•

S ta te Fiscal C apacity (high -)

•

S ta te D eficits (+)

Political factor
•
•

S ta te U nion Laws (w eak +)
Political C ulture (In d /T ra d +)

•
•

G ov ern o r C ontrol Govt. (R+)
P arty C ontrol L egislature (R +)

■—

Ideological factor
•

S tate Policy Liberalism (C onservative +)

•
•

S tate Ideology (C onservative +)
S ta te Institu tio n al Capacity (high -)

Figure 2.2. Summary of the Four Models

The 14 hypotheses discussed above are summarized below.
HI: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with lower health care expenditures.
H2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
H3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have lower level
o f state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal income.
H4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
H5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
H6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level o f state
government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
H7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
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H8: States with weak union laws are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with strong union laws.
H9: States with individualistc/traditionalistic political culture are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic political
culture.
H10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
H l l : States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled
legislature.
H12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have higher level
of state government privatization than states with liberal government policy
H13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
H14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower level of
state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
Chapter III presents the methodology for this study; the dependent variable and each
o f the independent variables are operationalized and the various data sources for each
model are discussed.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter I provided an introduction to this study summarizing the background
information and the rationale for examining the factors that influence the level of state
government privatization. Chapter II presented the review of the literature and
provided a detailed analysis of privatization in the historical and contemporary
contexts; established the philosophical foundation of privatization, identified the
potential factors that are likely to influence the level of state government privatization,
and developed 14 testable hypotheses to answer the main research question in this
study. This chapter presents the methodology detailing the research design, the
definitions and measurements of variables, the data analysis, the limitations and
delimitations o f this study.

The Research Design

This is a state comparative cross-sectional study designed to answer the
research question: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization
(LSGP)? LSGP is the variable of interest, and states serve as the unit o f analysis.
According to Sharkansky and Hofferbert (1971), “Scholars who want to explain policy
differences use policies as dependent variables and try to identify the economic, social,
or political characteristics of each state that shape those policies” (p.317). Cross
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sectional study is appropriate for this research since cross-sectional studies usually
investigate the relationships among several variables and are suited for answering
questions such as “how much,” “how many,” “what happened” and related questions
(O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003, p.27).
There are additional advantages o f using cross-sectional secondary data.
Essentially, the use o f secondary data saves time as well as costs that researchers
might otherwise incur in collecting primary data; and researchers with different
interests can work with data from a single cross-sectional study (O ’Sullivan, Rassel,
and Berner, 2003, p.27). However cross-sectional studies have disadvantages as well.
Cross-sectional studies do not allow measuring changes over time. Furthermore,
although cross-sectional studies may uncover some potential relationships that may
lead to future experimental studies, they cannot be used to establish cause-effect
relationships between the outcome and the predictor variables (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and
Berner, 2003). Nevertheless, cross-sectional secondary data are useful for conducting
non-experimental research studies, such as the proposed study, that are otherwise
impossible or unfeasible due to the amount of time and costs involved in “instrument
design, data collection, and compilation” (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, 2003,
p.265).
Every effort has been taken to collect cross-sectional secondary data from the
same time period (2002) for the independent variables. In some cases where data are
not available for the same time period, data from different years are used. One
consistent year for the data collection was chosen because the purpose o f this study is
to measure differences in the level o f state government privatization accounted for by
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a variety o f variables at a given point in time. As such this study uses static measures
and does not attempt to measure changes in the level of state government privatization
over time.
However, the use o f data for a single year is problematic in terms o f
accounting for the effect of data lag on the dependent variable. As mentioned in the
previous chapters, the 2002 survey data by the Council o f State Governments (CSG)
were used for the dependent variable in this study, and addressing the data lag effect is
essential in order to enhance the validity o f the dependent variable. Underlying the
case for lag effect is the argument that prior economic conditions and fiscal decisions
might have unduly influenced the responses provided in the target year (2002). To get
around this problem data for four years prior to 2002 were collected, and the data for
each individual year was used to examine its relationship with the dependent variable.
Specifically, data from 1998 to 2001 were collected for state health care
spending, state pension spending, state per-capita personal income, state labor cost,
state per-capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits. Each o f the four
individual years were used to examine their influence on the dependent variable, and
the results were compared to the results of the 2002 data. A careful examination o f the
results o f the five data set revealed that the results were very similar. Furthermore, the
data for the four years were compiled to estimated data for 2002 and compared with
the 2002 actual data. The computation o f the data is explained below.
Four separate forecasting techniques, namely, simple moving average (SMA),
exponential smoothing (EXS), transformation moving average (TMA) and regression
against time (Regression) (see Wang, 2010) were used and compared with each other
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to get a relatively accurate estimate for 2002 for the aforementioned ratio level
variables. The transformation moving average (TMA) forecasting technique provided
an estimate that is close to the 2002 actual data. To determine the reliability o f the
accuracy o f the forecast, the absolute percentage error (APE) and the mean absolute
percentage error (MAPE) measures were used. “A smaller actual-versus-forecast
difference indicates more accurate forecasting” (Wang, 2010, p.l 1). On both measures,
TMA was found to be relatively more accurate than the other three techniques. A ttest was performed to determine if there is a significant mean difference between the
two sets o f data. A significant difference was not found, and the 2002 estimated data
were used for subsequent statistical analyses.

Variables: Definition and Measurement
Dependent Variable

As noted, the dependent variable is the level of state government privatization
(LSGP) which is measured using the 2002 Council of State Governments (CSG) data*.
LSGP is thus defined as the level of state government privatization in four service
areas based on the CSG survey responses o f state agency heads for the four classes of
services: corrections, education, health and human services, and transportation (Chi,
Arnold, and Perkins, 2004). The secondary data were obtained directly from the
Council o f State Governments (CSG). “Since the early 1980s, The Council of State
Governments (CSG) has monitored and disseminated information on privatization
trends in state government” (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466).
A request was made to obtain an updated or a recent survey data, but the data were unavailable
because CSG has not conducted similar surveys in recent years.
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In 2002, CSG conducted a 50-state national survey of state officials to identify
the privatization trends. According to CSG statement, “The survey was sent to 450
state budget and legislative service agency directors and heads o f five executive
branch agencies: personnel, education, health and human services, corrections and
transportation. The survey yielded an overall response rate of nearly 77 percent” (Chi,
Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466). The 2002 CSG survey provided the data to measure
the level of state government privatization (LSGP). That is, the conceptual definition
is operationalized using the responses of state agency heads to the CSG’s question:
“How many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The
responses are given in the following order: 0; <1%; 1-5%; 6-10%; 11 -15%; >15%.
The four services were selected out of the five classes of services that the CSG
identified in its 2002 survey as “the most popular privatized services” and published in
The Book o f the States (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p.477). However the fifth,

personnel programs and services, has a large number of missing data on the responses
to the aforementioned question and is dropped from the study. The ordered responses
for the four classes of services are coded into the following six levels:

0 = 0; <1% =

1; 1-5% =2; 6-10% =3; 11-15% = 4; >15% =5. Based on these values the total
scores for each state included in this study are calculated; using these summated scales,
an index o f the level o f state government privatization (LSGP) is constructed. The
values range from 0 indicating no state government privatization to 20 indicating high
level o f state government privatization; but there is no case with scores lower than six
and higher than 16, which in turn are recoded and transformed into three ordinal levels:
6-10 = 0 (low); 11-13 = 1 (medium); 14-16 = 2 (high).
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Independent Variables

The data for the independent variables are collected from a variety o f sources
including professional organizations, government databases and websites, and from
pre-existing studies that have previously developed and published indices. As
explained in the previous section, the data for the ratio level independent variables for
2002 were estimated based on the figures collected from 1998 to 2001. The year 2002
is retained as the target year in order to coincide with the data year for the dependent
variable. The use o f a consistent year allows for the independent variables to reflect
the socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological environment of all states at
the same point in time regardless of variations in the levels of state government
privatization.
For the few variables for which comparable data are unavailable for the same
time period, other years are used. In this study the variables state political culture
(Elazar, 1984), state policy liberalism (Erikson, Wright, Mclver, 1993), state ideology
(Berry & Berry, 1992), and state institutional capacity (Bowman & Keamey, 1988) are
from different years. As noted, the data for these variables are from different years and
are less likely to be a threat to reliability because their values are assumed to be fairly
stable over time (Erikson, Wright, Mclver, 1993). The definition and measurement for
each o f the independent variables are given below.

State Health Care Spending

State health care spending is the amount o f 2002 estimated state expenditures
on health care services and is measured as a percentage o f state budget/total
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expenditures. Health care spending is expected to be associated with the level of state
government privatization because o f the fact that many states privatized some of their
health care services as a cost saving mechanism (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). The
data for this variable are collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S.
Census website.

State Pension Spending

State pension spending is the amount o f 2002 estimated state expenditures on
pension benefits and is measured as a percentage o f state budget/ total expenditures.
Many state officials have adopted some strategies including privatization o f services to
reduce costs associated with employee pension benefits (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010).
Therefore, state pension spending may affect the level o f state government
privatization. The data are collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S.
Census website.

State Per-Capita Personal Income

State per-capita personal income is calculated by dividing the 2002 estimated
gross state product by the total population of the state; the amount is measured in U.S.
dollars. Extensive theoretical and empirical studies have shown per capita personal
income to be associated with many areas o f public policy including privatization
(Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005). The data are collected from State
and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website.
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State Labor Cost

State labor cost refers to public employees’ compensations excluding defined
pension benefits; the amount refers to the 2002 estimated state expenditures on its
public employees and is measured as a percentage o f state budget/total expenditures.
State labor costs have been partly blamed for growing budget crises that states
continue to face (Edwards, 2010). Studies have shown that labor costs are associated
with the privatization o f services (Kodrzycki, 1998; Sawicky, 1998). The information
is collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website.

State Per-Capita Spending

State per-capita spending is calculated by dividing the 2002 estimated total
state expenditures by the total number o f population o f a state. The amount is in U.S.
dollars. Evidence in the literature has shown that rising per capita expenditure is
associated with the privatization o f services (Kodrzycki, 1998). The information is
collected from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website

State Fiscal Capacity

Fiscal capacity is defined as the ability o f a state government to finance its
public services (Price and Riccucci, 2005). Numerous studies have found associations
between fiscal/economic factors and state privatization decisions (Nicholson-Crotty,
2004; Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1997; Pouder, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Brudney
et al., 2005). Following the instrument developed by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and updated by Tannenwald and Cowan (1997)
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and utilized by Price and Riccucci (2005) in their study o f the determinants o f state
prison privatization, the measure for the fiscal capacity variable for this study is
calculated in three steps (see Price and Riccucci, 2005).
First, per-capita tax revenue is calculated by dividing the tax revenue of each
state by the population in that state. Second, the average value of per-capita tax
revenue is calculated by adding the per-capita tax revenue o f each state and dividing
the total by the 50 states. Third, the per-capita tax revenue is again divided by the
average per-capita tax revenue and multiplied by 100 to arrive at the value/measure for
state fiscal capacity variable. Based on this composite measure, anything below 100 is
considered low capacity, and anything over 100 is considered high capacity. In this
study, 100 and below is coded as 0 to indicate low fiscal capacity, and 101 and above
is coded as 1 to indicate high fiscal capacity. The data for tax revenue are collected
from State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census website, and the population
data are collected from U.S. Census Bureau website.

State Deficits

Deficit refers to a level o f expenditures that are not matched by a
corresponding amount o f revenues in a given fiscal year. As it is commonly known,
deficit occurs when expenditures on government programs exceed the amount o f tax
receipts. The amount is calculated based on the 2002 estimated deficits and is
measured as a percentage o f state budget/total expenditures. Evidence in the literature
has shown that deficits are associated with privatization of services (Lopez-de-Silanes
and Vishny, 1997). The deficit for each state for the 2002 estimated data is calculated
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from the spending and revenue data collected from State and Local Government
Finance, U.S. Census website.

State Union Laws

Studies have used state union laws as proxy to measure the strength of state
public employee unions. It is argued that in a state where there is a strong union law,
public employee unions are strong and deter privatization. Whereas in a state where
union law is weak, unions are weak as well and encourage privatization (Lopez-deSilanes and Vishny, 1997). Strong or weak union laws refer primarily to the presence
or absence o f collective bargaining protection in a given state. States where employee
unions have collective bargaining protection usually have strong union laws. The
“right to work” states usually have weak union laws. As such strong union laws are
coded as 1 and weak union laws are coded as 0. The information for this variable is
collected from the National Rights to Work Legal Defense Foundation website.

State Political Culture

Elazar (1984) defined political culture “as the historical sources o f differences
in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that influence political life in the various states”
(p.l 10). The author identified three political cultures: moralistic, individualistic, and
traditionalistic. These political cultures are shown to influence state policymaking
(Breaux et al., 2000; Breaux and Morris, 2001; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007;
Price and Riccucci, 2005). Moralistic political culture embraces liberal philosophy,
and seeks to advance the collective welfare over narrow individual interest. On the
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other hand, individualistic political culture is assumed to have conservative orientation
and focuses largely on promoting individual self-interest, and view the market place as
the best means to allocate values that benefit them; similarly, traditionalistic political
culture is assumed to have conservative leanings and seeks to advance elite interests
(Elazar, 1984; Dresand and Gosing, 2008). As such, moralistic culture is expected to
discourage privatization, and individualistic culture is expected to promote
privatization. Traditionalistic culture focuses on maintaining the status quo, but it can
also be assumed to favor privatization. In this study, individualistic political culture is
coded as 0, moralistic political culture is coded as 1, and traditionalistic political
culture is coded as 2. These three categories are further recoded with two dummy
variables in the runs o f the ordinal logistic regression (OLR). Categorization o f state
political culture is taken from Elazar (1984).

Party Affiliation o f the Governor Controlling State Government

Studies have shown that the governor controlling state government is
associated with the level of state government privatization (GAO, 1997). Republican
governors tend to follow conservative ideology and are shown to be more likely to
encourage privatization than their Democratic counterparts who are commonly
associated with liberalism (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). Republican governor is coded as
0 and Democratic governor is coded as 1. The information for this variable is
collected from the National Governors Association website, which includes
information about party affiliation o f the governor and terms of office for each state
governor in 2002.
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The Party Controlling the State Legislature

It is commonly assumed that the political party controlling or dominating the
state legislature is more likely to affect state policy decision than the minority
counterpart ((Freire, 2008; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). The Republican Party is assumed
to espouse conservative ideology and is largely associated with the privatization
movement (Sclar, 2000). On the other hand, the Democratic Party is assumed to
subscribe to liberal ideology and discourages privatization. In this study, Republican
Party is coded as 0, Democratic Party is coded as 1, and split control is coded as 2.
These categories are further recoded with two dummy variables in the runs of the
ordinal logistic regression (OLR).The information for this variable is collected from
the National Conference of State Legislatures.

State Policy Liberalism

The measure for this variable is taken from Erikson, Wright, and Mclver
(1993). State policy liberalism is defined as the policy preferences o f state
governments and is another name for government ideology; Erikson, Wright, and
Mclver (1993) developed state policy liberalism (government ideology) index by
summing the standardized scores of the responses of 47 states to eight policy areas.
The index runs from negative (-) 1.54 for most conservative to positive (+) 2.12 for
most liberal.
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State Ideology

State ideology (state citizens’ ideology) reflects the policy preferences o f the
citizens o f a state, and it is found to have association with state policy choices (Berry
and Berry, 1992; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al., 2007). Scholars have developed a
measure o f state ideology, which is “generally conceived as the mean position on a
liberal-conservative continuum of the active electorate” (Berry, Ringquist, Fording,
and Hanson, 1998, p. 327-328). Conservative states are coded as 0 (for all Southern
states) and liberal is coded as 1 (for all non-Southern states). This information is taken
from Berry and Berry (1992).

State Institutional Capacity

State institutional capacity refers to the ability o f a state government to develop
and implement policy decisions, and is shown to be one o f the determinants o f state
policy decisions (Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). The information for this variable
is taken from Bowman and Keamey (1988) who developed measures o f institutional
capacity based on factor scores in four categories: “accountability, centralization,
representation, coordination, and staffing and spending” (p.359). The factor scores in
the four categories are added to arrive at a composite measure for state institutional
variable. The composite index ranges from negative (-) 3.326 indicating very low
capacity to positive (+) 4.282 indicating very high capacity. The variable names,
abbreviations, sources, measurements and coding of variables are summarized in
Table 3.1 below
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Table 3.1 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables
Abbreviation

Source

Measurement (Coding of
Variables)

LSGP

Council of State
Governments (CSG)

Low (0), Medium (1),
High (2) (Ordinal)

State Health Care Spending
(2002)

SHCS

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Percentage of state budget/
total expenditure (Ratio)

State Pension Spending
(2002)

SPS

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Percentage o f state budget/
total expenditure (Ratio)

State Per-Capita Personal
Income (2002)

SPCPI

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Dollar amount (Ratio)

State Labor Cost (2002)

SLC

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Labor cost as a percentage
o f state budget/total
expenditure (Ratio)

State Per-Capita Spending
(2002)

SPCS

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Per-capita dollar amount
(Ratio)

State Fiscal Capacity*
(2002)

SFC

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

100 <= 100 Low (0), > 100
High (1) (Ordinal)

State Deficits (2002)

SDEF

State & Local Govt
Finance, US Census

Percentage o f state budget/
total expenditure (Ratio)

State Union Laws

SUL

National Rights to Work
Legal Defense
Foundation website

Weak (0); Strong (1)
(Ordinal)

State Political Culture

SPC

Elazar (1984)

DSPC IND = 0; other = 1
DSPC MOR = 0; other = 1
rWntninah

Party o f Governor
Controlling State
Government (2002)

GCSG

National Governors
Association website

Republican (0), Democratic
(1) (Nominal)

Variable Name

Dependent Variable
Level o f State Government
Privatization (2002)

Independent Variables
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Table 3.1 Continued
Variable Name

Abbreviation

Source

Measurement (Coding of
Variables)

Party Controlling State
Legislature (2002)

PCSL

National Conference
of State Legislatures

DPCSL R = 0; other = 1
DPCSL D = 0; other = 1
(Nominal)

State Policy Liberalism

SPL

Erikson, Wright,
Mclver (1993)

Index ranges from -1.54
(most Conservative) to
+2.12 (most Liberal)
(Interval)

State Ideology

SID

Berry & Berry
(1992)

Conservative (0), Liberal
(1) (Nominal)

State Institutional
Capacity

SIC

Bowman & Keamey
(1988)

Index runs from -3.326 to
+4.282 (Interval)

*

State fiscal capacity is calculated in three steps. 1. Per-capita tax revenue (PCR)= total tax revenue
divided by state population; 2. Average per-capita tax revenue (AVG.PCR) = the sum o f all the percapita tax revenue divided by 50 states. 3. Fiscal capacity is calculated by dividing per-capita tax
revenue (PCR) by the average per-capita tax revenue (AVG.PCR), and then multiplying the result by
100. Based on this computation, 100 or less is considered to be low fiscal capacity and is coded as 0;
101 and above is considered to be high capacity and is coded as 1 (source: Price & Riccucci, 2005).

Data Analyses

The data collected and assembled are analyzed using SPSS program*. Four
separate state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideology)
and a combined model are tested using the ordinal logistic regression technique.
Ordinal logistic regression is appropriate for this study because o f the ordered nature
o f the dependent variable. Ordinal logistic regression model predicts the probabilities
*

Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) program version 20.0 has been used to run the
statistical tests.
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o f outcomes for each case using the maximum likelihood method to estimate the
model’s parameter coefficients without losing the information contained in the
ordering o f the dependent variable. The Model Fitting Information, the Goodness-ofFit and the test o f significance will be examined to determine the model fit and the
significant predictor variables. While ordinal logistic regression does not have an
equivalent to the R-squared that is found in OLS regression (the proportion o f variance
of the dependent variable explained by the predictors), there is a number o f pseudo-Rsquared statistics which need to be interpreted with caution. In this study, Nagelkerke
Pseudo R-Squared* will be examined to estimate the variance explained by each o f the
models.

Data Screening

Prior to conducting multivariate analysis, the data has been screened for
possible errors. Data screening is the process o f carefully reviewing and cleaning the
data to ensure quality so that valid conclusions can be drawn from the data; data
screening increases the likelihood of reducing data errors (Hatcher & Stepan ski, 1994).
The data have been examined using frequency distributions for categorical variables
and descriptive statistics for quantitative variables. A frequency distribution
aggregates the number o f cases with a given value and provides information about the
percentage or relative frequency distributions of the cases.
*The Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared is selected because it has values between 0 and 1 and indicates
whether the full/fitted model is a far better fit than the intercept/null model. In other words, if the full
model (the model that included the predictor variables) perfectly predicts the outcome and has a
likelihood o f 1, then Nagelkerke R-Squared = 1. In contrast, Cox and Snell would have a maximum RSquared value that is less than 1, and M cFadden’s R-squared is not commonly used because negative RSquared is possible. Hence, the Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared is commonly used and is the most
reported R-Squared estimate in logistic regression (Bums & Bums, 2008; Meyers, Gamst & Guarino,
2006).
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For categorical variables, the values that correspond to the coded values for the
possible categories were examined for accuracy. “When reviewing a frequency
distribution, it is useful to think o f these different values as representing categories to
which a subject may belong” (Hatcher & Stepanski, 1994, p. 106). For quantitative
variables, descriptive statistics were performed on each quantitative variable to
generate the means, standard deviations, the minimum and maximum values. The
ranges o f values were examined to ensure that no cases had values outside the range of
possible values (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010).

M issing Values

Missing values can bias the results o f the data analyses because o f loss o f
legitimate information that should be available (George & Mallery, 2001). Missing
values were identified and corrected accordingly. Frequency table and descriptive
statistics provided useful information in identifying missing values for both
categorical and quantitative variables. Frequency table was used for categorical
variables and descriptive statistics was used for quantitative variables. SPSS provides
several options to replace missing data, such as replacing with median value or with
the mean score o f all other cases. However, replacing many missing values can bias
the results and the replacement should be kept to a small number o f cases; replacing a
small number o f cases has little influence on the outcome o f the analyses (George &
Mallery, 2001; Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). In this study, an investigation o f the state
data has shown that 15 o f the 50 states had a large number o f missing values and were
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excluded from the study. Another case, Alaska, had an outlier and was deleted from
the data set. The remaining 34 states had usable data and were used in this study.

Outliers

Ordinal logistic regression is sensitive to outliers, and data with extreme values
were identified using frequency table and descriptive statistics. Outliers are extreme
scores at one or both ends o f a sample distribution and can adversely affect the results
o f the analyses (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). “Outliers can exist in both univariate and
multivariate situations, among dichotomous and continuous variables, and among IVs
as well as DVs” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p.27). The frequency table and the
descriptive statistics allow deciphering the general distributions o f values in the data
cleaning process, and extreme values were identified and corrected either by deletion
o f cases or by recoding and transforming the data (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). As
indicated above Alaska was deleted from the data set because it had one variable (state
per capita spending) that was found to be an outlier.

Normality

In this study ordinal logistic regression technique is employed to analyze the
data. One o f the advantages of using ordinal logistic regression is that it is flexible in
its assumptions; “the predictors do not have to be normally distributed, linearly related,
or have equal variances within each group” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p. 290).
However, in the data cleaning process, distribution diagnosis was made using
frequency tables and descriptive statistics as well as graphical methods. For
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categorical variables, bar graphs were generated, and for continuous variables,
histograms were generated.

M ulticollinearity

The data will be examined for multicollinearity. Correlations will be computed
between the independent variables to identify the variables that are highly correlated
(intercorrelations o f .80 or higher) (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010). “Multicollinearity is a
problem that arises when moderate to high intercorrelations exist among predictor
variables to be used in a regression analysis” (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010, p. 163). The
existence o f highly correlated independent variables indicates that the two variables
are measuring essentially the same thing; one o f them can be deleted without losing
real information (Mertler &Vannatta, 2010).

Limitations

This study employed pre-existing data from multiple sources to examine the
factors that predict the level of state government privatization. There are a number of
limitations to this study. One of the limitations involves the sample size; the data for
the dependent variable are collected from a 50-state survey conducted by the Council
o f State Governments (CSG) in 2002. While the survey covered all the 50 states, only
the data for 34 states are usable; the remaining 16 states have incomplete, missing, or
outlier data and are excluded from the analysis. This limitation raises questions of
external validity or generalizability because o f the fact that results o f the analysis for
the 34 states cannot be generalized to all the 50 states.
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However, using eight variables measured at interval/ratio scale, a t-test was
performed to determine if there was a significant mean difference between the 16
excluded states and the 34 states that were included in this study; the result revealed
that there was a statistically significant mean difference in per-capita personal income
between the two groups. On the other seven measures, statistically significant
difference was not found (see Appendix D). Since there was no systematic difference
between the two groups and evidence of sample selection bias was not found, it is safe
to assume that the results o f this study can be generalized to all the 50 states.
Second, the data used are secondary and come from different sources, and the
accuracy o f the data cannot be verified. Third, history may affect external validity
because the data collected for both the dependent and independent variables are for
2002, and some o f the measures may have changed over time (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and
Bemer, 2003). Fourth, confounding variables may also impact the validity of the
conclusion of this study; for example, while the selfish actions o f politicians and
bureaucrats are assumed to exist, their influences on the level of state government
privatization cannot be directly detected, measured, and assessed.
Reliability o f measures is also an issue in this study. While the data for the
dependent variable and the 10 independent variables are from 2002, data for four
independent variables are collected from different time periods; that is, data for state
political culture, state policy liberalism, state ideology, and state institutional capacity
variables are from 1984, 1993, 1992, and 1988 respectively; in this case the reliability
o f the measures become questionable. These limitations point to some of the potential
weaknesses o f this study. Although political culture, state policy liberalism, and state
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ideology have been shown to change slightly over time, they are largely assumed to
remain fairly consistent for a long period o f time (Berry & Berry, 1992). State
institutional capacity is expected to change over time as well, but for lack o f recent
data, the Bowman & Kearney (1988) index is utilized; while these variables may be
assumed to change slightly over time, the focus o f this study is to examine the level of
state government privatization at a given point in time (2002) and is static in nature
and does not attempt to measure changes over time. This static approach therefore
minimizes the problem associated with the reliability o f measures.

Delimitations

The scope o f the statistical analysis of this study is limited to privatized
services aggregated by four departments (correction, transportation, education, and
health & human services) and does not investigate specific services or programs that
are likely to be privatized by each department. Furthermore, this study simply focuses
on the level o f state government privatization, and the statistical investigation will not
address the nature o f the privatized services, the modes o f privatization, the reasons
why they were privatized, and whether the desired results were achieved or not. Also
the study is confined by data collected in 2002 and does not attempt to look beyond
the prescribed one-year time frame. Chapter IV provides the results o f the data
analyses. Chapter V presents the conclusions, the limitation of this study, and
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS OF THE DATA ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter III laid out the research design, the data collection method, and the
analytical technique. This chapter presents the results o f the data analyses in four
separate sections. The first section provides an overview o f the data diagnosis results,
the second section reports the frequencies and descriptive statistics that included
univariate and bivariate statistics and individual hypotheses tests. The third section
presented the multivariate analyses of the four state comparative models
(socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological models) and a model o f best fit
that combined the significant predictor variables from each of the four models. The
last section provides the chapter summary

Data Diagnosis Results

To determine the extent o f missing values, outliers, and multicollinearity,
frequency distribution and descriptive statistics were performed on both the dependent
and independent variables using SPSS 20.0 program. The data screening process
showed a missing value for one nominal independent variable, party controlling state
legislature (PCSL), for Nebraska; this is so because the state of Nebraska has a
unicameral legislature with nonpartisan control. The missing value represents less
than three percent o f the variable in question, namely, party controlling the state
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legislature, and is not expected to affect the statistical test significantly. In fact, a
preliminary statistical test of the political model, which contains the party controlling
state legislature variable, was run with the missing value and then compared with the
result o f the model that was run without the missing value. The results were identical,
and the case with the missing value (in this case Nebraska) is left in the dataset
without further action.
The data screening analysis also revealed that two ratio level independent
variables were positively skewed; state labor cost (SLC) (skew = 1.725) and state percapita spending (SPCS) (skew = 3.445) were skewed in a positive direction. A log
transformation o f the variable state labor cost corrected the skew to the normal limit of
between 0 and 1 (skew = .712). However, neither the log-transformed nor the non
transformed state labor cost variable was found to be a significant predictor o f the
dependent variable, and the original (the non-log transformed) form was kept in the
dataset for ease o f interpreting the coefficients (which are in log-odds units) generated
by the ordinal logistic regression.
The log transformation of the state per-capita spending (SPCS) variable failed
to correct the skewness to its normal limit. The skewness still remained slightly higher
(skew = 1.762) than the normal limit. Alaska was the case that contributed to the
positive skew with its state per-capita spending being $11,111.87 compared to the
maximum state per-capita spending o f $6,037.25 and the mean value o f $4,292.67 for
all other cases. The economic model that contains the state per-capita spending
variable was run using the original value (the non-log transformed form) for Alaska.
Then the model was run again using the log-transformed value. The results o f the two
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models were compared. In the former case, only the state deficit was significant; state
fiscal capacity, state per-capita spending, and state labor cost were not significant.
However, fiscal capacity and state per capita spending approached significance in a
two-tailed test with a p-value of .050 and .088 respectively at p <.05. In the latter case,
that is, with the log-transformed variable, only state labor cost was found not to be
significant. The other three variables (state fiscal capacity, state deficit, and state percapita spending) became unambiguously statistically significant.
However, the log-transformation did not completely remove the skewness o f
the state per-capita spending variable, and its use or inclusion in the model is expected
to distort the results o f the statistical test. In addition, the log-odds unit o f the
transformed variable poses difficulty in terms of interpreting the coefficients generated
by the ordinal regression analysis because of the fact that the coefficients are also in
log-odds units. To get around these two problems, the case that contributed to the
skewness (Alaska) was removed from the dataset. A t-test was performed on state per
capita spending by creating two dichotomous groups (one with Alaska included and
another with Alaska removed) to determine if there are significant mean differences
between the two groups in terms of their influence on the dependent variable. No
significant difference was found.
While a significant influence did not exist between the two groups, Alaska was
nonetheless removed from the dataset for subsequent statistical analysis. This was
done because outliers can unduly influence the results o f the statistical test causing
some variables to be insignificant when in fact they are significant or vice versa
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2010). As indicated above, the retention of Alaska caused two
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out o f the four variables in the economic model to be insignificant when in fact they
were significant; for this reason Alaska is removed from the dataset. The undesirable
consequence o f this action is that the sample size would be reduced to 34 cases (states).
The diagnostic analysis o f the continuous variables did not reveal problems
with multicollinearity with collinearity statistics showing levels o f tolerance ranging
from .281 to .810 and variance inflation factor (VIF) ranging between 1.234 and 3.565.
Values o f tolerance greater than 0.1 and values o f VIF less than 10 indicate that
multicollinearity is not a problem (Mertler & Vannatta, 2010).

Descriptive Statistics
This section reports the frequencies and descriptive statistics for all the
variables that include univariate and bivariate statistics. First, the frequency
distributions and the associated percentages for the dependent variable are reported.
Second, the summary statistics for all quantitative independent variables are reported.
Third, the frequency distributions and percentages for all categorical variables are
presented. Fourth, the bivariate results are presented.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is coded with three categories (low, medium, high),
and the extent o f the distributions are shown in Table 4.1 below. Out of the 34 states
included in this study, twelve (35.3%) states are engaged in a low level o f state
government privatization, thirteen (38.2.0%) states are engaged in medium level o f
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state government privatization, and nine (26.5%) states are engaged in high level of
state government privatization.

Table 4.1
Dependent Variable: Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP)
Category

Frequencies (N)

%

Low

12

35.3

Medium

13

38.2

High

9

26.5

N (Total)

34

100.00

Quantitative Independent Variables

Summary statistics for all quantitative variables are presented in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2
Summary Statistics for Quantitative Independent Variables
Variable

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min.

Max.

Healthcare Spending % expend

3.43

1.22

1.70

5.84

Per-capita Personal Income

$32,.828.00

$4,394.00

$24,830.00

$43,980.00

Pension Spending % expend

7.11

1.96

3.68

12.04

Labor Cost % expend

15.55

3.49

10.06

27.90

Per-capita Spending

$4,292.67

$752.07

$3,174.31

$6,037.25

Deficit % expend

-4.13

11.14

-24.16

15.96

State Institutional Capacity

-0.15

1.80

-2.62

4.22

State Policy Liberalism

-0.16

0.88

-1.54

1.49
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Categorical Independent Variables

Table 4.3 below presents the descriptive statistics for categorical independent
variables. The frequency distribution reveals that eighteen (52.9 %) states have weak
union laws and sixteen (47.1 %) states have strong union laws. The distribution o f
political culture shows that fourteen (41.2%) states are moralistic, ten (29.4%) states
are individualistic, and ten (29.4%) states are traditionalistic. The distribution o f party
affiliation o f governor controlling state government shows that sixteen (47.1%) states
are Republican controlled and eighteen (52.9%) states are Democratic controlled. The
distribution o f the party controlling state legislature shows that sixteen (47.1%) states
had Republican controlled legislatures, nine (26.5%) states had Democratic controlled
legislatures, and eight (23.5%) states had split controlled legislatures. One state,
Nebraska, has a missing value, which accounts for only 2.9%; Nebraska has a
unicameral legislature with nonpartisan control and is not classified as Republican or
Democratic. The state ideology distribution shows that eleven (32.4%) states are
ideologically conservative and twenty three (67.6%) states are ideologically liberal.
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Table 4.3
Summary Statistics for Categorical Independent Variables
% (N)

List of States

Low

61.8 (21)

AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS,
LA,
MO, NE, NV, NH, OK, PA, SC, TN,
TX, UT, WA

High

38.2 (13)

CA, KY, MI, MT, NJ, NM, ND, OR, RI,
SD, VT, WV, WY

Weak

52.9(18)

AZ, AR, FL, GA, ID, IA, KS, LA, NE,
NV, ND, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WY

Strong

47.1 (16)

CA, IL, IN, KY, MI, MO, MT, NH, NJ,
NM, OR, PA, RI, VT, WA, WV

Moralistic

41.2 (14)

CA, ID, IA, KS, MI, MT, NH, ND, OR,
SC, SD, UT, VT, W A

Individualistic

29.4 (10)

IL, IN, KY, MO, NE, NV, NJ, PA, RI,
WY

Traditionalistic

29.4 (10)

AZ, AR, FL, GA, LA, NM, OK, TN,
TX, WV

Republican

47.1 (16)

AR, FL, GA, ID, LA, MT, NE, NV, NH,
ND, RI, SC, SD, TX, UT, VT

Democratic

52.9(18)

AZ, CA, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, MI, MO,
NJ, NM, OK, OR, PA, TN, WA, WV,
WY

Republican

47.1 (16)

AZ, FL, ID, IA, KS, MI, MO, MT, NH,
ND, OR, SC, SD, TX, UT, WY

Democratic

26.5 (9)

AR, CA, IL, LA, NM, OK, RI, TN, WV

Split

23.5 (8)

GA, IN, KY, NV, NJ, PA, VT, WA

Conservative

32.4(11)

AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MO, OK, SC,
TN, TX, WV

Liberal

67.6 (23)

AZ, CA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MT,
NE, NV, NH, NJ, NM, ND, OR, PA, RI,
SD, UT, VT, WA, WY,

Variable
State Fiscal
Capacity

State Union
Laws*

State Political
Culture

Party o f Governor
Controlling State
Government

Party Controlling
State Legislature

State Ideology

* Weak and strong union law categories are based on the states that have “the right to work” laws and
states that do not have “the right to work” laws respectively.
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Bivariate Analyses

Categorical Independent Variables

The bivariate relationships between the categorical variables and the dependent
variable were computed using cross tabulations and measures of strength o f
association statistics. Cross-tabulations provide in tabular format the relationship
between two or more categorical variables and allow a comparison o f the proportion
o f subjects in different groups and their relative impact on the response variable
(Plichta & Garzon, 2009; George & Mallery, 2001). Also, the strength of associations
between each o f the categorical independent variable and the dependent variable is
examined using the measure that is appropriate for the level of measurement (ordinal
or nominal). As such, in this study, the strength o f associations between ordinal
independent variables and the dependent variable, which is also ordinal, is measured
using Sommer’s d coefficients. The Sommer’s d measure is used when both the
dependent and independent variables are measured at ordinal level (Jones and Olson,
2005). The Sommer’s d measure is also chosen because it is appropriate for use with a
table o f any size and can be used for hypotheses that specify directional relationships
(Jones and Olson, 2005).
Similarly, Cramer’s V can be used to measure the strength o f associations
between nominal predictor variables and ordinal dependent variable (George &
Mallery, 2001; Jones and Olson, 2005). For example, Jones and Olson (2005) suggest
using “this measure [Cramer’s V] with any size table if at least one o f the variables in
a particular contingency table is nominal” (p.280). According to Jones and Olson
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(2005), the measures of associations assume values ranging “from 0 to 1.0 for
nominal-level data and from -1.0 to 1.0 for ordinal and metric levels o f data” (p.278).
While the existence, direction, and strength of the relationships between the
independent and the dependent variables are examined, the chi square test of
significance is not performed because the data is not a probability sample. Jones and
Olson (2005) note that “Statistical significance tests are premised on probability
theory” (p.286). The data used for this study represent all the cases in the population
o f interest (in this case the 50 states), and “it is inappropriate to use statistical
significance tests when [working] with the entire population in lieu o f a sample o f the
population” (Jones and Olson, 2005, p.286); with this caveat, the results o f the
bivariate analyses are presented in the pages that follow.

State Fiscal Capacity

State fiscal capacity variable is measured at ordinal level and has low and high
categories. The results o f the bivariate analysis are shown in Table 4.4 below. An
examination of the results o f the column percent entries for low fiscal capacity shows
that 42.9 percent o f the states have low levels of state government privatization, 28.6
percent have medium levels of state government privatization, and 28.6 percent have
high levels of state government privatization. Similarly, and examination o f the
column percent entries for high fiscal capacity show that 23.1 percent o f the states
have low levels o f state government privatization, 53.8 percent have medium level of
state government privatization, and 23.1 percent have high levels o f state government
privatization.
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The percentages suggest that there is a strong association between state fiscal
capacity and the levels o f state government privatization, as measured by Sommer’s d
coefficient value o f .543. According to Jones and Olson (2005), the coefficient value
o f .50 or higher is interpreted as having “substantial/strong or very strong relationship”
(p.280) in a positive or negative direction between the independent and the dependent
variables. As noted above, the Sommer’s d measure is asymmetrical and allows
considering the direction o f the relationships when interpreting the values o f the
coefficients for ordinal variables. In this study, it was hypothesized that states with
low fiscal capacity were more likely to have higher levels o f state government
privatization. The results show that, for most of the states, the associations were in the
opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship.
As shown in Table 4.4 below, a majority o f states (42.9 percent) with low
fiscal capacity were associated with low level of state government privatization
compared to only 23.1 percent of states with high fiscal capacity. Also, only 28.6
percent o f states with low capacity were associated with medium level of state
government privatization compared to a majority o f states (53.8 percent) with high
fiscal capacity. However, for the higher level of state government privatization
category, the result appeared to be consistent with the hypothesized relationship; 28.6
percent o f states with low fiscal capacity were associated with high level o f state
government privatization compared to only 23.1 percent o f states with high fiscal
capacity. Overall, however, the majority o f states appeared to have relationships with
the levels o f state government privatization in the opposite direction than expected.
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Table 4.4
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Fiscal Capacity
State Fiscal Capacity
Level of State Government
Privatization

Low
N (%)

High
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

9 (42.9)

3 (23.1)

12 (35.3)

Medium

6 (28.6)

7(53.8)

13 (38.2)

High

6(28.6)

3 (23.1)

9 (26.5)

Total

21 (100.0)

13 (100.0)

34 (100.0)

Somer’s d = .543

State Union Laws

The state union laws variable is measured at ordinal level and has two
categories: weak and strong. As shown in Table 4.5 below, the results o f bivariate
analysis indicate that 38.9 percent, 27.8 percent, and 33.3 percent o f states with weak
union laws have low, medium, and high levels o f state government privatization
respectively. On the other hand, 31.2 percent, 50.0 percent, and 18.8 percent of states
with strong union laws have low, medium, and high levels of state government
privatization respectively. The Somer’s d coefficient value of .921 suggests that there
is a very strong association between state union laws and the levels of state
government privatization.
The direction o f associations for state union laws variable is similar to that for
state fiscal capacity variable. It was hypothesized that weak union laws/power would
lead to higher levels of state government privatization; but, as shown in Table 4.5
below, the results suggest that 38.9 percent o f states with weak union laws were
associated with low level o f state government privatization compared to 31.2 percent

o f states with strong union laws, which is in the opposite direction than expected. Also,
only 27.8 percent of states with weak union laws were associated with medium level
of state government privatization compared to 50.0 percent of states with strong union
laws. However, 33.3 percent o f states with weak union laws were associated with high
levels o f state government privatization compared to only 18.8 percent o f states with
strong union laws, which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. Overall, for the
majority o f states, the relationships with the levels of state government privatization
were in the opposite direction than suggested by the stated hypothesis.

Table 4.5
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Union Laws
State Union Laws
Level of State Government
Privatization

Weak
N (%)

Strong
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

7 (38.9)

5 (31.2)

12 (35.3)

Medium

5 (27.8)

8 (50.0)

13 (38.2)

High

6(33.3)

3 (18.8)

9 (26.5)

Total

18 (100.0)

16(100.0)

34 (100.0)

Somers’d = .921

State Political Culture

The state political culture variable has three categories: moralistic,
individualistic, and traditionalistic. The results o f the bivariate analyses are presented
in Table 4.6 below. Looking at the percentages o f column entries for state political
culture, the results indicate that 50.0 percent, 40.0 percent, and 10.0 percent o f states
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with individualistic political culture have low, medium, and high levels o f state
government privatization respectively. The column percent entries for moralistic
culture show that 42.9 percent, 35.7 percent, and 21.4 percent o f the states have low,
medium, and high levels of state government privatization. Similarly, the percent
entries for traditionalistic culture indicate that 10.0 percent, 40.0 percent, and 50.0
percent o f states with traditionalistic culture have low, medium, and high levels of
state government privatization. Cramer’s V value o f .214 suggests that there is a weak
association between state political culture and the levels o f state government
privatization.

Table 4.6
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Political Culture
State Political Culture
Level of State Government
Privatization

Individualistic
N (%)

Moralistic
N (%)

Traditionalistic
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

5 (50.0)

6 (42.9)

1 (10.0)

12 (35.3)

Medium

4 (40.0)

5 (35.7)

4 (40.0)

13 (38.2)

High

1(10.0)

3 (21.4)

5 (50.0)

9 (26.5)

Total

10 (100.0)

14 (100.0)

10 (100.0)

34 (100.0)

Cramer’s V = .214

Party Affiliation o f the Governor Controlling State Government

The party affiliation o f the governor controlling state government variable has
two categories: Republican and Democratic. The results o f the bivariate analyses are
presented in Table 4.7 below. The column percent entries for Republican show that
37.5 percent, 43.8 percent, and 18.8 percent of states with Republican governors have
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low, medium, and high levels of state government privatization respectively. Similarly,
the column percent entries for Democratic governors show that states with an equal
percentage o f 33.3 percent each have low, medium, and high levels of state
government privatization respectively. The Cramer’s V value of .686 suggests that
there is a strong association between the party o f governor controlling state
government and the levels o f state government privatization.

Table 4.7
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by Party of Governor
Controlling State Government
Party of Governor Controlling
State Government

Level of State Government
Privatization

Republican
N (%)

Democratic
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

6 (37.5)

6 (33.3)

12(35.3)

Medium

7 (43.8)

6(33.3)

13 (38.2)

High

3(18.8)

6 (33.3)

9 (26.5)

Total

16(100.0)

18 (100.0)

34(100.0)

Cramer’s V = .686

The Party Controlling State Legislature

The party controlling state legislature variable has three categories: Republican,
Democratic, and split controls. As shown in Table 4.8 below, the column percent
entries for Republican category show that 37.5 percent o f states with Republican
governors have low levels o f state government privatization, and another 37.5 percent
and 25.0 percent have medium and high levels o f state government privatization
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respectively. The Democratic category shows that states with an equal percentage of
33.3 percent each have low, medium, and high levels of state government privatization
respectively. Also, the column percent entries for split control show that 37.5 percent
o f states are in the low category o f state government privatization, another 37.5
percent o f states are in the medium category, and 25.0 percent are in the high category
o f state government privatization. The Cramer’s V value o f .994 indicates that there is
a very strong relationship between party controlling state legislature and the level of
state government privatization.

Table 4.8
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by Party Controlling State
Legislature
Party Controlling State Legislature
Level of State Government
Privatization

Republican
N (%)

Democratic
N (%)

Split Control
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

6 (37.5)

3 (33.3)

3 (37.5)

12 (36.4)

Medium

6 (37.5)

3 (33.3)

3 (37.5)

12 (36.4)

High

4(25.0)

3 (33.3)

2 (25.0)

9 (27.3)

Total

16(100.0)

9 (100.0)

8 (100.0)

33 (100.0)

Cramer’s V = .994

State Ideology

The state ideology variable has two categories: conservative and liberal. The
results o f the bivariate analyses are presented in Table 4.9 below. The column percent
entries for conservative category show that 27.3 percent, 45.5 percent, and 27.3
percent o f states with conservative ideology have low, medium, and high levels of
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state government privatization respectively. Similarly, the column percent entries for
liberal category show that 39.1 percent, 34.8 percent, and 26.1 percent of states with
liberal ideology have low, medium, and high levels o f state government privatization
respectively. The Cramer’s V value of .896 suggests that there is a very strong
association between state ideology and the levels of state government privatization.

Table 4.9
Level of State Government Privatization (LSGP) by State Ideology
State Ideology
Level of State Government
Privatization

Conservative
N (%)

Liberal
N (%)

Total
N (%)

Low

3 (27.3)

9 (39.1)

12(35.3)

Medium

5 (45.5)

8 (34.8)

13 (38.2)

High

3 (27.3)

6 (26.1)

9 (26.5)

Total

11 (100.0)

23 (100.0)

34 (100.0)

Cramer’s V = .896

Hypotheses Tests o f Independent Variables

This section presents the results of the statistics for fourteen hypotheses that
were operationalized using both quantitative and categorical measures. Ordinal
logistic regression with a logit link function was run to test the hypotheses. A
summary o f the parameter estimates is provided for all the independent variables in
Table 4.10. The results o f other statistical analyses are reported in the context o f the
stated hypotheses. For the parameter estimates, the coefficients returned from an
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ordinal logistic regression (OLR) are in log-odds units, and the interpretation of the
effect o f a predictor variable on the dependent variable is also based on the ordered
log-odds estimate. However, the interpretation of the log-odds estimates o f the
coefficients is not straightforward; for this reason, the odds ratio (exp (£)) estimate is
used to interpret the coefficients for statistically significant predictor variables.

Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have
higher level of state government privatization than states with lower health care
expenditures.
The model fitting information for the final model, the parameter o f the model
for which the model fit is calculated, is not significant (%2 = .599, d f = 1, p-value =
.439) at .05 level; this suggests that the inclusion of the state health care expenditure
variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only model.
However, the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions (the goodnessof-fit tests) were not statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits
the data (Pearson y2 = 58.626, df = 59, p-value = .489; Deviance, %L = 63.953, df =
59, p-value = .307). Overall, only 2% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .020) o f the variation
in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Furthermore, with a
chi-square test value o f .130 for the general model and an associated p-value o f .729,
the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis which states that there is no
difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result indicates that the
proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results of the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10. A
Wald statistics of .526 and associated p-value of .468 indicates that the state health
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care expenditure variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the
level o f state government privatization. However, the negative coefficient shows that
the state health care expenditure variable has an inverse relationship with the low level
o f state privatization, which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. The result
nonetheless suggests that the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher
level of state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
Although the model fitting information for the final model is not completely
significant, it can be stated that it approaches significance (%2 = 3.83, d f = 1, p-value =
.066) at .05 level. Nonetheless, the statistical result indicates that the inclusion of the
state pension spending variable in the model did not show an improvement over the
intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were
not statistically significant which indicate that the model adequately fits the data.
(Pearson x2 - 61.846, d f = 63, p-value = .517; Deviance, y(2 = 67.760, df = 63, p-value
= .318). Also about 11% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .107) o f the variation in the
dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. The chi-square test value of
2.128 for the general model and an associated p-value o f . 145 shows that the test of
parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption
is not violated.
The summary Table 4.10 presents the results o f the parameter estimates. A
Wald statistics o f 3.012 and associated p-value of .083 indicates that the state pension
spending variable approached significance at .05 level, but is not quite significant; this
result is for a two-tailed test of significance; however, the hypothesis is directional,
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and the variable state pensions spending is significant at p-value o f .042 (.083 divided
by two) for a one-tailed test. Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficient shows
that the influence o f the state pension spending variable on the level of state
government privatization is in the expected direction as suggested by the hypothesis.
The result thus indicates that the hypothesis is supported. As such, the finding
suggests that states with higher pension spending, compared to states with low pension
spending, have .736 times more chances o f having higher level o f state government
privatization than lower level of privatization.

Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have
lower level of state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal
income.
The results o f the OLR test shows that the model fitting information for the
final model is not significant (x2 = .841, d f = 1, p-value = .359) at .05 level, which
suggests that the state per capita personal income variable did not show an
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chisquare distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model
adequately fits the data. (Pearson y2 = 67.546, d f = 65, p-value = .390; Deviance, y2 73.075, d f = 65, p-value = .230). However, only 2.8% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .028)
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also,
the chi-square test value o f .002 for the general model and an associated p-value
o f .967 shows that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the
proportional odds assumption is retained.
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The summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f the parameter estimates. A Wald
statistics o f .770 and associated p-value o f .380 indicates that the state per capita
personal income variable is not significant. However, the positive sign o f the
coefficient shows that the influence o f state per capita personal income variable on the
level o f state government privatization is in the opposite direction than expected, and
the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
The results o f the model fitting information shows that the model is not
significant (%2 = .077, d f= 1, p-value = .782) at .05 level; this suggests that the state
labor cost variable did not show an improvement over the intercept only model. The
Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically
significant which indicate that the model adequately fits the data. (Pearson y l =
63.317, d f = 63, p-value = .396; Deviance, %2 = 71.067, df = 63, p-value = .227).
Only 0.3% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .003) of the variation in the dependent variable is
explained by the predictor variable. Also, the chi-square test value of .668 for the
general model and an associated p-value o f .414 shows that the test of parallel lines
failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f the parameter estimates. A Wald
statistics o f .092 and associated p-value of .795 indicates that the state labor cost
variable is not significant; and the negative coefficient shows that the state labor cost
variable is inversely related to the level of state government privatization which is in
the opposite direction than expected. The hypothesis is not supported. .
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Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
Overall, the model is not significant (x2 = .351, d f = 1, p-value = .574) at .05
level; the result indicates that the state per capita spending variable did not show an
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chisquare distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model
adequately fits the data. (Pearson j l - 67.711, d f = 65, p-value = .385; Deviance, x2 =
73.601, d f = 65, p-value = .217). Only 1% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .010) of the
variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also, the test
of parallel lines with the chi-square test value of .269 and p-value o f .604 failed to
reject the null hypothesis. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f
.290 and a p-value o f .590 indicate that the state per capita spending variable is not
significant; and. the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
The statistical result shows that the state fiscal capacity variable has a direct
relationship with the dependent variable, which is in the opposite direction than
suggested by the hypothesis above. The influence o f state fiscal capacity variable on
the dependent variable is however insignificant. As shown in Table 4.10, a Wald test
statistics o f .308 with an associated p-value of .579 indicates that fiscal capacity
variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of the level of
privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported. Also, only 1.1% (Nagelkerke
Pseudo R2 = .011) o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the
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predictor variable. Overall, the model is not significant (%2 = .320, d f = 1, p-value =
.572) at .05 level; the result indicates that the state fiscal capacity variable did not
show an improvement over the intercept only model. Similarly, the Pearson and
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating
that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson y2 = 2.027, df = 1, p-value = .154;
Deviance, y2 = 2.016, d f = 1, p-value = .156). Also, the test of parallel lines with the
chi-square test value o f 2.016 and p-value o f .156 failed to reject the null hypothesis
and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.

Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficits are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
The result o f the model fitting information for the final model shows that the
model is not significant (y2 = .906, df - 1, p-value = .341) at .05 level, which suggests
that the state deficits variable did not show an improvement over the intercept only
model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not
statistically significant indicating that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson %2 =
68.636, df = 65, p-value = .355; Deviance, y2 = 73.010, d f = 65, p-value = .232).
However, only 3% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .030) of the variation in the dependent
variable is explained by the predictor variable. Also, the chi-square test value o f .001
for the general model and an associated p-value o f .977 shows that the test of parallel
lines failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not
violated. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f .977 and
associated p-value of .327 indicates that the state deficits variable is not found to be a
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statistically significant predictor o f the level of state government privatization. The
result indicates that the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level o f
state government privatization than states with strong union power.
The model fitting information for the final model is not significant { j l = .042,
d f = 1, p-value = .838) at .05 level. The inclusion o f the state union power variable in
the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson
and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant
suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson %2 = 1.876, df = 1, p-value
= .171; Deviance, j l = 1.893, d f = 1, p-value = .169). Overall, only 1% (Nagelkerke
Pseudo R2 = .001) o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the
predictor variable.

A chi-square test value of 1.893 for the general model and an

associated p-value of .169 indicate that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results of the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10. A
Wald statistics of .042 and associated p-value of .838 indicates that the state union
power variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the level of
state government privatization. However, the negative coefficient shows that the state
union power variable has an inverse relationship with the low level o f state
government privatization which is consistent with the stated hypothesis. The result
nonetheless suggests that the hypothesis is not supported.
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Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization than states with moralistic
political culture.
The model fitting information for the final model is significant (x2 = 6.071, df
= 2, p-value = .048) at .05 level. The inclusion o f the state political culture variable in
the model showed an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant suggesting
that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y2 = .400, df = 2, p-value - .819;
Deviance, y2 = .405, df = 2, p-value = .817). Overall, 18.4 % (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
= . 184) o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor
variable. Furthermore, a chi-square test value o f .405 for the general model and an
associated p-value of .817 indicate that the test o f parallel lines failed to reject the null
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated.
The results o f the parameter estimates are shown in the summary Table 4.10.
With a Wald statistics o f 4.896 and an associated p-value of .027, the individualistic
political culture was found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the level of state
government privatization, but in the opposite direction than expected and the
hypothesis was not supported. The significant result suggests that states with an
individualistic political culture, compared to traditionalistic political culture, have 7.42
times decreased chances of having a higher level o f state government privatization
than a lower level o f state government privatization. Similarly, with a Wald statistics
of 3.624 and associated p-value o f .057, the moralistic political culture approached
significance at .05 level of significance. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported, and
states with a moralistic political culture, compared to traditionalistic political culture,
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have 4.768 times greater chances of having a lower level of state government
privatization than a higher level of state government privatization.

Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level
o f state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
The model fitting information for the final model is not significant (x2 = .451,
d f = 1, p-value = .502) at .05 level. The inclusion of the governor controlling state
government variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept
only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not
statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y l =
.526, df = 1, p-value = .468; Deviance, y l = .528, df = 1, p-value = .467). Overall,
only 1.5% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .015) o f the variation in the dependent variable is
explained by the predictor variable. The test o f parallel lines with a chi-square test
value o f .528 and an associated p-value o f .467 was not found to be significant and
failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is retained.
As shown in the summary Table 4.10, the results of the parameter estimates with a
Wald statistics o f .426 and associated p-value o f .504 indicates that the governor
controlling state government is not found to be statistically significant, and the
hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled
legislature.
The model fitting information for the final model was not significant (y l =
.152, d f = 2, p-value = .927). The inclusion of the party controlling state legislature
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variable in the model did not improve the intercept only model. The Pearson and
deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating
that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y l = .264, d f = 2, p-value = .876;
Deviance, y l = .264, d f = 2, p-value = .876). Overall, only .5% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
= .005) o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor
variable. The test o f parallel lines with a chi-square test value of .264 and an
associated p-value o f .876 was not found to be significant and failed to reject the null
hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption was not violated; the summary Table
4.10 shows the results o f the parameter estimates. With a Wald statistics o f .003 and
associated p-value o f .953, the Republican Party was found to be insignificant
compared to the split control. Similarly, with a Wald statistics of .083 and a p-value of
.773, the Democratic Party was insignificant compared to a split control. Therefore,
the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have
higher level of state government privatization than states with liberal government
policy.
The result o f the model fitting information for the final model shows that the
model is not significant (y l = .246, d f = 1, p-value = .620) at .05 level, which suggests
that the inclusion o f state (government) policy liberalism variable in the model did not
show an improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance
statistics chi-square distributions were not statistically significant indicating that the
model fits the data adequately (Pearson y l = 68.658, d f = 61, p-value = .234;
Deviance, y l = 73.670, d f = 61, p-value = .128), but only .8% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2
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= .008) o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor
variable. As shown in the summary Table 4.10, a Wald statistics o f .263 and
associated p-value o f .608 indicates that the state (government) policy liberalism
variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of the level of
privatization which also indicates that the hypothesis is not supported.
However, with a chi-square test value of 7.024 and an associated p-value
of .008, the test o f parallel lines was significant, which indicates that the null
hypothesis is rejected and the proportional odds assumption is violated. A multinomial
regression was run to test the hypothesis, but the variable failed to achieve statistical
significance and the result is similar to that for ordinal logistic regression; therefore
the result o f the ordinal logistic analysis is retained.

Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
The result o f the model fitting information for the final model was not
significant (y l = .223, d f = 1, p-value = .637) at .05 level, which suggests that the
inclusion o f the state ideology variable in the model did not show an improvement
over the intercept only model. But the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square
distributions were not statistically significant which indicate that the model fits the
data adequately (Pearson y l = .309, d f = 1, p-value = .578; Deviance, y l = .307, df =
1, p-value = .580). Overall, only 0.7% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .007) of the variation
in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable. The test o f parallel
lines with a chi-square test value o f .307 and an associated p-value of .580 was not
found to be significant and failed to reject the null hypothesis and the proportional
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odds assumption was not violated. Also, the summary Table 4.10 shows the results o f
the parameter estimates. With a Wald statistics o f -.316 and associated p-value of .641,
the state ideology variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor o f the
level o f privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower
level o f state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
The statistical result shows that the state institutional capacity variable has a
negative relationship with the dependent variable as expected, but its influence on the
dependent variable was insignificant. As shown in the summary Table 4.10 below, a
Wald test statistics o f .015 and an associated p-value o f .902 suggest that the state
institutional capacity variable is not found to be a statistically significant predictor of
the level of state government privatization, and the hypothesis is not supported. The
model fitting information also shows that the final model that included the predictor
variable was not significant; this suggests that the inclusion of the state institutional
capacity variable in the model did not show an improvement over the intercept only
model. Likewise, the goodness-of-fit test result shows that the model fits the data
adequately; the Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not
statistically significant (Pearson y l = 68.108, df = 65, p-value = .372; Deviance, y l =
73.901, d f = 65, p-value = .210). However, only .1% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .001)
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variable.
The test o f parallel lines turned out to be significant with a chi-square test
value o f 4.192 and an associated p-value o f .041. The result suggests that the null
hypothesis is rejected and the proportional odds assumption is violated. A multinomial
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regression was run to test the hypothesis for state institutional capacity variable, but
the test failed to achieve statistical significance as predictor of the level o f state
government privatization. Therefore, the ordinal logistic regression result is retained.

Table 4.10
Bivariate Ordinal Logistic Regression: Parameter Estimates of Independent
Variables
Hypotheses

V ariable

0

S.E.

W ald

df

Sig.

Exp(0)

HI

Health Care Spending

-.193

.268

.526

.468

.824

H2

Per-Capita Personal Income

.065

.075

.770

.380

1.067

H3

Pension Spending

-.306

.176

3.012

H4

Labor Cost

-.024

.092

.068

.795

.976

H5

Per-Capita Spending

-.023

.043

.290

.590

.977

H6

Fiscal Capacity (High)

-.363

.653

.308

.579

.696

H7

State Deficit

-.029

.029

.977

.323

.971

H8

State Union Law (weak)

-1.30

.634

.042

.838

.273

Political Culture (Ind.)

2.004

.905

4.896

7.42

Political Culture (Mor.)

1.562

.821

3.624

.027*
**
.057

4.768

Governor o f State Govt.(R)

.426

.638

.447

.504

1.531

Party Cont. State Legist. (R)

.046

.770

.003

.953

1.047

Party Cont. State Legist (D)

-.251

.870

.083

.773

.778

H12

Policy Liberalism

.188

.367

.263

.608

1.207

H13

State (Citizens) Ideology

-.316

.677

.217

.641

.729

H14

Institutional Capacity

.022

.178

.015

.902

1.022

H9
H10

.083

.736

H ll

* Significant at .05 level (two-tailed); ** significant at .05 level (one-tailed).
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Multivariate Analyses

This section reports the results o f the four comparative models (socioeconomic,
economic, political, and ideology) and a fifth model of best fit that combined all the
significant predictor variables from each o f the four models. As noted, the level of
state government privatization is the dependent variable and is coded with three
ordinal levels: 0 = low, 1 = medium, 2 = high. However, since OLR takes the highest
number as a reference category be default, the dependent variable is recoded to 0 =
high, 1 = medium, and 2 = low for ease o f interpreting the ordinal logistic regression
analysis.
Before constructing each factor model, correlation analysis was performed for
the interval/ratio level independent variables. The results o f the correlation analysis
did not reveal serious problem o f multicollinearity (where r = >.80). While there is no
serious multicollinearity among the independent variables, a close examination o f the
correlation results shows the existence o f low to moderate correlations between some
of the independent variables. As shown in Table 4.11 below, the following variables
have low to moderate correlations.
The state deficit (SDEF) variable is negatively correlated with a relatively low
level o f significance with the state health care spending (SHCS) variable (r = -.367,
p< .05). The state (government) policy liberalism (SPL) variable is positively
correlated with the per capita personal income (SPCPI) variable with a relatively low
level o f significance (r = .376, p < .05), the state per capita spending (SPCS) variable
with a relatively modest level of significance (r = .460, p<.01), and the state
institutional capacity (SIC) variable with a relatively modest level o f significance (r
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=.597, p<.01). In addition, state institutional capacity variable is slightly significantly
correlated positively with state per-capita personal income (r = .441, p < .01), and
negatively with the state labor cost (SLC) (r = -.393, p < .05).

Table 4.11
Correlations Matrix: Quantitative Independent Variables
Health
Care
Spending %
Expend.
Health Care
Spending %
Expend.

PerCapita
Personal
Income

Labor
Pension
Spending Cost %
% Expend Expend

PerDeficit %
Capita
Expend
Spending

Policy
Libera
lism

Institu
tional
Capacity

1

Per-Capita
Personal
Income

.139

1

Pension
Spending %
Expend

-.093

.198

1

Labor
Cost %
Expend

.023

-.258

-.034

1

Per-Capita
Spending

-.122

-.034

-.117

-.077

1

Deficit %
Expend

-.367*
(.05)

-.016

.268

.040

.148

1

Policy
Liberalism

.198

.376*
(.05)

.092

-.119

.460**
(.01)

.032

1

Institutional
Capacity

.268

.441**
(.01)

-.100

-.393*
(.05)

.157

-.020

.597**
(.01)

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed).
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Results of the Model Analyses

The ordinal regression results of each of the four factor models and the model of best
fit are presented below.

Socioeconomic M odel

The socioeconomic model examined the joint effects of state healthcare
expenditure, state pension expenditure, and state per capita personal income variables.
The model fitting information (the likelihood ratio) provided a chi-square test value of
7.155 with an associated p-value o f .067 for the final model (the model that included
the three predictor variables) and approached significance at .05 level o f significance,
two-tailed test. However, the hypothesis is directional, and the model is significant
with a p-value o f .034 at.05 level o f significance, one-tailed test. The result indicates
that the combined model is better than the intercept only model. The Pearson and
deviance statistics chi-square distributions (the goodness-of-fit tests) were not
statistically significant suggesting that the model adequately fits the data (Pearson y2 =
63.516, df = 63, p-value = .458; Deviance, y2 = 66.761, d f = 63, p-value = .349).
Overall, 21.4% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .214) o f the variation in the dependent
variable is explained by the predictor variables included in the model. Furthermore,
with a chi-square test value of 2.129 for the general model and an associated p-value
o f .546, the test of parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis which states that
there is no difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result
indicates that the proportional odds assumption is not violated. As shown in Table
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4.12 below, only state pension spending is significant by controlling for health care
spending and per capita income variables.

Table 4.12
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Socioeconomic Model

(Estimate)

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

ExpGS)
ODDS
RATIO

Health Care Spending

-0.343

.284

1.465

1

.226

.709

Pension Spending

-0.423

.195

4.717

1

.030*

.655

Per-Capita Income

0.122

.080

2.319

1

.128

1.129

J8

Variable

R2 = .214; * P <05

Economic M odel

The economic model examined the joint effects o f state labor cost, state per
capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state deficits variables. The likelihood ratio
chi-square test value o f 8.556 with an associated p-value o f .073 indicate that the
model approached significance at .05 level, two-tailed test, but it is unambiguously
significant for a one-tailed test. The result suggests that the combined model is an
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chisquare distributions were not statistically significant suggesting that the model
adequately fits the data (Pearson y l = 69.723, d f = 62, p-value = .234; Deviance, y l =
65.360, d f = 62, p-value = .361). Overall, about 25% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .251)
of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variables
included in the model. Furthermore, a chi-square test value of 2.129 for the general
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model and an associated p-value o f .546 indicate that the test of parallel lines failed to
reject the null hypothesis and the proportional odds assumption is not violated. As
shown in Table 4.13 below, state per capita spending, state fiscal capacity, and state
deficit turned out to be significant when each is evaluated by controlling for the other
three variables in the model.

Table 4.13
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Economic Model

0
Variable

(Estim ate)

S.E.

W ald

df

Sig.

ExpfiS)
ODDS
R A TIO

Labor Cost

-.062

.097

.402

1

.526

.939

Per-Capita Spending

.180

.078

5.391

1

.020*

1.197

-3.714

1.470

6.383

1

.012*

.024

.100

.045

4.874

1

.027*

1.105

Fiscal Capacity (High)
Deficit
R2 = .251; *P< 0 5

Political M odel

The political model examined the joint effects o f four variables: state union
laws, state political culture, the party o f governor controlling state government, and
the party controlling state legislature. The likelihood ratio chi-square test value o f
8.963 and a p-value o f . 176 for the final model suggest that the combined model is not
better than the intercept model. However, the model fits the data adequately (Pearson
X2 = 30.346, d f = 30, p-value = .448; Deviance, y2 = 34.995, df = 30, p-value = .243),
and about 26% (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .261) o f the variation in the dependent
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variable is explained by the predictor variables included in the model. The test o f
parallel lines with a chi-square test value o f 10.077 and an associated p-value o f .121
is insignificant and failed to reject the null hypothesis, and the proportional odds
assumption is not violated. As shown in Table 4.14 below, only the political culture
variable (both individualistic and moralistic) is significant by controlling for the other
predictor variables included in the model.

Table 4.14
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Political Model

(Estimate)

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(iS)
ODDS
RATIO

Union Laws (Weak)

.575

.857

.450

1

.502

1.777

Political Culture (Individualistic)

3.120

1.212

6.621

1

.010*

22.646

Political Culture (Moralistic)

2.236

1.099

4.136

1

.042*

9.356

Party of Governor (R)

.626

.772

.656

1

.418

1.870

Party Controlling Legislature (R)

.606

.989

.376

1

.540

1.833

Party Controlling Legislature (D)

1.474

1.128

1.908

1

.191

4.367

P

Variable

R2 = .261; *P<05

Ideology M odel

The ideology model examined the joint effects o f state (government) policy
liberalism, state (citizens) ideology, and state institutional variables. With a likelihood
ratio chi-square test value of 1.052 and an associated p-value of .789, the model turned
out to be insignificant, suggesting that the combined model did not show an
improvement over the intercept only model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-
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square distributions were not statistically significant, which indicates that the model
fits the data adequately (Pearson y2 = 70.407, df = 63, p-value = .244; Deviance, &2 =
72.864, d f = 63, p-value = .185). Overall, only 3.4 % (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .034)
o f the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor variables in the
model. However, with a chi-square test value of 16.401 and an associated p-value
o f .001, the test o f parallel lines rejected the null hypothesis which states that there is
no difference in the coefficients across response categories. The result thus indicates
that the proportional odds assumption is violated. Furthermore, as shown in Table
4.15 below, all the variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical
significance.

Table 4.15
Ordinal Logistic Regression: Ideology Model

0
(Estim ate)

S.E.

W ald

df

Sig

Exp(0)
ODDS
R A TIO

State Policy Liberalism

-.446

.512

.759

1

.384

.640

State Ideology (Conservative)

-.711

.797

.796

1

.372

.491

State Institutional Capacity

.031

.224

.019

1

.890

1.031

V ariable

R2 = .034

M odel o f Best Fit

The chi-square test value o f 17.764 and an associated p-value o f .007 indicates
that the combined model o f best fit showed an improvement over the intercept only
model. The Pearson and deviance statistics chi-square distributions were not
statistically significant, indicating that the model fits the data adequately (Pearson %2 =
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64.364, d f = 60, p-value = .326; Deviance, y2 = 56.153, df = 60, p-value = .617). Also,
with a chi-square test value of 7.157 and an associated p-value o f .307, the test of
parallel lines failed to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the proportional odds
assumption is not violated. Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.16 below, in the
combined model o f best fit, state pension spending (Wald = 5.359, p = .021), and state
fiscal capacity (Wald = 5.595, p = .018), were significant in the expected direction..
Also, state deficits (Wald = 4.775, p = .029), and individualistic political culture
(Wald = 3.901, p = .048) were significant, but in the opposite direction than expected..
But the moralistic political culture and the state per-capita spending variables were
insignificant in the combined model of best fit. Overall, about 46% (Nagelkerke
Pseudo R2 = .459) o f the variations in the dependent variable is explained by the
model o f the best fit, which is much higher than the variations explained by each o f
the four previous models.

Table 4.16
Ordinal Logistic Regression Model: Model of Best Fit
P

Exp (0)
ODDS
RATIO

(Estimate)

s.E.

Wald

Pension Spending

-.502

.217

5.359

.021*

.605

Per-Capita Spending

.140

.084

2.777

.096

1.150

-3.587

1.516

5.595

.018*

.028

.112

051

4.775

.029*

1.119

Political Culture (Individualistic)

2.019

1.022

3.901

.048*

7.531

Political Culture (Moralistic)

1.034

.954

1.175

.278

2.812

Variable

Fiscal Capacity(High)
Deficit

R2 = .459; *P <05

df

Sig.
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Chapter Summary

The introduction section of this chapter laid out the statistical tests to be
performed and the order in which the results would be presented. Accordingly, the
first section provided the results of the data diagnostic test followed in the second
section by the report o f the frequencies and descriptive statistics that included
univariate and bivariate statistics and individual hypotheses tests. The third section
presented the multivariate analyses o f the four state comparative models.
The data diagnostic analysis showed one missing value and one outlier, and
these problems were corrected for subsequent bivariate and multivariate analyses. The
crosstab analysis revealed the existence o f strong relationships between the state fiscal
capacity categories and the level of state government privatization, as measured by
Sommer’s d coefficient value of .543; but for most of the states, the relationships were
in the opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship. Similarly,
state union law categories were found to have very strong relationships with the level
o f state government privatization, as measured by Somer’s d coefficient value of .921.
Overall, for the majority of states, the relationships were in the opposite direction than
expected.
However, with Cramer’s V value o f .214, the relationships between the state
political culture categories and the level o f state government privatization were found
to be weak. Also, the Cramer’s V value of .686 showed the existence o f strong
relationships between the categories o f the party o f governor controlling state
government and the level o f state government privatization. As measured by the
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Cramer’s V value o f .994, the relationships between the party controlling state
legislature categories and the level o f state government privatization were very strong.
The relationships between the state ideology categories and the level o f state
government privatization were also very strong as measured by the Cramer’s V value
of.896. The results o f the hypotheses tests for individual variables revealed that all the
variables, with the exception of state pension spending and individualistic political
culture, were insignificant. The state pension spending variable was significant at .05
levels o f significance in one-tailed test in the expected direction. The individualistic
political culture was also significant, but in the opposite direction than expected. The
hypotheses and the test results are summarized in Table 4.17 below.
Also, the multivariate analyses of the socioeconomic, economic, political, and
ideology models and a model of best fit were examined. The results revealed that the
socioeconomic model was better than the intercept/base model, and explained about
21 .4% o f variations in the dependent variable. The economic model also showed an
improvement over the intercept/base model, and explained 25% o f the variations in the
dependent variable. However, both the political model and the ideology model were
not better than the intercept/base only model; the political model explained about 29%
o f the variations in the dependent variable, but only 3.4% o f the variations in the
dependent variable were explained by the ideology model. Furthermore, a combined
model o f best fit that included the significant variables from the previous four models
was run. The combined model was significant and showed an improvement over the
intercept/base model and explained about 46% o f the variance in the dependent
variable.
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Table 4.17
Summary of the Hypotheses Testing and Findings
Hypotheses

Test Result

Supported/Not
Supported

1

States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to
have higher level o f state government privatization than
states with lower health care expenditures.

Insignificant

Not Supported

2

States with higher pension spending are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states
with lower pension spending.

Significant

Supported

3

States with higher per capita personal income are more likely t( Insignificant
have lower level o f state government privatization than states
with lower per capita personal income.

Not Supported

4

States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher
level of state government privatization than states with lower
labor costs.

Insignificant

Not Supported

5

States with higher per capita spending are more likely to
have higher level o f state government privatization than
states with lower per capita spending.

Insignificant

Not Supported

6

States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have
lower level of state government privatization than states
with lower fiscal capacity

Insignificant

Not Supported

7

States with higher deficit are more likely to have higher level
o f state government privatization than states with lower
deficits.

Insignificant

Not Supported

8

States with weak union power are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with
strong union power

Insignificant

Not Supported

9

States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are
more likely to have higher level o f state government
privatization than states with moralistic political culture.

Significant

Not Supported

10

States with Republican governors are more likely to have
higher level of state government privatization than states
with Democratic governors

Insignificant

N ot Supported

11

States with Republican-controlled legislatures are more
likely to have higher level o f state government privatization
than states with Democratic-controlled legislatures.

Insignificant

N ot Supported
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Table 4.17 Continued

Hypotheses

Test Result

Supported/Not
Supported

12

States with conservative policy (government ideology) are
more likely to have higher level of state government
privatization than states with liberal policy

Insignificant

Not supported

13

States with conservative state ideology (citizens’ ideology)
are more likely to have higher level o f state privatization than
states with liberal state ideology.

Insignificant

Not Supported

14

States with high institutional capacity are more likely to have
lower level o f state government privatization than states with
low institutional capacity

Insignificant

Not Supported
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Introduction

This study examined the factors that influence the level o f state government
privatization. Chapter IV reported the results of the statistical analyses that included
frequencies, descriptive statistics, bivariate and multivariate analyses. This chapter
presents a summary o f the study, summary and discussion o f the findings, policy
implications, limitations and delimitations, contribution o f this study, as well as
recommendations for future study and the conclusion.

Summary o f the Study

This study attempted to answer the research question: What factors predict the
level o f state government privatization? The survey conducted by the Council o f State
Governments (CSG) in 2002 provided the data for the dependent variable, which was
constructed based on the responses of state agency heads to the CSG’s question: “How
many services and programs in your agency are currently privatized?” The responses
were ordinal in nature, and the dependent variable was transformed and recoded with
three ordinal levels o f low, medium, and high. The literature review guided the
selection o f the factors that were thought to be the likely drivers o f the amount of
privatization that state governments undertake. As such, socioeconomic, economic,
political, and ideological factors were theorized as having considerable influences on
the level of state government privatization, and fourteen hypotheses were tested. Also
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four models were developed and tested and analyzed using quantitative method.
Specifically, data for eight quantitative and six categorical variables were compiled
and analyzed for each o f the final 34 states included in this study.
After the data were collected, assembled, and cleaned, bivariate and
multivariate analyses were conducted. Correlation and crosstab statistics were
performed on quantitative and categorical variables respectively, and ordinal logistic
regression was employed for the multivariate analysis to answer the overarching
research question o f this study, namely, what factors predict the level o f state
government privatization? The purpose was achieved by developing and testing
fourteen hypotheses and examining four models: socioeconomic, economic, political,
and ideology models. A fifth model of best fit that included five significant variables
from the four models was run to determine the variables that reemerge as significant
predictors o f the level o f state government privatization (the dependent variable).

Summary and Discussion of the Findings

Fourteen hypotheses were developed and tested using ordinal logistic
regression to answer the overarching question: What factors predict the level o f state
government privatization? The bivariate ordinal regressions indicated that only two
(state pension spending and state political culture) of the 14 explanatory variables
were found to have statistically significant associations with the level o f state
government privatization (the dependent variable), but individualistic political culture
was significant in the opposite direction than expected; thus only state pension
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spending hypothesis was supported. These results are summarized and discussed
below.

Hypothesis 1: States with higher health care expenditures are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with lower health care
expenditures.
The statistical results failed to support this hypothesis. As indicated in the
review o f the literature, state policymakers sought to reform health care services to
control the rising costs as well as to expand access to citizens (Dye, 1998); as a result
many states privatized some of their health care services as a cost saving mechanism
(Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004). But the hypothesis in this study was not supported
perhaps because the negative impact of health care expenditure on state fiscal
conditions might have been mitigated by the support states receive from the federal
government.
The data used for the state health care expenditure variable are the aggregate
expenditure on health care services, and does not distinguish between Medicaid and
other types o f services that states might be providing to their citizens. However, it is
commonly known that Medicare is designed for the aged (elderly) and is directly
under the purview o f the federal government; whereas, in the case o f Medicaid, both
the federal and state governments share the financial burden of the program; that is,
the federal government is responsible for about half o f the cost o f the program (Dye,
1998). Moreover, since the program (Medicaid) was designed for the needy or poor
people, some politicians, advocates for the poor, and other interest groups might have
expressed concerns that the recipients o f the benefits might not be well served by
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private providers; as such, policymakers might have recognized the need to exercise
caution in terms o f engaging in large scale privatization o f health care services to
avoid undesirable social and political consequences. This reasoning perhaps explains
why there were fewer services privatized in the Health and Human Services (HHS)
category compared to corrections, education, and transportation categories.

Hypothesis 2: States with higher pension spending are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with lower pension spending.
This hypothesis was supported by both the bivariate and multivariate analyses.
The review of the literature revealed that the majority of public pension plans is
underfunded or unfunded and has constrained states’ ability to finance their public
pensions and health care expenditures (CSG, 2007). As a response to the growing
fiscal crises, state officials have been engaged, among other things, in the privatization
o f services when feasible (CSG, 2007; Edwards, 2010). The result o f this statistical
test supports the hypothesis that pension spending is indeed positively and
significantly associated with the level o f state government privatization. Although the
state employee pension system has been designed to alleviate the financial hardships
o f retirees and has been an integral part o f state programs since the Great Depression
(Boivie and Almeida, 2009; Munnell, Aubry, and Muldoon, 2008), the result o f this
study suggests that the growth in pension spending may require state policymakers to
rethink their priorities and focus their attention on alleviating the fiscal crises.
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Hypothesis 3: States with higher per capita personal income are more likely to have
lower level o f state government privatization than states with lower per capita personal
income.
This hypothesis was not supported. The result is consistent with previous studies
that examined the impact of per capita income on state policy making in general and
privatization policy in particular (Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005).
For example, in their study o f the determinants o f state prison privatization decisions,
Price and Riccucci (2005) found per capita personal income not to be a significant
determinant of prison privatization decision.
In this study, the result o f insignificant association between per capita personal
income and the level o f state privatization can perhaps be understood in terms of the
pressures that state policymakers face from different groups of citizens. Assuming other
things such as tax collection effort being equal, it can theoretically be argued that states
with higher per capita personal income are more likely to collect more in tax revenue
and are less likely to face financial crises warranting privatization o f services. However,
some scholars have argued that citizens in states with higher per capita personal income
are more likely to demand privatization o f services because they want more choices
(Savas, 1987). It is also possible to argue theoretically that, in states with low per capita
personal income, the need to prevent some people from falling into poverty might have
constrained the desire o f elected state official to privatize most services. It is common
for opponents o f privatization to argue that privatization creates “a harsh state where
only the fittest survive and the poor and sick are left to cope as better they can” (Savas,
1987, p.3). Thus, a multitude o f reasons can be offered to justify the insignificant
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associations between higher per capita personal income and the level o f state
government privatization.

Hypothesis 4: States with higher labor costs are more likely to have higher level o f
state government privatization than states with lower labor costs.
This hypothesis was not supported. Previous empirical studies, at least at local
level, have found that privatization in the form o f contracting out was more prevalent
in cities and towns paying high wages to their own employees (Kodrzycki, 1998). The
privatization trend in the 1980s and 1990s did not resonate well with the public sector
employees because o f their perceived fears o f losing their jobs. This perception might
have mitigated the aggressive demand by public employees for wage and salary
increases, which in turn might have contributed to less aggressive privatization of
services by state governments.

Hypothesis 5: States with higher per capita spending are more likely to have higher
level o f state government privatization than states with lower per capita spending.
The hypothesis was not significant at the bivariate level. In the economic
model, the statistical result was significant by controlling the other predictor variables
in the model. But the significance was in the opposite direction than expected, and the
hypothesis was not supported. Moreover, the significance disappeared in the model of
best fit after controlling for the other variable included in the model.
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Hypothesis 6: States with higher fiscal capacity are more likely to have lower level of
state government privatization than states with lower fiscal capacity.
This predictor was not significant at the bivariate level, and the hypothesis was
not supported; the multivariate analysis indicated that it was significant, but in the
opposite direction than suggested by the hypothesized relationship, indicating that the
hypothesis was not supported. The result appeared to be consistent with previous
studies that have found state fiscal capacity to be insignificant at least in the context of
a single service such as prison privatization (Price and Riccucci, 2005).

Hypothesis 7: States with higher deficit are more likely to have higher level o f state
government privatization than states with lower deficits.
Higher deficit was found to be insignificant in the bivariate analysis. In the
combined economic model and the model o f best-fit, the state deficit variable was
significant when controlled for other predictor variables, but the significance was
inconsistent with the relationship suggested by the hypothesis, which indicates that the
hypothesis was not supported. The failure of the state deficit variable to achieve
statistical significance in the expected direction appear to reject or contradict the
argument in much o f the privatization literature that governments resort to
privatization as a means to reduce costs and to balance their budgets (Henton and
Waldhom, 1984; Chi, 1998; Kettl, 2002; Van Slyke, 2003).

Hypothesis 8: States with weak union power are more likely to have higher level of
state government privatization than states with strong union power.
This hypothesis was not supported by the statistical tests at either the bivariate
or multivariate level. The insignificant result is consistent with some prior studies that
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found state union laws not to be significant predictors o f state privatization decisions
(Price and Riccucci, 2005). The result further suggests that the drive toward
privatization in the 1980s and 1990s might have restrained or reduced the power of
unions to thwart state decisions to privatize services; in this sense it can be concluded
that contemporary privatization serves as a counterweight against activist and
powerful public employee unions and that, as Nicholson-Crotty (2004) observed,
“public employee unions simply do not wield the power over the privatization process
that researchers had previously suspected” (p.53).

Hypothesis 9: States with individualistic/traditionalistic political culture are more
likely to have higher level of state government privatization than states with moralistic
political culture.
This variable was significant at both the bivariate and multivariate levels.
However, the hypothesis was not supported by the results because o f the fact that the
influence was in the opposite direction than suggested by the stated hypothesis. The
moralistic political culture was found to be significant in the expected direction in the
bivariate analysis as well as in the political model; but its significance disappeared in
the model o f best fit after controlling for state pension spending, state per-capita
spending, state fiscal capacity, state deficit, and individualistic political culture. Given
the mixed statistical results, unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn. At best, the
results suggest conducting further empirical investigation.
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Hypothesis 10: States with Republican governors are more likely to have higher level
o f state government privatization than states with Democratic governors.
As indicated in the review of the literature, some scholars argue that
contemporary privatization follows conservative ideology (Ginsberg, 2009; Hodge,
2000), and privatization policy is associated primarily with the Republican governors
who are assumed to promote conservative agendas in government (Sclar, 2000; Savas,
2000; Donahue, 1989). It is therefore hypothesized that states with Republican
governors are more likely to have higher level o f state government privatization.
However, the statistical result failed to support this hypothesis and is consistent with
some of the results o f prior studies that found neither the Republican governor nor the
Democratic governor as having significant effect on the decision to privatize services;
while both Republican and Democratic governors have privatized services, their
decisions whether or not to privatize were less swayed by their respective ideological
beliefs than by pragmatic considerations (see Price and Riccucci, 2005). Likewise, the
failure o f the statistical result in this study is indicative o f the fact that the level o f state
government privatization is not dependent on the party affiliations o f state governors.

Hypothesis 11: States with Republican-controlled legislature are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with Democratic-controlled
legislature.
The result failed to support the hypothesis. The result suggests that party
affiliations, based on the Republican and Democratic configuration, were not
significant. As shown in the literature, at state level, pragmatism appeared to
overshadow political and ideological considerations (Donahue, 1989; Allen, et. al.,
1989). The result also confirmed previous findings that the party controlling state

188
legislature was not a significant predictor of privatization decisions at least in the
context o f prison privatization (Price and Riccucci, 2005).

Hypothesis 12: States with conservative government policy are more likely to have
higher level o f state government privatization than states with liberal government
policy.
The statistical result was not significant at both the bivariate and multivariate
levels, and the hypothesis was not supported. The result in this study contradicted
both the theoretical argument and the empirical evidence in the literature. The review
o f the literature has revealed that the conservative-liberal spectrum or the right-left
cleavage serves as a functional device to categorize government political orientations
and policy proposals (Freire,2008); that is, political motivations figure prominently
when legislators and/or governors consider the adoption o f enabling legislations for
privatization or other policy areas (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). While this argument has
merit on theoretical grounds, the statistical result in this study raises questions about
the validity o f the argument especially when combined with the empirical evidence,
which was found to be insignificant.
For example, previous empirical studies have found that “states are more likely
to privatize their prisons when the government ideology is more conservative as
compared with more liberal” (Price and Riccucci, 2005, p.228), but this result is
contradicted by the findings in the current study. While the comparison made between
the statistical results o f a single privatized program and the aggregate amount of
privatization appears to be somewhat tenuous, it can safely be assumed that the
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comparison does not necessarily alter the fundamental distinction inherent in the
conservative-liberal ideological spectrum.
The failure o f the statistical findings to support the hypothesis has perhaps one
possible explanation which is essentially not dissimilar to the explanations offered in
the preceding two hypotheses (hypotheses 10 and 11). That is, state policymakers are
more likely to take a pragmatic path, and the conservative-liberal cleavage does not
appear to play a significant role in terms o f government decisions regarding the
amount o f privatization that states undertake.

Hypothesis 13: States with conservative state ideology are more likely to have higher
level of state government privatization than states with liberal state ideology.
This hypothesis was not supported by the statistical result, and the findings
supported some prior empirical studies and contradicted others. M any state
comparative studies have utilized state ideology variable to assess state policy
outcomes under varying circumstances (Brudney et al., 2004; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004;
Berry and Berry, 1992; Price and Riccucci, 2005; Soss et al., 2001; Breaux et al.,
2007). For example, Brudney et al. (2004) conducted an empirical investigation o f the
determinants o f state contracting out using variables in their model that included state
ideology variable as developed by Berry et al. (1998). Their findings indicated that the
“political and ideological variables included in the model failed to achieve statistical
significance” (Brudney et al., 2004, p. 413), an outcome supported by the current
study.
On the other hand, studies that examined the factors that motivate state level
privatization decisions in the area o f prison and corrections have found political and
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ideological variables (used as a proxy for state ideology) to be significant (Price and
Riccucci, 2005; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004), an outcome contradicted by the results of
this study. These conflicting results are perhaps a reflection of the differences in the
target or outcome variables; one o f the studies focused on the method o f privatization,
which was contracting out and the other two focused on prison and corrections
privatization. While the current study utilized the same variable that the three studies
mentioned above used, this study is however different from the previous studies
because o f its focus on the aggregate level o f state government privatization; this shift
o f focus from individual program to an aggregated level o f privatization may have
altered the results o f the statistical analysis.

Hypothesis 14: States with higher institutional capacity are more likely to have lower
level of state government privatization than states with lower institutional capacity.
The statistical result failed to support the hypothesis and the finding was not
significant. State institutional capacity variable has been used in empirical studies as
one o f the determinants o f state policy decisions in many areas of public policy
(Travis, Morris, and Morris, 2004). Essentially, the assumption is that state
institutional capacity has the potential to constrain or enhance the ability o f a state
government to adopt and implement the desired program. But there are no prior
studies that have examined the effect o f state institutional capacity on the level o f state
government privatization. In the current study, state institutional capacity variable was
employed in the ideology model as one of the determinants of the level o f state
government privatization, and it was found to be insignificant.
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One possible explanation for the finding to be insignificant is that
implementation of privatization decisions perhaps involves negotiations with outside
contractors or providers, and the task is likely to demand a considerable amount o f
time, resources, staff, and experts; this requires high not low institutional capacity to
undertake time-consuming, back and forth negotiations, bargaining, and writing
complex contracts to avoid or minimize risks that might otherwise affect the
government in the future; when considering scenario o f this nature, it appears
plausible to hypothesize a direct relationship between high institutional capacity and
higher level o f state government privatization. Indeed, the findings of this study
appear to be at variance with the assumption that states with high institutional capacity
have the flexibility and ability to implement programs and provide services without
necessarily adopting a privatization strategy. Thus, as the result indicates, associating
high institutional capacity with lower level of state government privatization and low
institutional capacity with higher level o f state government privatization may not hold
much sway.

Study Implications

In the 1980s and 1990s many states began embracing privatization as a
strategy to deal with their fiscal crises. As indicated in the review o f the literature, by
and large, microeconomic-based theories provided the intellectual rationale for and
informed the development o f privatization policy (Savas, 1987; Sclar, 2000).
Numerous studies point to the superiority o f the private sector (the market system) as
an effective and efficient means of providing goods and services, and the use of
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privatization was justified largely on grounds of economic efficiency (Savas, 1987;
Henton and Waldhom, 1984; Donahue, 1989; Pouder, 1996). Privatization was thus
viewed by state policymakers primarily as a “management issue” devoid o f political
and ideological considerations (Chi, Arnold, & Perkins, 2004, p. 466). As such, state
governments began adopting privatization policy to promote economic efficiency and
to save costs (Donahue, 1989; Allen et al., 1989; GAO, 1997; Price and Riccucci,
2005).
As noted, the belief in the fundamental superiority o f the private sector/the
market system as an engine of economic growth is rooted in microeconomic-based
theories, the philosophical/ideological origin of which is traced to the classical
political and economic thoughts o f the 18th century. The analysis o f the historical
literature in this study established the connection between contemporary privatization
theory and the conservative political and ideological beliefs that dominated the social
and economic thoughts o f the 18th century. While the social, political and economic
realities o f the late 20th century are fundamentally different from that o f the 18th
century, advocates of privatization and in particular some economists of the classical
persuasion appear to be less convinced about the influences of politics and ideology on
the privatization policy. Nevertheless other scholars question the argument that
privatization is undertaken solely for economic reasons and contend that politics and
ideology are also factors that are likely to influence the decisions to privatize services
(Boix, 1997; Morris, 1999; Hodge, 2000; Sclar, 2000).
These competing claims set the background for investigating the drivers of the
level o f state government privatization in this study. As such, this study conducted an
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empirical investigation to determine the extent to which variables related to
socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors influence the level of state
government privatization. The results are discussed and summarized in the preceding
section. The implications are presented below.
In the socioeconomic model, only state pension spending variable was found to
be a statistically significant predictor of the level o f state government privatization in
the expected direction. This variable was also statistically significant in the model of
best fit after controlling for other variables. Many studies have shown that growing
pension liabilities and increasing health care expenditures have exasperated state
budget crises requiring major budget reforms and cuts (Edward, 2010; CSG, 2007).
Given the findings o f this study, policy initiative to privatize some pension programs
is not unwarranted. Identifying areas of state pension programs that can be privatized
to save costs without increasing the financial hardships o f retirees might prove to be
challenging, but it appears to be the desirable course of action from the perspective of
state policymakers.
The results o f the economic model and the model o f best fit showed that most
o f the economic variables had statistically significant influence on the level o f state
government privatization; however, the influences were in the opposite directions
than suggested by the stated hypotheses. The contradictory results in terms o f the
direction of the influence suggest that the hypotheses were not supported. The policy
implications are thus not readily apparent. At best, the findings can be interpreted as
providing tentative support to the argument in the literature that economic factors are
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more likely to influence privatization o f goods and services by state government; the
findings further suggest the need to conduct a follow up study.
The political model failed to demonstrate significant associations between the
political variables and the level o f state government privatization with the exception of
individualistic and moralistic political cultures. The findings of this study showed that
both individualistic and moralistic cultures were significant, but the significance o f the
moralistic culture disappeared in the model of best fit when controlling for other
variables. The significance o f the individualistic political culture was in the opposite
direction than expected and the hypothesis was not supported. Similarly, the results of
the statistical analyses failed to link Republican governors and legislatures to higher
level of state government privatization relative to their Democratic counterparts,
supporting previous studies that state government privatization is rather dependent on
pragmatic consideration than on the party affiliation of the governor and/or legislature
(Donahue, 1989). Also, the results of the political model supported previous findings
that showed that public employee unions do not exert significant influence on
privatization decisions ( Nicholson-Crotty, 2004). In general, the implication o f the
results o f the political model is that political factors are less likely to inform policy
development at least in the area of privatization.
By far, the ideology model appeared to have the weakest explanatory power
with only 3.4% o f the variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the model,
and none o f the predictor variables was found to be significant. The results failed to
link ideology to the level of state government privatization and contradicted previous
empirical studies that found ideology to be significantly associated with privatization
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(see, for example, Price and Riccucci, 2005). The results o f the ideology model
indicate that ideology is less likely to play a significant role in terms o f influencing
policy decisions with regard to privatizing public services.
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that state policymakers are less
likely to be swayed by socioeconomic, political and ideological factors in making
policy decisions at least in the area of privatization. Although the influences of the
significant variables in the economic model were in the opposite direction than
expected, the findings nonetheless provide tentative support to the argument in the
literature that economic factors matter; the implication is that economic factors are
more likely to influence state government privatization decisions.

Limitations and Delimitations o f This Study
Limitations

Limitations are essentially weaknesses that have the potential to limit the
validity of the study (Plichta and Garzon, 2001). This study has limitations that can be
attributed to a number o f factors that include: small sample size, history, confounding
variables, and the secondary nature of the data; these possible limitations are discussed
in detail below.
One o f the limitations o f this study is the small sample size. Sample size is an
important issue because it has the potential to diminish or enhance the validity of the
results (Irby & Lunenburg, 2008). While the sample size required for credible research
depends on the nature o f the study (O’Sullivan, Rassel, & Bemer, 2003), researchers
who seek to undertake state comparative studies are usually constrained by the
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existence o f a maximum sample size o f 50 cases (states) only. In this study, the
problem related to the small sample is essentially two-fold: first, as noted, state
comparative studies normally use 50 states as the maximum sample size, but this study
employed only 34 cases/states for lack o f usable and valid data for the remaining 16
states. The smaller sample size is an obvious weakness that limits the validity and
generalizability o f the results to all the 50 states.
However, in general, the characteristics o f the 16 states were found to be
similar to the characteristics o f the 34 states based on the t-test o f the mean
difference between the two groups that was performed using eight interval/ratio level
data (see Appendix D); the result of the t-test provides limited support to the validity
and generalizability of the results of this study to the 16 states that were not included
in this study as well. Second, many o f the variables used in this study failed to be
significant, and the inadequate sample size may have been a factor in the failure of
those variables to achieve statistical significance; according to Irby & Lunenburg
(2008), “Inadequate sample size.. .can bias the results o f a quantitative study” (p.230).
History may have been another factor limiting the external validity o f this
study because some o f the measures may have changed over time (O ’Sullivan, Rassel,
and Bemer, 2003). While the data for the dependent variable and the 10 independent
variables were from year 2002, data for state political culture, state policy liberalism,
state ideology, and state institutional capacity variables were from 1984, 1993, 1992,
and 1988 respectively; in this case, the reliability o f the measures become questionable
and point to some potential weaknesses o f this study. Although political culture, state
policy liberalism, and state ideology are believed to be fairly consistent for a long
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time, they have nonetheless been shown to change slightly over time (Berry & Berry,
1992). Likewise, state institutional capacity is expected to change over time as well,
but for lack o f recent data, Bowman & Kearney (1988) index has been utilized.
Essentially, this study focused on investigating the factors that influence the
level of state government privatization at a given point in time (2002) and did not
attempt to measure changes over time and was static in nature. Nonetheless, the use of
data from different time periods ranging from nine to eighteen years represented quite
a significant time lag and may have been a factor for the failure o f many o f the
variables to achieve statistical significance in the current study. In addition, state
governors and the majority party in state legislatures can change from one political
party to another in a year or two. If at all one or more changes had taken place
between political parties prior and during the year the CSG conducted its privatization
survey (2002), these changes were not accounted for, and this deficiency may have
been a factor for the party affiliation o f the governor and the party controlling state
legislature variables to be insignificant.
Moreover, confounding variables may have impacted the validity o f the
conclusion o f this study. Events other than the independent variables such as the
behaviors o f politicians and bureaucrats may have limited the validity o f this study.
While spurious results are not suspected in the current study, the rational utility
maximizing behaviors o f politicians and bureaucrats (Buchanan, 1978) are nonetheless
assumed to exist, but their behaviors could not be directly detected, measured, and
assessed in quantitative studies. As such, the indirect influence o f the utility
maximizing behaviors o f the actors many have altered the influences o f some o f the
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measures on the level o f state government privatization. Furthermore, this study used
secondary data from multiple sources and the accuracy o f the data could not be
verified and may have influenced the results of this study in ways that are hard to
detect.

Delimitations

Delimitations are essentially the boundaries that limit the scope o f the
investigation (Plichta and Garzon, 2009). The scope of this study is confined to
investigating the factors that are expected to influence the amount o f privatized
services aggregated by four departments (correction, transportation, education, and
health & human services), and did not attempt to examine specific services or
programs that may have been privatized by each department. Also, as the review of
the literature has indicated, state governments privatize services primarily for
economic reasons, that is, to achieve economic efficiency and cost savings (Donahue,
1989; Allen et al., 1989; GAO, 1997). However, evaluating and analyzing the
privatized services to determine whether or not the stated economic goals were
achieved is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, the current study did not
attempt to look beyond the prescribed one-year time frame.

Contribution of This Study

This study has contributed to state comparative research in general and the
theory and practice in privatization theory in particular in two major ways: First, this
study has taken a macro approach/model that allows investigating the aggregate level
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o f state government privatization as opposed to investigating individual services.
Investigating the aggregate level o f state privatization is one important area that has
received little attention in the literature. Second, the results raise new questions and
provide new information that future researchers can build on. These are explained in
detail below.
First, as indicated in the review o f the literature, competing theoretical
arguments were offered as explanations for the adoption o f privatization policy by
state governments, and a considerable amount o f empirical research has been
conducted either to support or refute the theoretical claims. Many variables with
different social, economic, political, and ideological dimensions were used in a
number o f empirical studies to determine the significant predictors o f state
privatization efforts. Yet, in much o f the empirical research, case studies were largely
the focus of the investigation with the aim o f determining whether or not the services
privatized have achieved the intended goals, be it cost savings, efficiency gains, and/or
quality services. While the focus on single cases is appropriate under certain
circumstance, the approach is less useful in terms o f understanding the factors that
drive the aggregate level o f state government privatization at a macro level.
However, building on the multidimensional approach used in single case
studies, this study adopted a macro level strategy and examined the extent to which
variables related to socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological factors
influence the level o f state government privatization aggregated by departments. No
previous studies have investigated simultaneously a broad range of privatized services
aggregated by corrections, education, transportation, and health and human services
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departments. This approach is the first of its kind and provides an umbrella framework
that can serve as a guide for future research in the area o f privatization; in this sense,
this study is fundamentally different from prior approaches and is an important
contribution to research in state comparative studies.
Second, the results o f this study suggest that further research is warranted.
Essentially, the results o f this study have generally shown the existence of statistically
significant associations between some variables, largely economic variables, and the
level of state government privatization, but the hypotheses were not supported by the
statistical analyses; these conflicting results raise new questions that other researches
may try to answer. Future research can build on the findings of this study and resolve
the conflicting results; this is as an important contribution to the privatization
literature. On the other hand, the findings with regard to the political and ideological
factors provide new information that may serve as a useful contribution to future
research. In general, the political and ideological variables included in this study, with
the exception o f political culture, which was found to have mixed results, were refuted
as having significant influence on the level of state government privatization; this is an
important finding because it provides a less ambiguous general conclusion about the
extent to which political and ideological factors influence the level of state
government privatization. Overall, the findings add to our knowledge base in
privatization theory and contribute to the body o f research and scholarship in public
administration.
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Recommendation for Future Research

This study empirically examined the factors that drive the level o f state
government privatization by developing and testing 14 independent hypotheses and
four state comparative models (socioeconomic, economic, political, and ideological
models) and a model o f best-fit. The bivariate analyses showed that only one o f the 14
hypotheses was found to be statistically significant in the expected direction,
suggesting that the hypothesis was supported. The multivariate analyses showed that
most o f the variables in the economic model were significant, but the hypotheses were
not supported because o f the fact that the significances were in the opposite direction
than suggested by the stated hypotheses. Also, most of the variables in the
socioeconomic, political, and ideology failed to achieve statistical significance. Some
o f the significant variables were in the opposite direction than expected, and a large
part of the variance in the dependent variable (the level of state government
privatization) remained unexplained; this result points to the limitation of this study
and suggests the need to conduct further research. Below are two suggestions for
future research.
First, researchers may build on the current study by conducting new
privatization survey across the 50 states; this provides complete data for all the 50
states and avoids the problems associated with small sample size as was the case in
this study. While this approach is likely to be costly and complex for individual
researchers, it is certainly doable if conducted or sponsored by an institution, such as a
university or other organization. The use of new privatization data that covers all the
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50 states will perhaps shade new lights and fill the gap created by the small sample
size used in the current study.
Second, a research design is one important consideration that needs to be
addressed upfront when conducting future research similar to the current study. It is
commonly known that different research designs can be used to investigate the same
phenomenon and produce similar or different results. This study employed crosssectional quantitative method, which is a static and time bound design, but, as
indicated earlier, the data used for some of the categorical independent variables were
from different time period, which may have weakened the findings of this study.
Cross-sectional design may be suitable to the extent that the data collected are from
the same time period. However, other research designs that allow capturing changes of
variable values over time such as longitudinal design (time-series or panel studies)
may be suitable and may uncover important information that extends or improves the
current study.

Conclusion

The purpose o f this study was to examine the factors that influence the level of
state government privatization. Specifically, this study attempted to answer the
research question: What factors predict the level o f state government privatization?
Literature has shown that privatization is a multidimensional concept with social,
economic, political, and ideological implications. Therefore, to answer the research
question, fourteen hypotheses were developed and tested along with four state
comparative models and a model of best-fit. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were
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conducted, and most o f the economic variables at the multivariate level were found to
be negatively but statistically significant predictors of the level o f state government
privatization; although the negative relationships are inconsistent with the stated
hypotheses and warrant further investigation, the statistically significant results
nonetheless provide limited support to the argument in the literature that state
governments privatize services for pragmatic reasons, that is, to achieve economic
efficiency and cost savings. And the statistically insignificant findings o f most o f the
variables in the socioeconomic, political, and ideology models may be interpreted in
ways that support the views that alleviating the fiscal problems that states face takes
precedence over social, political, and ideological concerns.
A concluding remark that can be inferred from this study but does not speak
directly to the findings is that, political and ideological orientations and social
concerns aside, state policymakers need to promote privatization policies that
encourage the development o f management strategies to achieve the optimal level of
economic efficiencies and cost savings. This could mean looking for alternative
management approaches to the current public-private partnerships. As indicated in the
review of the literature, previous studies have suggested using alternative management
that include fostering in-house competitions, promoting managed competition to
induce efficiency in the public sector by allowing both the public and private sectors
to compete in providing services (Featherstun, Thornton II, and Correnti, 2001), or
using the “public authorities that may take advantage o f private-sector efficiencies
while maintaining public accountability” (Leavitt and Morris, 2004, p. 154).
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
LIST OF OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS
•

Reduce the cost o f government

•

Generate revenue, both by selling assets and then by collecting taxes from them

•

Reduce government debt, for instance, through debt-equity swaps

•

Supply infrastructure or other facilities that government cannot otherwise provide

•

Bring in specialized skills needed for technologically advanced activities

•

Initiate or expand a service quickly

•

Lessen government interference and direct presence in the economy

•

Reduce the role o f government in society (build or strengthen civil society)

•

Accelerate economic development

•

Decentralize the economy and broaden the ownership of economic assets

•

Show commitment to economic liberalization and increase business confidence

•

Promote the development o f capital markets (by creating and selling shares)

•

Attract new foreign and domestic investment and encourage return o f flight capital

•

Satisfy foreign lenders (including international bodies such as the World Bank)

•

Improve living standards

•

Gain popular support (by getting rid o f malfunctioning bureaucracies)

•

Reward political allies

•

Weaken political opponents (for example, labor unions)

Source: Savas, 2000, p. 119-120.
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Appendix B

LIST OF STATES INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

States Included

States Excluded

Arkansas
Arizona
California
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming

Alabama
Alaska
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Virginia
Wisconsin

Alaska had an outlier and was excluded from the data set.
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Appendix C

CASE SUMMARIES: LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH LEVEL OF STATE
GOVERNMENT PRIVATIZATION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Low

M edium

High

Arkansas
California
Idaho
Illinois
Indian
Missouri
Nevada
North Dakota
South Carolina
Utah
Washington
Wyoming

Florida
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Texas
Vermont
West Virginia

Arizona
Georgia
Kansas
Louisiana
New Mexico
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
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Appendix D

A COMPARISON OF THE MEAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 34 STATES
INCLUDED AND THE 16 STATED NOT INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY

V ariables

M ean (n=34)

M ean (n=16)

df

2-tailed
t-test

p-value

State Labor Cost

15.551

15.456

24

0.940

.05

State Health Care Spending

3.416

3.703

24

0.532

.05

State Per-Capita Spending

4292.665

4934.475

18

0.186

.05

State Pension Spending

7.107

8.064

26

0.164

.05

State P er-C apita Personal Income

32885.601

38576.544

19

0.020*

.05

State Deficits

-4.120

-5.734

22

0.721

.05

State Policy Liberalism

-0.165

0.3285

25

0.124

.05

State Institutional Capacity

-0.152

0.331

26

0.439

.05

* Significant at p<= .05
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